Montenegro, shield of the West

That is, of course, super-hyperbole:  Montenegro is a tiny country of fewer than 620,000 people whose virtues include a beautiful coastline along the Adriatic and willingness since the late 1990s to be counted in the growing pro-democracy, pro-Europe camp in the Balkans.  It can lay reasonable claim to being the most ethnically integrated (and varied) country in the region (only 45% of the population self-identifies as “Montenegrin” tout court).

The postage-stamp sized country gained independence from its union with Serbia, the last remnant of Yugoslavia, in 2006 and has since made good progress.  It is now a candidate for membership in the European Union but will not complete the 35 chapters of the membership process for some years.

Montenegro’s leadership would like to bring it into NATO, even if only 40% of the population is currently in favor (30% are undecided).  But the Montenegrins hesitate:  the Americans are telling them it will be difficult to do this in May at the NATO summit in Chicago.  They are excessively respectful of American advice.  Neither NATO nor the EU is in an expansive mood in this era of euro-schlerosis (or worse) and difficulties pursuing the Alliance war in Afghanistan.  That is unfortunate for the NATO, which has so far benefited from its investment in enlargement.

The Montenegrin military numbers a bit over 3000.  A couple of dozen participated in NATO’s Afghanistan mission and others have joined UN mission in Liberia and Cyprus as well as the EU naval mission off Somalia.  Podgorica (that’s the charming capital, once known as Titograd) is well-intentioned, but its capacities are miniscule.

Still, it would be a good idea for Montenegro to get fully read and to press for NATO membership, and for NATO to think about opening the door.  Why?  First, as one keen Balkan-watcher notes, Montenegro is first in line, so if it is shut out none of the other candidates can come in.  This would be particularly problematic if Macedonia, which is fully qualified for NATO membership but blocked by Greek objections to its name, were to manage somehow to get itself unblocked.  That could happen:  either because Athens and Skopje come to an agreement on the name (unlikely) or because the International Court of Justice decides that Skopje–under an agreement with Greece signed in 1995–is entitled to come into NATO under its awkward UN designation:  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM).

The ICJ decision on that question issued today may, or may not, open the door for Macedonia to enter NATO as The FYROM.  The court decided that Greece had violated the agreement but said it could not order Greece to allow The FYROM into NATO.  Such respect for sovereignty seems almost quaint.  But what it does is to leave the issue, once again, up to Athens, which so far has shown no inclination to put this issue behind it.  Let’s hope Greece makes a wiser decision this time around.

There are more than tactical reasons for admitting Montenegro to NATO.  It would help to convince all the non-NATO, non-EU members in the Balkans that they really do have an opportunity to join the West, even if they may have years more of preparation before they fully qualify.  It would raise the ante with Serbia, where the majority of the population opposes NATO membership.  And it would help to insulate Montenegro against any instability that arises in either Bosnia or Kosovo, where things are still not fully settled.  

With an active push, NATO membership is at least possible for all of these countries far sooner than EU membership is likely for any of them.  Chicago is an opportunity to keep the Balkans and NATO moving forward at minimal cost in these uncertain times.