Month: December 2011
Saleh in the U.S. is not the worst of it
My gut tells me I’m with Andrew Exum, who objects forcefully to allowing Yemen’s former President Saleh into the U.S., supposedly for medical treatment. A serial human rights abuser and murderer of unarmed protesters, he merits neither our sympathy nor our safe haven. It is hard for me to imagine that an angry someone won’t find a way to drag him into a U.S. court.* But does the brain confirm the gut feeling?
I can imagine what John Brennan, the White House counter-terrorism “czar” and chief administration spokesman on Yemen, is arguing. Getting Saleh out of Yemen will remove an obstacle to the transition process there. It will also enable the U.S. to continue support for security forces that fight Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the local Al Qaeda franchise. This is Brennan’s first concern.
Unfortunately those forces are under the control of Saleh’s relatives. So continuing our support for them also helps Saleh to keep his regime in place, if not for his own return then for the ascendancy of one of his sons to power. What we are seeing is the emergence into the open of something that has clearly been true all along: the Americans don’t want too much change in Yemen, as it threatens their top priority, which is the fight against Al Qaeda. The American Ambassador’s recent denunciation of the protesters is part of this picture.
This is a big mistake, a bigger one than allowing Saleh into the U.S. The conditions that enable Al Qaeda to thrive in Yemen are not going away so long as Saleh and his family maintain their autocratic rule. It may be tactically convenient to get Saleh to the U.S., but it is strategically stupid for the United States to remain in his pocket, snookered into supporting his sons as the only bulwark against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The problems that make Yemen home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula go far beyond terrorism: sectarian and secessionist rebellions are raging north and south, water and oil are running out, qat is king, poverty is endemic and abuse of the population is reaching epic proportions.
Any serious counter-terrorism effort in Yemen should include this bigger picture, as John Brennan knows. But I fear it does not. If Saleh comes to the U.S. it will be a symptom of a much bigger problem with U.S. policy in Yemen.
*This option is outlined by William F. Schulz at Huffpost.
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The Libya analogy does not stop at Benghazi
For those tempted to consider Syrian pleas to establish a “safe area” to protect civilians, Safe Area for Syria: an Assessment of Legality, Logistics and Hazards, prepared for the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army by the London-based Strategic Research & Communication Center, is a must-read. It suggests:
At present, the most achievable option would be to establish a “safe area” in the country to provide refuge for embattled civilians from other cities and towns, a base of operations for the designated political leadership of the Syrian opposition as well as a military command centre — in other words, a Syrian Benghazi.
The pre-requisite is
…a pre-emptive aerial campaign would have to be waged to neutralize the regime’s air defence systems, particularly in Aleppo and Lattakia and in and around Damascus.
Safe areas come under attack because that is where the enemy is. The Syrian proposal is not intended to be a safe area like Sarajevo, which during the Bosnian war was declared but no military action taken to protect it until after it was attacked. Our Syrian colleagues are telling us the safe area they want would require in advance a significant air operation over much of Syria to prevent the shelling and air attacks that naturally result when a “safe area” is declared.
I won’t delve too deeply into the legal side of the paper, except to say that it dreams up some pretty far-fetched schemes because it is clear no UN Security Council resolution authorizing such a safe area can pass over Russian objections. It is hard to picture any of these schemes passing muster with Pentagon lawyers, and even less with the White House.
But if I am wrong and it turns out they are willing to bite the bullet and destroy Syrian air defenses, the military action won’t stop there. We’ll soon need to take out Syrian armor and artillery, which will be used to shell the safe area. And we’ll be doing this at the same time that the Free Syrian Army goes on the offensive. Sound familiar? The Libyan analogy does not stop at Benghazi.
What is the alternative? You see it on unfolding on the ground today in Syria. The Arab League observers are reportedly in Homs, where the Syrian security forces have wrecked a great deal of damage. I hope we are encouraging them to stay there, and to spread out to other areas that have been under siege. I also hope they can communicate directly with people outside Syria. The presence of the observers will encourage large demonstrations, and increase the risk to the regime of using violence. The Syrian security forces will play “cat and mouse,” but it is a game the mouse always loses if it goes on long enough. The Arab League just has to make sure it is a tireless and omnipresent cat.
