Month: November 2011
Arab spring needs economic reform
Economic factors cannot entirely explain the Arab Spring, though they certainly played an important role. Whether positive change ultimately prevails will depend on the economic policies advanced by leaders emerging from revolutions and their counterparts in still stable Arab states.
Yesterday at Carnegie, a panel of economists and political scientists, including Marina Ottaway from Carnegie, Caroline Freund of the World Bank, Masood Ahmed from the IMF, and Undersecretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs Robert Hormats, discussed these issues while Uri Dadush moderated.
There is general agreement that economic conditions did not trigger recent upheaval in the Arab world on their own. On par with other developing countries, macroeconomic indicators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, did not by themselves augur revolution, Hormats points out. Due mainly to what Freund characterizes as regional and international economic segregation, these countries weathered the global recession far better than developed Western states. Of course, as Ahmed reminds us, if economic indicators are disaggregated, this idyll gives way to a gloomier picture of high youth unemployment rates, rampant corruption, and highly stratified inequality. But this problem is as much political as it is economic or demographic, a balance that is visible in the broader contours of the recent revolutions.
Where economic conditions become far more crucial is in the future trajectory of the Arab Spring. Most of the panelists agree that regional instability will keep growth rates and other indicators down for the near future. Oil importing states such as Egypt and Tunisia traditionally received billions in private investment, but large capital outflows are starving these countries of cash. For Ottaway, wariness over accepting loans from international institutions such as the IMF, as was the case in Egypt, only exacerbates this shortage. Freund insists that the World Bank is prepared to help, but isn’t sure that the money will be spent wisely or, as in Libya, is even necessary. Now that countries have exhausted their own resources, as well as loans from GCC neighbors, Ahmed predicts that governments will turn increasingly to the World Bank, IMF, and international markets. Unfortunately, as Hormats interjects, the tragic coincidence of the Arab spring with the European debt crisis and budget cuts in the U.S. may prevent an Arab recovery from resembling that of Eastern Europe after 1989.
However, there are important steps that governments, both inside and outside the region, can take to ensure long-run growth. In line with previous recovery programs, Hormats emphasizes the need to differentiate between stabilization and structural reform. Stabilization of fiscal conditions must come first, and international institutions will have to provide significant financing. Equally important will be shifting subsidies away from energy, which tend to be inefficient and overly concentrated on the middle and upper classes, toward food and other basic necessities. This will help reduce budget deficits to more sustainable levels.
In terms of structural reforms, facilitating intra-regional trade must be a centerpiece. Not only will trade allow countries to exploit comparative advantages, Ahmed points out, but it will also provide the basis for economies of scale that enable new global trade opportunities. Similarly, Fruend adds, attraction to large markets will bring investment from the West and Asia. In light of the failed attempts to create a free trade bloc, Ottaway is skeptical that regional politics will allow for such integration, but she nonetheless supports the plan in theory.
Investing in entrepreneurship will also be crucial. Too often, states favored large corporations run by well-connected individuals over SMEs more representative of the middle class. This was partly a failure of education systems, which did not equip graduates with the skills they needed to be competitive in the modern labor market. But it was also a matter of priorities, both on behalf of regional governments and assistance donors. Governments must abandon the theory that corruption is a source of power and align themselves with the movement towards transparency and accountability. And donors must ensure their funds are directed towards the same purposes.
Structural economic reform will be particularly difficult in the Arab world, since it will require governments to embrace an ideology that helped catalyze revolution in the first place. Mobilizing the private sector will be crucial to future growth, but privatization, especially in Egypt, is precisely what led to corruption and inequality. Freund is nervous that privatization and the private sector have become pejorative terms, and that this will make socialist economic policies politically expedient. Leaders will thus have to convince citizens, as Ahmed argues, that the implementation of economic liberalization, and not the process per se, caused the economic conditions protesters so forcefully rejected.
Crooks, fools and optimists
Discussions of Bosnia tend to rehash a relatively few themes: how the Dayton agreements are flawed, whether the High Representative is still needed, how Bosnians should be preparing the country for European Union membership, what threats of violence and war remain.
