Month: December 2011
Is Iraq coming apart?
With the last of the American soldiers leaving, Iraq’s politicians are going after each other. Iraqiyya, the coalition that won the most seats in 2010, is boycotting the parliament, where it is nominally part of the majority. Prime Minister Maliki is targeting Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq and Vice President Tariq al Hashemi, mainstays of the relatively moderate Sunni political forces that have sought to participate in the post-Saddam Hussein democratic framework.
Ironically, Vice President Hashemi recently offered an optimistic view of what might happen after American withdrawal:
There is nothing to worry about because there is no security vacuum in the country. In fact, the internal security situation might improve after the US withdrawal. However the Iraqi armed forces’ insufficient training – in particular, the absence of well trained air and naval forces – will mean that Iraq’s borders are undefended in case of any attack from outside the country.
But he added:
The ground forces alone are not sufficient to protect Iraq’s borders because these forces are busy with internal security-related tasks. And [after the US withdrawal] there may also be internal issues that arise because of different Iraqi ethnicities’ claims to different provinces. So we really need to find political solutions to these problems quickly.
Yes, indeed they do, though at the moment the strongest tensions appear to be sectarian, between Sunni and Shia, rather than ethnic (between Arabs and Kurds). An arrest warrant has supposedly been issued for Hashemi, and his bodyguards are under investigation for a carbombing in Baghad’s green zone apparently intended to kill Maliki, who has asked parliament to withdraw confidence from Mutlaq. Hashemi and Mutlaq flew to Kurdistan today, likely looking for support to bring down Maliki’s government. As Maliki has fulfilled few of the promises he made to get the Kurds to join his coalition government, Hashemi and Mutlaq may well find a friendly reception in Kurdistan. But to put together an alternative governing coalition, they will need to entice one or more of the Shia parties to join. That will not be easy.
Juan Cole is right when he says:
If the country’s vice president really is a terrorist, it is a sad commentary on the state of Iraqi politics. If he isn’t, then al-Maliki is deploying ‘war on terror’ accusations to grab complete power for his coalition of Shiite parties.
The important question is not whether Maliki’s government survives but whether the current quarrels are managed peacefully and in accordance with the constitution. I know all the principals in the most recent quarrels: Maliki, Hashemi and Mutlaq. They are tough and wily, but are they murderers or dictators? I’ve learned from experience to reserve judgment until there is clear evidence one way or the other. It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions.
Is Iraq coming apart? We should not mistake the fall of a government for the dissolution of a state. It is not even clear yet that Maliki will fall. Too early to tell what is really going on.
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Oy veh, Egypt
The facts are reasonably clear: the army is attacking demonstrators who want to remove it from power. The demonstrators, focused for the last couple of days on the cabinet office that houses the army’s recently appointed civilian but retrograde government, lack nonviolent discipline. Somehow the notion has grown that hurling stones and Molotov cocktails is consistent with nonviolence. It isn’t. It incites responses in kind (but amplified in severity) from the security forces and limits the number of people who will join in street protests. The protesters may not cause a lot of harm to the soldiers, but they are doing serious damage to their cause. A lot of Egyptians either support the army or just want the disorder to stop.
Stepping back from daily events, the main political tug of war is between the Muslim Brotherhood (now represented politically by the Freedom and Justice Party, or FJP) and the military. The FJP is doing well in Egypt’s ongoing parliamentary elections. But it will likely need allies to get over 50% of the seats and in any event won’t want to try to govern on its own. It will find coalition partners either among the more extreme Islamists (the Salafists are also doing well, though not as well as originally imagined) or among the non-Islamists. But the non-Islamists are fractious. Some will even prefer to keep the army in power–or at least use it to limit the sway of the Islamists–rather than ally with the the FJP.
The Americans are leaning on the army to transfer power to civilians as soon as possible. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is no doubt responding that they would like to do so but cannot in an atmosphere of disorder that extremists the Americans don’t like might exploit. When the complicated elections conclude in mid-January, the FJP–disciplined and well-organized–will offer itself as the logical and democratically validated alternative. But the parliament whose majority the FJP is likely to lead will have few powers–the main one is to choose a committee that will write a new constitution. Whether the army will allow it to do even that without severe constraints is not clear. Presidential elections are due by next July.
