Macedonia and Greece, again

Longstanding friend and now deputy prime minister for european integration of Macedonia Teuta Arifi stopped by SAIS this morning for a chat.  That naturally set me thinking about Skopje’s problems again.  It is hard to find anyone in Washington who remembers, but Macedonia was for years a source of considerable anxiety here, because of its potential to create the conditions for a generalized war in the Balkans, including between NATO members Greece and Turkey.  This was why the United States, in an inspired moment of coercive diplomacy, issued in December 1992  the “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic to lay off Macedonia.  The UN deployed its one and only explicitly “preventive” peacekeeping mission, UNPREDEP, there in 1995.

Considering its potential for precipitating difficulty, Macedonia has been remarkably successful in extracting itself from dicey situations.  As the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, it became independent in September 1991 without war, a fate Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia did not escape.  It weathered Milosevic’s expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo in 1999.  In 2001, it suffered a near breakdown into civil war as Albanian insurgents presented a military challenge.  That ended with the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation has gone a long way to consolidating the Macedonian state and ensuring equality among its citizens.

One problem has proven insoluble:  Greece objects to Macedonia calling itself Macedonia.  Many years of UN mediation have failed to resolve the problem, though some claim the differences have narrowed.  Macedonia is called The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM) in the UN General Assembly.  In 1995, Greece and The FYROM signed an interim agreement allowing that name to be used for membership in other international organizations.  Earlier this month, the International Court of Justice found Greece in violation of the accord, in particular when it blocked The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.

That should have settled the matter, but it has not, yet.  Greece hasn’t budged.  Its former ambassador in Washington has suggested publicly that Athens should renounce the interim accord rather than fulfill its provisions.  Skopje says it is offering to meet any time, any where to discuss the name issue.

I am biased on this question.  I believe countries and people have a right to call themselves what they want.  The notion that Macedonia’s preference for that name implies territorial designs on Greece is risible.  It does however reflect a claim to cultural and historical affinity with Alexander the Great, a monumental statue of whom may or may not now grace Skopje, even if ethnic Macedonians are mainly of Slavic descent.  The Slavs were late comers to the Balkans, entering about a millenium after Alexander.

Why would an American, other than one of Greek, Macedonian or Albanian heritage, care about all this?  The main reason is that Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s entry into NATO is holding up the expansion of euroatlantic institutions.  With the important exception of Croatia’s accession to the EU now scheduled for July 1, 2013, NATO and EU expansion are stalled.  Keeping that process moving is vital to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans.  The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Summit in Chicago  next spring, along with Montenegro, would reassure the region and help nudge Serbia in the euroatlantic direction, even if it never decides to join NATO.

So what should Greece do?  Be gracious.  You lost in court.  You’ve got far bigger problems with the euro and your economy.  Unload this one.  Go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a solution.  Or step aside and allow The FYROM (and Montenegro) to enter NATO in Chicago.  The technocratic government in Athens may not have the political mandate to do this, but neither does it run the sorts of risks that a more political government would face.

I’ll be surprised, but delighted, if my advice is taken.