Syria options: quick failure or slow success
While I was enjoying a good discussion yesterday of mainly diplomatic Syria options over at Brookings (co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute), military experts at the Washington Institute were publishing an assessment of options for military intervention.
My bottom line: the “harder” military options, whether by the dissident-manned Free Syrian Army (FSA) or by external powers, are unlikely to be effective. Nonviolent options–multilateral diplomacy combined with continuing protests–have a much better chance for success, but they may take a long time. Where I come from, if the choice is between failing quickly and succeeding slowly, wisdom chooses slow success. But that also means sustaining the protesters for longer than they can last without help.
The Brookings/MEI event feature three of the very best on Syria: Murhaf Jouejati, who is now in the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ömer Taşpınar of Brookings and SAIS, and Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute.
Murhaf Jouejati set a good pace: the Barbara Walters interview showed Bashar al Assad for what he is: a liar. There is no disconnection from reality. He is determined to stay in power and use any means to do so. The U.S. sanctions have had a psychological effect but the European Union sanctions are far more important, especially the ban on importing Syrian oil. The big blows were the Turkish sanctions and the Arab League decision, which is to be implemented beginning December 27. This deprived Bashar of his claim to be an Arab champion.
The impact is substantial. Oil revenue is down, tourism is disappearing, the dinar has lost value, heating oil is scarce. The revolutionaries are shifting from street protests to strikes and boycotts, which are less dangerous. The SNC is coordinating with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which says it is committed to defensive actions. There are differences between the SNC and the National Coordinating Committee, a group inside Syria that is opposed to international intervention and prepared to talk with the regime, while the SNC would like international intervention to protect civilians and hasten collapse (and wants talks only on transition once Bashar has agreed to step down). Without outside intervention, regime implosion could take a long time. The Arab League proposal for international monitors has potential, but we need to get them in as quickly as possible, something Bashar is unlikely to agree to.
Ömer Taşpınar thinks two factors drive Turkish behavior on Syria: the damage Bashar has done to its “zero problems with neighbors policy” and a growing sentiment of Sunni solidarity, fed by disgust with Bashar’s continuation of the crackdown during Ramadan. Turkey does not want to be seen as supporting Western initiatives on Syria or following a U.S. lead. Ankara wants to see multilateral, especially UN Security Council, backing for whatever is done. It will not likely take unilateral action. The U.S. needs to be more effective diplomatically with Russia and China. The SNC needs to prepare and publish its vision for post-Assad Syria.
Andrew Tabler sees the U.S. as having been slow to react correctly to events in Syria, but it has now come around and is reaching out to the opposition, which is both grandiose in its ambitions and depressed in its mood. It is at a crossroads and needs to decide whether to use violence. The de facto contact group (U.S., France, Germany, UK, and Turkey, which should be augmented with Arab countries) needs to consider humanitarian corridors or buffer zones. The protests should remain nonviolent to preserve political and moral advantage. Sanctions have to be targeted to “break off” key regime pillars. The most likely to fall are the Sunni businessmen, who are already hedging their bets.
The military options published by the Washington Institute range from the silly to the unpromising. Humanitarian corridors into Syria’s cities? Apart from the fact that they don’t appear to be needed, they would impossible to sustain if the regime decided it did not want them. Buffer zones or enclaves along the Turkish border? That requires suppression of a substantial Syrian air defense system and constant vigilance thereafter, in the air and on the ground. Without it, the buffer zones just become unprotected targets, like the Safe Areas during the Bosnian war. That’s where you are sure to find your enemies, so that is where you aim. No-fly zone? It’s a bad joke, since the regime is not using aircraft to repress demonstrations. It would just be the top of the slippery slope to broader intervention.
In the end, the Washington Institute resorts to that next to last refuge of scoundrels, covert action:
…even covert intervention would buoy the opposition’s morale, while signaling to Damascus that events are moving against it, that external powers are willing to run risks to aid the population, and that the opposition has important allies. Taken together, these developments could significantly alter the dynamic of the Syrian struggle.
I’m all for doing whatever we can to get the Syrian opposition the money, cell phones, fuel and other supplies they need to sustain nonviolent protest, but “covert action” has a serious record of compromising whoever accepts it and failing to produce good results.
My conclusion: the Arab League proposal for human rights monitors is the best idea out there. If Bashar rejects them, it is one more nail in his coffin. If he accepts them, they are likely to report on atrocities and help to end his regime. I just hope the Arab League has 500 of them ready and willing if he does accept. A UN Security Council resolution calling for their deployment would be a giant step in the right direction. That’s a tall order for our diplomats, but one worthy of their efforts.
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The guys at Stratfor (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111214-syria-crisis-assessing-foreign-intervention) see a whole continuum of responses between hand-wringing (trying to persuade the Russians and Chinese to support protesters against the government in power) and military invasion. Providing funding, weapons, training, and intelligence) could help to increase the abilities of the FSA, although it lacks most of the advantages that Libya had (a geographical base, internal cohesion, and the absence of a serious air-defense capability by the government).
As for the gloomy prognostications of the military people at the alternative conference – they didn’t want to do Libya, either. Or Bosnia, if I remember correctly. Libya was, at least, cheap – around a billion dollars, a rounding-error sum. Since we import about 3 billion barrels of oil a year (something under 10 million a day, according to the EIA site), a 30-cent fall in the price of a barrel of oil (not a gallon of gas) means we recoup the cost to the economy in a year by getting Libya’s oil back on the market and thus lowering worries about supply disruptions etc. and hence the international price of oil. (All checks of arithmetic welcomed – it seems too good to be true: 300 days/year x 10 million bar/day x $1/3 per bar)