Egypt will be fortunate to get that far without further upheavals. There is no guarantee the revolution of 2011 will end in a democracy. The demonstrators made a profound errorentrusting their fate to the army, which is using its power to preserve is prerogatives and limit Islamist gains. As distasteful as it may be, the best bet for non-Islamists now is to throw in their lot with the Islamists, aiming to establish a truly democratic framework that will enable them eventually to gain power after a period of Islamist rule. But I know from the Middle East Institute conference session at which Esraa Abdel Fattah, one of the originators of the April 6 Movement that sparked Egypt’s revolution, spoke last month how deep the distrust and distaste for the Islamists is.
I don’t envy the difficult choices that Egyptians now have to make. The euphoria of deposing Hosni Mubarak has long since evaporated. They are now engaged in a long, hard slog that has no better than even odds of coming out in a truly democratic direction. Even in the best of circumstances, that will take years more to create. Meanwhile the economy is deteriorating, religious and other social divisions are exacerbating, and extremists are recruiting. The country desperately needs improved leadership, more money and a healthy dose of common sense. It is unlikely to get any of those in time.
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Macedonia and Greece, again
Longstanding friend and now deputy prime minister for european integration of Macedonia Teuta Arifi stopped by SAIS this morning for a chat. That naturally set me thinking about Skopje’s problems again. It is hard to find anyone in Washington who remembers, but Macedonia was for years a source of considerable anxiety here, because of its potential to create the conditions for a generalized war in the Balkans, including between NATO members Greece and Turkey. This was why the United States, in an inspired moment of coercive diplomacy, issued in December 1992 the “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic to lay off Macedonia. The UN deployed its one and only explicitly “preventive” peacekeeping mission, UNPREDEP, there in 1995.
Considering its potential for precipitating difficulty, Macedonia has been remarkably successful in extracting itself from dicey situations. As the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, it became independent in September 1991 without war, a fate Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia did not escape. It weathered Milosevic’s expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, it suffered a near breakdown into civil war as Albanian insurgents presented a military challenge. That ended with the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation has gone a long way to consolidating the Macedonian state and ensuring equality among its citizens.
One problem has proven insoluble: Greece objects to Macedonia calling itself Macedonia. Many years of UN mediation have failed to resolve the problem, though some claim the differences have narrowed. Macedonia is called The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM) in the UN General Assembly. In 1995, Greece and The FYROM signed an interim agreement allowing that name to be used for membership in other international organizations. Earlier this month, the International Court of Justice found Greece in violation of the accord, in particular when it blocked The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.
That should have settled the matter, but it has not, yet. Greece hasn’t budged. Its former ambassador in Washington has suggested publicly that Athens should renounce the interim accord rather than fulfill its provisions. Skopje says it is offering to meet any time, any where to discuss the name issue.
I am biased on this question. I believe countries and people have a right to call themselves what they want. The notion that Macedonia’s preference for that name implies territorial designs on Greece is risible. It does however reflect a claim to cultural and historical affinity with Alexander the Great, a monumental statue of whom may or may not now grace Skopje, even if ethnic Macedonians are mainly of Slavic descent. The Slavs were late comers to the Balkans, entering about a millenium after Alexander.
Why would an American, other than one of Greek, Macedonian or Albanian heritage, care about all this? The main reason is that Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s entry into NATO is holding up the expansion of euroatlantic institutions. With the important exception of Croatia’s accession to the EU now scheduled for July 1, 2013, NATO and EU expansion are stalled. Keeping that process moving is vital to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Summit in Chicago next spring, along with Montenegro, would reassure the region and help nudge Serbia in the euroatlantic direction, even if it never decides to join NATO.
So what should Greece do? Be gracious. You lost in court. You’ve got far bigger problems with the euro and your economy. Unload this one. Go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a solution. Or step aside and allow The FYROM (and Montenegro) to enter NATO in Chicago. The technocratic government in Athens may not have the political mandate to do this, but neither does it run the sorts of risks that a more political government would face.
I’ll be surprised, but delighted, if my advice is taken.
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Let’s not lose Iraq now
No, Iraq has not been “worth it.” Even a majority of its veterans don’t believe that. President Bush launched the war believing that there were weapons of mass destruction. That in any event was the only argument that really held water. Neither Saddam Hussein’s marginal role in supporting international terrorism nor his gross mistreatment of the Iraqi people would have garnered the broad support that the Bush Administration managed to assemble for the invasion.
The Iraqi toll is huge: more than 100,000 killed seems to be the consensus. The American toll, though much smaller, is deeply felt: almost 4500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded, not counting civilians. In a decade of financial collapse the economic costs, projected to reach trillions, cannot be ignored.