Those issues came up at yesterday’s discussion of the Bosnian economy at SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations) with the State Department’s Jennifer Brush, Sarajevo beer magnate Mujo Selimović, the World Bank’s Marco Mantovanelli, former Republika Srpska Finance Minister Svetlana Cenić and Bosnian diaspora entrepreneur Edin Saračević. But the discussion, chaired by Mike Haltzel, focused mainly on the economy and how to fix it.
The bad news. The panel agreed that international funding of the public sector in Bosnia suffers large losses to government corruption. Bosnia is not a good place to start a business, or stay in one. There is a real, even if small, risk of serious violence that would disrupt the economy (including repayment of loans, which some debtors would welcome) and partition the country.
The good news. But the country has a good pre-war business history, when several Bosnian companies became world-class competitors. And there are ample opportunities in post-war Bosnia to get a good return on investment: hydro power, organic food production, information technology. The labor force learns quickly and thoroughly. The well-educated, successful diaspora can be helpful–some may return, others may help with international marketing of Bosnian good and services. Few of them care much about ethnic divisions.
Foreign investors are looking for stability, which NATO membership would certify, and improved local institutions, in particular for rule of law. Political divisiveness and lack of a unified economic space are drags on the economy.
What Bosnia needs is to shift from an economic model based on internationally financed domestic consumption to one based on investment and private sector exports. International budget support to the various levels of Bosnian government is no longer appropriate, unless there is a serious risk of systemic failure. The international financial institutions (IFIs) should be shifting to private sector loans, leaving the governments to obtain financing from taxpayers and focusing IFI efforts on export-oriented entrepreneurs. They in turn will mobilize ordinary Bosnians, who are tired of the “techno-beat” of ethnic identity (Serb, Croat, Muslim, Serb, Croat, Muslim) and interested in pursuing jobs and improved living conditions.
It was suggested that Bosnia divides people among crooks, fools and optimists. I don’t count myself a crook and I am certainly not an optimist, so I guess I must be a fool. But if I were in charge I would shut off the tap of money flowing from the internationals to Bosnian governments and get it moving in the private sector direction. Let the governments get their money from taxes, and suffer the accountability that follows from that.
Nuclear cabal
The big news today is Iran’s progress towards nuclear weapons. The reports are based on information reported to have been given to the UN-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which administers the Non-proliferation Treaty (Iran is a “state party”).
It is the people who gave the information to the IAEA who seem to have leaked the information, which includes details of Iranian efforts not only to obtain the necessary highly enriched uranium but also to learn how to detonate a nuclear weapon. Foreign assistance from Russia, Pakistan and North Korea is alleged to be involved.
I have no reason to doubt the assertions, but no confirmation either. The IAEA will not necessarily publish its findings later this week with all the spin that accompanies today’s revelations. It is often more cautious than the Americans like, and presumably today’s leaks are an effort to box the IAEA into taking a hard line.
For what purpose? My best guess is that the Americans are trying to get the Security Council to go along with ratcheting up the sanctions on Tehran. While there has been audible saber-rattling from Israel the last few days, I don’t think we can expect that to happen in the lead-up to a real attack. Israel needs tactical surprise to pull it off. The rumbling from Israel is also preparation for tougher sanctions, I imagine.
The most interesting aspect of the reports today is the part about foreign assistance. Those in charge of nonproliferation policy in my past often assumed that no state with nuclear weapons would consciously help another get them. That assumption has evaporated. We seem to have a kind of nuclear cabal willing to do things thought anathema in the past.
Patriotism, not treason
I surprised a Kosovar visitor this morning with an idea I thought I had published long ago but now can’t find on peacefare: Pristina should be represented in Belgrade. So if I have already mentioned it, please excuse the repetition.
If not, here is my thinking.
I would never want to negotiate with a foreign state in whose capital I am not represented. Why? Because it is important to understand the political dynamics there. Even if we are the direst of enemies, there will be a range of political views, with some leaning more in directions I might find useful than others. Having a representative there will help me to understand at least this much: how not to strengthen my enemies. I might even find some allies, especially if I couch my desires in the right terms.
