peacefare.net

Let’s not lose Iraq now

No, Iraq has not been  “worth it.”  Even a majority of its veterans don’t believe that.  President Bush launched the war believing that there were weapons of mass destruction.  That in any event was the only argument that really held water.  Neither Saddam Hussein’s marginal role in supporting international terrorism nor his gross mistreatment of the Iraqi people would have garnered the broad support that the Bush Administration managed to assemble for the invasion.

The Iraqi toll is huge:  more than 100,000 killed seems to be the consensus.  The American toll, though much smaller, is deeply felt:  almost 4500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded, not counting civilians.  In a decade of financial collapse the economic costs, projected to reach  trillions, cannot be ignored.

That said, the right thing to do now is to make the best of a bad thing.  The Bush Administration put in place both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that expires at the end of this month and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which will now govern the Iraq/U.S. relationship, including the substantial office of security cooperation that will provide training to the Iraqi army and police.  While Republicans are complaining that President Obama did not do whatever was necessary to extend the SOFA and enable a small (10,000?) U.S. contingent to remain in Iraq, they certainly would not be patting him on the back if he had caved to Iraqi demands that American forces give up de facto immunity from prosecution, which is what the current SOFA provides.  Both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki decided it was politically more palatable to allow the SOFA to expire and use the SFA for the future defense relationship.

The SFA is more than adequate for that and broader purposes, if it is implemented energetically.  It covers not only defense and security but economy and energy, education and culture, health and environment, information and communications technology, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation.  I keep hearing of meetings happening and efforts being made, but so far as I can tell no one has prepared a comprehensive review of what has been accomplished and what is planned under the SFA.  That makes me suspicious that it is little more than whatever the stovepiped agencies of the U.S. government happen to want to do in Iraq, rather than the strategic effort its label suggests.

What would be strategic in Iraq today?  First and foremost in my view is pipelines.  Yes, pipelines.  Most Iraqi oil, especially of the cheaply produced kind, is in the south, and for decades Iraq has exported it via the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz, where it runs a gauntlet of Iranian guns.  Iraqi exports are now reaching the limit of the existing export capacity and there are plans to expand it.  More leverage to Iran.

Far better, or more likely in addition, Iraq should be expanding export capacity to the north.  This requires repair of its aptly named “strategic” pipeline, a two-direction pipeline that links oil facilities in the south to those farther north.  It would also require construction of a major new pipeline to get oil to Turkey, where it can be sold into European markets more economically than through the Gulf route.  Tying Iraq to European oil and eventually gas markets would do more to ensure Baghdad’s future political and diplomatic orientation than dozens of persuasive diplomats. Maybe more than 10,000 American troops would have done.

The SFA also invites the United States to “work with and through the democratically elected government of Iraq” to strengthen democratic institutions.  This is important, as it opens the door to assistance to the court system, the parliament, provincial and local governments that are vital counterweights executive power.  The SFA also welcomes American diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq’s international and particularly regional role.  This is something the Iraqis highly value–they haven’t got a lot of other pals to lend a helping hand–and it would help to preserve American influence in Baghdad.

I won’t attempt a comprehensive review of the SFA here,  though it is something I hope someone will undertake, but maybe there is room for one more item:  educational and cultural cooperation.  Getting more Iraqis to the U.S., especially for educational purposes, would help enormously in the long term to ensure a more modern and Western oriented Iraq.  Our current visa regime needs some loosening to allow it to happen.  But just as important is getting Americans to Iraq without wearing BDUs (Battle Dress Uniforms).  Most Iraqis have had contact with few American civilians–it is high time they saw more of America than military might.  Apart from the very real security issues, the Iraqi visa regime, at least in Washington DC, is prohibitive–I know the ambassador and haven’t been able to get a visa for more than a year (most of my dozen or so trips into Iraq have been on Pentagon ID, but that presumably will no longer work after the end of this year).

You don’t have to be a Bush voter to recognize that Iraq is an important country in the Middle East:  its geographic position, its long border with Iran, and its vast oil resources (on the order of those in Saudi Arabia) give it real weight in how the region will evolve.  It is disturbing that the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations hasn’t held a hearing on it (except for confirmation of new ambassadors) in three years.

The Americans need to do something now that doesn’t come naturally:  pursue a mutually respectful relationship with Iraq through civilian means even as its troops complete their withdrawal.  Nothing about the giant and expensive embassy convinces me that we are doing it effectively and efficiently.  Give me a comprehensive report on the implementation of the SFA–I’m wonk enough to look forward to reading it.