That said, the right thing to do now is to make the best of a bad thing. The Bush Administration put in place both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that expires at the end of this month and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which will now govern the Iraq/U.S. relationship, including the substantial office of security cooperation that will provide training to the Iraqi army and police. While Republicans are complaining that President Obama did not do whatever was necessary to extend the SOFA and enable a small (10,000?) U.S. contingent to remain in Iraq, they certainly would not be patting him on the back if he had caved to Iraqi demands that American forces give up de facto immunity from prosecution, which is what the current SOFA provides. Both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki decided it was politically more palatable to allow the SOFA to expire and use the SFA for the future defense relationship.
The SFA is more than adequate for that and broader purposes, if it is implemented energetically. It covers not only defense and security but economy and energy, education and culture, health and environment, information and communications technology, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation. I keep hearing of meetings happening and efforts being made, but so far as I can tell no one has prepared a comprehensive review of what has been accomplished and what is planned under the SFA. That makes me suspicious that it is little more than whatever the stovepiped agencies of the U.S. government happen to want to do in Iraq, rather than the strategic effort its label suggests.
What would be strategic in Iraq today? First and foremost in my view is pipelines. Yes, pipelines. Most Iraqi oil, especially of the cheaply produced kind, is in the south, and for decades Iraq has exported it via the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz, where it runs a gauntlet of Iranian guns. Iraqi exports are now reaching the limit of the existing export capacity and there are plans to expand it. More leverage to Iran.
Far better, or more likely in addition, Iraq should be expanding export capacity to the north. This requires repair of its aptly named “strategic” pipeline, a two-direction pipeline that links oil facilities in the south to those farther north. It would also require construction of a major new pipeline to get oil to Turkey, where it can be sold into European markets more economically than through the Gulf route. Tying Iraq to European oil and eventually gas markets would do more to ensure Baghdad’s future political and diplomatic orientation than dozens of persuasive diplomats. Maybe more than 10,000 American troops would have done.
The SFA also invites the United States to “work with and through the democratically elected government of Iraq” to strengthen democratic institutions. This is important, as it opens the door to assistance to the court system, the parliament, provincial and local governments that are vital counterweights executive power. The SFA also welcomes American diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq’s international and particularly regional role. This is something the Iraqis highly value–they haven’t got a lot of other pals to lend a helping hand–and it would help to preserve American influence in Baghdad.
I won’t attempt a comprehensive review of the SFA here, though it is something I hope someone will undertake, but maybe there is room for one more item: educational and cultural cooperation. Getting more Iraqis to the U.S., especially for educational purposes, would help enormously in the long term to ensure a more modern and Western oriented Iraq. Our current visa regime needs some loosening to allow it to happen. But just as important is getting Americans to Iraq without wearing BDUs (Battle Dress Uniforms). Most Iraqis have had contact with few American civilians–it is high time they saw more of America than military might. Apart from the very real security issues, the Iraqi visa regime, at least in Washington DC, is prohibitive–I know the ambassador and haven’t been able to get a visa for more than a year (most of my dozen or so trips into Iraq have been on Pentagon ID, but that presumably will no longer work after the end of this year).
You don’t have to be a Bush voter to recognize that Iraq is an important country in the Middle East: its geographic position, its long border with Iran, and its vast oil resources (on the order of those in Saudi Arabia) give it real weight in how the region will evolve. It is disturbing that the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations hasn’t held a hearing on it (except for confirmation of new ambassadors) in three years.
The Americans need to do something now that doesn’t come naturally: pursue a mutually respectful relationship with Iraq through civilian means even as its troops complete their withdrawal. Nothing about the giant and expensive embassy convinces me that we are doing it effectively and efficiently. Give me a comprehensive report on the implementation of the SFA–I’m wonk enough to look forward to reading it.
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What does Kosovo’s president represent?
Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga’s speech today at SAIS was what I had hoped. She was forward-looking, even while reviewing the sad history of oppression from 1989 until the NATO intervention in 1999. She was clear about Kosovo’s status as a sovereign and independent state, even if it has not achieved universal recognition and membership in international organizations. She was hopeful about Kosovo’s European aspirations, while recognizing the many challenges that have to be faced, including normalization of relations with Serbia through the EU-sponsored dialogue. She was forceful about Kosovo’s territorial integrity, while emphasizing the rights of the Serbian community under the Ahtisaari plan. She underlined the importance of reintegration of the northern muncipalities, but called for an economic development plan encompassing south Mitrovica as well.