Take Belgrade, for example. Most of the Serbian political spectrum is rock solid in public in wanting sovereignty over Kosovo. There are some who openly disavow that goal, but many more who realize it is not compatible with Serbia’s own ambitions to join the European Union. It is in part a matter of priorities: Serbia has limited resources (especially financial) and needs to limit its commitments. That is why it concurred in Kosovo joining the IMF and World Bank, enabling Serbia to get out from under the obligation to pay some arrears. There are today lots of people in Belgrade who would like more transparency and accountability for Serbia’s subsidies to Serbs in Kosovo. Which is what Pristina should want too. So screaming foul about the subsidies is likely not going to be as effective as calling for transparency and accountability, an objective at least some in Belgrade share.
But would Belgrade agree to Kosovo representation? I don’t know. But I do know that Serbia maintains state institutions inside Kosovo. Reciprocity is the heart of state-to-state relations: if Kosovo regards itself as sovereign and independent, it should ask for representation inside Serbia.
Of course Serbia may say “no,” since it does not regard Kosovo as sovereign and independent. Pristina can’t evict the Serbian institutions, because they are located in the Belgrade-controlled north. A better course would be to accept an unofficial office in Belgrade, one opened by a Kosovar nongovernmental organization. The head would need to be an Albanian who speaks native Serbian and can appear publicly and informally as a spokesman and defender of the Kosovo institutions, just as the Serbian institutions in north Kosovo do for Belgrade.
Belgrade might want that non-office office to be located outside the capital. That’s fine: it should then be in the Albanian-majority Presevo valley. Belgrade won’t like that, but if it refuses, it embarrasses itself.
The real problem with this idea is not Belgrade’s attitude–which we don’t know yet–but rather the Albanians. I am reliably told that it would be hard to find someone to go to Belgrade, since that would be regarded as treasonous. This is of course absurd: representing your country in a hostile capital is patriotism, not treason.
Boren graduate fellowships
Boren Fellows represent a variety of academic and professional disciplines, but all are interested in studying less commonly taught languages, including but not limited to Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian and Swahili. For a complete list of languages, click here.
Boren Fellowships are funded by the National Security Education Program (NSEP), which focuses on geographic areas, languages, and fields of study deemed critical to U.S. national security. Applicants should identify how their projects, as well as their future academic and career goals, will contribute to U.S. national security, broadly defined. NSEP draws on a broad definition of national security, recognizing that the scope of national security has expanded to include not only the traditional concerns of protecting and promoting American well-being, but also the challenges of global society, including sustainable development, environmental degradation, global disease and hunger, population growth and migration, and economic competitiveness.
To view the Program Basics of the Boren Fellowships, click here.
This week’s “peace picks”
Very busy calendar the first part of the week. Remember there may be registration and RSVP requirements not cited here. Best to check on the respective web pages.
1. The EU-brokered Negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia: Challenges and Prospects, Woodrow Wilson Center, November 7, 12-1 pm
Nearly three and a half years after Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, the EU is bringing both sides back to the negotiation table. This meeting will address: why Serbian and Kosovar governments are negotiating now?; what is the nature, format and context of these negotiations, and what are the goals that the EU hopes to achieve?
Jovan Teokarevic, associate professor of political science at the University of Belgrade will compare the current negotiations with those that had been unsuccessfully brokered by the UN and describe the strategies; and tactics used by both sides; and the role of international actors – the EU, the US, NATO, EULEX–in this process. A number of possible outcomes will be presented and discussed, including the types of negotiations that might be developed in the future. Most importantly, Teokarevic will address the need for a sustainable solution for the Serbian enclave in northern Kosovo, which would be part of a general reconciliation between Serbians and Kosovar Albanians.
2. Economic Development in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Absence of Government and Its Consequences, SAIS, Bernstein-Offit 500, November 7, 2-4 pm
We hope you will be able to join us for this timely and informative discussion. Please RSVP to ktimlin@csis.org.