PS: Reports today suggest that some Syrian security forces have left Homs as the observers arrived and that the protest there today is large. Here is what was going on before arrival of the observers:
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Accountability is not only for the bad guys
A Libyan e-penpal writes
As you know the Russians proposed two days ago a project at the U.N. to investigate on the Libyan victims committed by NATO according to Russia. We as Libyans are proud of the involvement of NATO and the United States who freed us with our Libyan fighters from the deposed dictator “Gaddafi”. Even if there were casualties, we as Libyans are confident that it is by pure mistake or by premeditation of the dictator’ forces, who put weapons and artilleries in civilian homes. Everyone in Libya and in the entire world knows the attitude of the Russians when the revolt against “Gaddafi” began February 17, 2011. What we can say is the total hypocrisy of the Russians. Once again, we thanks the U.S.A. and NATO.
I am grateful for the confidence this Libyan and many others place in NATO and the U.S. During my visit to Libya in September I was often stopped on the street to be told how much the intervention was appreciated. Certainly the Russians are less interested in getting to the facts of the matter and more interested in embarrassing NATO.
But I have to confess that I would like to see NATO do its own unclassified after action assessment of civilian damage, cooperatively with the new Libyan authorities. Whether or not we ever conduct an operation exactly like this one again, doing a serious assessment would provide vital information for protection of civilians in the future.
So far, NATO has apparently left the investigating to nongovernmental organizations and the press. They do an admirable job, but what they cannot do is figure out how to decrease harm to civilians in future operations. I have no doubt but that NATO intends to do that–there is just no mileage in killing civilians for the Alliance–but it also has to take the trouble to determine exactly how mistakes occur in order to correct them.
If NATO continues to resist a public inquiry, it will feed the Russian propaganda mill. Better to sit down with the Libyan authorities, the NGOs and the New York Times to figure out how a serious investigation can be conducted. Then go do it. Anyone who claims undertake military action as part of the “responsibility to protect” should be willing to do that much. And the present Libyan authorities, who no doubt fear that such an investigation will extend to the behavior of some of the anti-regime rebels, need to begin to assemble the facts that will eventually be needed to sort out who did what to whom.
Accountability cannot be limited to the bad guys.
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Could we go to war by mistake again?
I was on C-Span this morning talking about Iraq. The program is now up on their website. A lot of questions focused on the past: why we went to war in Iraq, who should be held accountable for the mistake and whether oil was a motive. The moderator, Rob Harrison, tried to keep the focus on the future, but he was only partly successful.
While I too worry more about the future than about the past–there is more you can do about it–I regard it as healthy to ask why we made a mistake like invading Iraq.
I am convinced oil had little to do with it–we were getting oil from Saddam Hussein, and we are getting some oil from Iraq now. Few American companies have benefited from Iraq’s new openness to foreign oil companies, and most of those are active in Kurdistan. The stuff is sold on a world market at market prices. No need to invade anyone to get it.
One caller suggested we were unhappy with Saddam because he wanted customers to pay for oil in a currency other than dollars. Lots of oil producing countries have tried that trick, which has been abandoned as often as it has been adopted. The day will come, but it is not here yet. And it is certainly nothing to go to war about.
There are two other explanations for the mistake that strike me as far more likely: the argument that a democracy in Iraq would transform the region and concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is no doubt that many within the Bush 43 administration were arguing the former. They were dead wrong: the Arab world regards today’s Iraq as a catastrophe, not a model democracy. The Arab spring owes nothing to Iraq. But the argument likely carried some weight in 2002-3.
The more decisive argument was WMD. I can’t know what was in George W. Bush’s head, but in the public sphere that was the argument that was prevalent, and prevailed. We had only recently been attacked, on 9/11 (2001, for those too young to remember!). The Bush 43 administration claimed that Saddam Hussein was harboring international terrorists and pursuing nuclear and biological weapons (he was known to have chemical weapons, and to have used them against Iraqi Kurds). It was a small step to concluding that he represented a grave and imminent threat to the United States, which is what Colin Powell argued at the UN Security Council. Condi Rice won the day with her warning that the smoking gun might be a mushroom cloud. I doubt she or Colin Powell knew the premise they were acting on was wrong.