Dr. Mart Laar,
Minister of Defense, Estonia
Mr. William J. Lynn III
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
Panel Presentations by:
Dr. Martin Libicki,
Senior Management Scientist, RAND Corporation
Col. Ilmar Tamm,
Director, Collective Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
Mr. Dmitri Alperovitch,
President, Asymmetric Cyber Operations, LLC
Ms. Michele Markoff,
Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Stephen Flanagan,
Henry A. Kissinger Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Frank Kramer,
Member of the Board, the Atlantic Council
Closing Remarks:
Dr. James Miller,
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
Eric Schmitt
Terrorism Correspondent, The New York Times
and
Thom Shanker
Pentagon Correspondent, The New York Times
Introductory Remarks by
H. Andrew Schwartz
Senior Vice President, CSIS External Relations
Moderated by
Thomas M. Sanderson
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS Transnational Threats Project
Tuesday, November 8, 5:00 p.m. – 6:30 p.m.
1800 K Street, NW, CSIS B1 Conference Center
A reception will begin at 5:00 p.m. with light refreshments and snacks. The event will begin at 5:30 p.m. Books will be available for purchase. RSVP required for admission.
While the death of Muammar Gaddafi and the virtual collapse of his regime forces have freed Libyans from more than four decades of tyranny, it has also complicated the security situation for their neighbors in the Maghreb and Sahel. Fighters loyal to the deposed dictator have taken refuge abroad and, as cross-border attacks they have carried out from Algeria show, still pose a threat, not only to the new government in Tripoli, but to regional stability. Moreover, there is the question of the impact that the arrival of mercenaries and others who fought for Gaddafi as well as copious quantities of arms will have in a region already beset by various armed movements from Taureg tribesmen to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to the Nigerian group Boko Haram to the Polisario Front separatists as well as penetrated by narco-traffickers and other criminals.
Panel Discussion with
Geoffrey D. Porter
President
North Africa Risk Consulting, Inc.
Fadel Lamen
President
American Libyan Council
Roger Peña
Senior Legislative Assistant for Defense and Foreign Affairs
Office of Senator Kay Hagan
Edward M. Gabriel
Former US Ambassador to Morocco
Moderated by
J. Peter Pham
Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center
Atlantic Council
DATE: | Wednesday, November 9, 2011 |
TIME: | 2:00 PM – 4:30 PM |
LOCATION: | Atlantic Council 1101 15th Street NW, 11th Floor Washington, DC 20005 |
RSVP with your name and affiliation to ksmith@acus.org.
Religion has been a source of conflict throughout human history, but religion can also be a tremendous force for peacebuilding.
9. Religion and Peacemaking: Reflections on Current Challenges and Future Prospects, USIP, November 9, 9 am-1 pm
For ten years, USIP’s Religion and Peacemaking program has helped lead an evolution of the field. There has been a demonstrated interest in engaging religious leaders in efforts to advance conflict management and peacebuilding. Religious peacebuilding is now integrated into U.S. government policies.
To mark the program’s anniversary, USIP will host a workshop to reflect on what the wider field of religious peacebuilding has achieved and how best to move forward over the next decade. On November 9, a panel of practitioners, policymakers and academics will address the challenges and opportunities of religious peacebuilding and how outside actors, including the U.S. government, can support such opportunities.
Speakers:
- Richard Solomon, Introductory comments
U.S. Institute of Peace - Joshua Dubois
White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
- Suzan Johnson Cook
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom - Scott Appleby
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies - Rabbi Michael Melchior
Mosaica Center for Inter-Religious Cooperation - Jackie Ogega
Religions for Peace
- Qamar-ul Huda
U.S. Institute of Peace
- Mohammed Abu-Nimer
American University
- David Smock, Moderator
U.S. Institute of Peace
Fall 2011 Rumsfeld Fellows Samiullah Mahdi (Afghanistan); Ramid Namazov (Azerbaijan); Khatuna Mshvidobadze (Georgia); Uluk Kydyrbaev (Kyrgystan); Bayasgalan Naranzul (Mongolia); Kakhorjon Aminov (Tajikistan); Jamshed Rahmonberdiev (Tajikistan); Dadebay Kazakov (Turkmenistan); Hikmat Abdurahmanov (Uzbekistan), and Frederick Starr (moderator), CACI chairman, will discuss this topic. A reception will precede the forum at 5 p.m. For more information and to RSVP, contact saiscaciforums@jhu.edu or 202.663.7721.