We are now facing in 2011, and soon 2012, the same argument with respect to Iran, more than once. This does not mean that the argument is wrong. There is lots of evidence that Iran is trying to assemble all the requirements, including non-nuclear high explosive technology, to build atomic weapons. There is nothing like the cloud of uncertainty that surrounded Iraq’s nuclear program. But still we need extra care to make sure that we have pursued all other avenues to stop Iran from going nuclear before deciding to use our military instruments.
There is ample evidence that the Obama administration has in fact done this:
1. We’ve tightened sanctions, and gotten others to tighten theirs.
2. We’ve offered negotiations, which so far have been fruitless.
3. Cyberattacks and assassinations targeted against key technologies and people, respectively, occur often.
4. Support is flowing to the Iranian opposition, perhaps even to ethnic separatists.
5. We’ve repeatedly said that no options are off the table.
Trouble is, none of this guarantees that Tehran won’t go ahead anyway, hoping that possession of nuclear weapons, or more likely all the technology required to build them, will end American attempts to topple the theocratic regime.
If so, we still have to answer one further question: will military action make us better off, or not? Certainly in Iraq it did not. It is easy enough to imagine that the Arab spring might have swept away Saddam Hussein, as it has other autocrats. Iran’s green movement, quiescent as it is for the moment, could still be our last best hope, not so much for ending the nuclear program as for removing the fears that have fueled it since the days of the Shah. Military action would do serious damage to dissent in Iran, especially as it will have to be repeated periodically to prevent Tehran from repairing damage and moving ahead with redoubled determination to build nuclear weapons.
If there is anything worse than going to war by mistake, it is doing it twice.
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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want
I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S. As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted: “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.” That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:
1. Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.
2. North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead. Lots more prestige and very lucrative.
3. Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel. It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.
4. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.
5. The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.
6. The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.
7. Bahrain does the same. Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.
8. Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.
9. The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.
10. Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.
11. Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”
12. I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.
If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas. If he doesn’t, then…
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It’s bad either way
Judging from my Twitterfeed this morning, there are two versions of the bombings outside security service buildings in Damascus today:
- The regime says it was Al Qaeda, or maybe the army deserters, or maybe just all those terrorists who have been attacking the state for months. Whatever it was, clearly that is where the regime wants the Arab League monitors, an advance party for which has just arrived in Damascus, to focus their attention. No need to go to Idlib or Daraa, where they might see Syrian army forces obliterating civilians.
- The protesters say it was the regime, giving itself an excuse to crack down. Al Qaeda is just a convenient suspect. The Europeans and Americans can hardly object to a crackdown aimed at their sworn enemy. Nobody wants Al Qaeda winning in Syria. But what really happened is that the secret services committed the act, or allowed it to be committed.
We may never know the truth–the Syrians have a habit of quickly cleaning up crime scenes, before any serious forensic evidence can be gathered.
I share the natural inclination to disbelieve the regime, which has established for itself a clear and consistent record of lying about everything. But it may not matter: these bombings represent an enormous escalation of the level and kind of violence in Syria. It will encourage both regime and protesters to ratchet up their rhetoric and intensify the physical conflict. While I might hope that will cause massive defections from the Syrian army, I think it far more likely it will reduce the numbers of people willing to go to the streets and improve the regime’s chances of repressing the demonstrations. The regime will target Sunni Islamists. Some of the Sunnis will respond by targeting Allawites, Christians and other regime loyalists. From here it is easy to go in the direction of sectarian civil war, no matter who was responsible for this morning’s bombings.
That’s where the Arab League observers come in. I share the blogosphere’s disappointment yesterday upon discovering that its leader is a Sudanese general who has served in Darfur and has an impeccable pedigree of loyalty to his country’s president, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court. But like it or not, the observers are the best bet for protecting the demonstrators in Syria, if they can get out of Damascus and communicate freely. It won’t take more than a couple of reports confirming the regime’s violence against unarmed civilians to enrage the international community.
What good will that do? We seem to be on the verge (or not) of a UN Security Council resolution on Syria, at long last. That would represent an end to Moscow’s protection of Bashar al Assad. I don’t believe that will necessarily cause him to fall right away, but he really cannot survive on his own forever. The Russians however will want what the Americans wanted in Egypt: a transition guided by people in the military who will maintain the country’s friendship with Moscow. The Syrian protesters seem smart enough to me not to follow the Egyptians down that dead end.
But first they have to find a way to avoid that civil war.
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