Plucked from a successful career in the Kosovo police, President Jahjaga is quickly establishing herself as a symbol of Kosovo’s youthful aspirations. She is trying hard to represent all of Kosovo’s ethnic communities, not just the majority Albanians, and to stay above the political fray. She embodies commitment to rule of law–her entire career prior to becoming president was spent in law school and the much-respected police service. And though she did not mention it today, she symbolizes the aspirations of Kosovo’s women for a stronger role in a society in which male politicians dominate.
What more could I have asked for? In response to my opening question about pursuing criminals responsible for crime against Serbs south of the Ibar, she emphasized mainly Pristina’s inability to get the full benefit of cooperation with international police organizations, of which Kosovo is not yet a member. I might have liked to hear something more about encouraging all citizens to protect their neighbors and support the authorities in maintaining law and order.
She was clear about protection of minority communities, but a colleague noted that he would have liked to hear more about how all the ethnic groups of Kosovo share a common history and culture. The beautiful Serb monasteries of Kosovo should be a source of pride to Albanians as well as to Serbs. The maintenance of separate, and conflicting, historical narratives is a serious obstacle to reconciliation in Kosovo, as it is elsewhere in the Balkans.
Asked whether she would come to Belgrade to meet President Tadic, she responded she would go anywhere to meet anyone so long as it was clearly understood that she is the president of a sovereign and independent state. That is not likely to happen soon, since Serbia will have elections next spring. But the time will come. If Jahjaga is still president when it does, Kosovo will be well represented.
A few minutes in the “green” room before the talk with President Atifete Jahjaga and Minister for European Integration Vlora Çitaku (that’s Ambassador Avni Spahiu hiding behind me):
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Syria options: quick failure or slow success
While I was enjoying a good discussion yesterday of mainly diplomatic Syria options over at Brookings (co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute), military experts at the Washington Institute were publishing an assessment of options for military intervention.
My bottom line: the “harder” military options, whether by the dissident-manned Free Syrian Army (FSA) or by external powers, are unlikely to be effective. Nonviolent options–multilateral diplomacy combined with continuing protests–have a much better chance for success, but they may take a long time. Where I come from, if the choice is between failing quickly and succeeding slowly, wisdom chooses slow success. But that also means sustaining the protesters for longer than they can last without help.
The Brookings/MEI event feature three of the very best on Syria: Murhaf Jouejati, who is now in the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ömer Taşpınar of Brookings and SAIS, and Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute.
Murhaf Jouejati set a good pace: the Barbara Walters interview showed Bashar al Assad for what he is: a liar. There is no disconnection from reality. He is determined to stay in power and use any means to do so. The U.S. sanctions have had a psychological effect but the European Union sanctions are far more important, especially the ban on importing Syrian oil. The big blows were the Turkish sanctions and the Arab League decision, which is to be implemented beginning December 27. This deprived Bashar of his claim to be an Arab champion.
The impact is substantial. Oil revenue is down, tourism is disappearing, the dinar has lost value, heating oil is scarce. The revolutionaries are shifting from street protests to strikes and boycotts, which are less dangerous. The SNC is coordinating with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which says it is committed to defensive actions. There are differences between the SNC and the National Coordinating Committee, a group inside Syria that is opposed to international intervention and prepared to talk with the regime, while the SNC would like international intervention to protect civilians and hasten collapse (and wants talks only on transition once Bashar has agreed to step down). Without outside intervention, regime implosion could take a long time. The Arab League proposal for international monitors has potential, but we need to get them in as quickly as possible, something Bashar is unlikely to agree to.
Ömer Taşpınar thinks two factors drive Turkish behavior on Syria: the damage Bashar has done to its “zero problems with neighbors policy” and a growing sentiment of Sunni solidarity, fed by disgust with Bashar’s continuation of the crackdown during Ramadan. Turkey does not want to be seen as supporting Western initiatives on Syria or following a U.S. lead. Ankara wants to see multilateral, especially UN Security Council, backing for whatever is done. It will not likely take unilateral action. The U.S. needs to be more effective diplomatically with Russia and China. The SNC needs to prepare and publish its vision for post-Assad Syria.
Andrew Tabler sees the U.S. as having been slow to react correctly to events in Syria, but it has now come around and is reaching out to the opposition, which is both grandiose in its ambitions and depressed in its mood. It is at a crossroads and needs to decide whether to use violence. The de facto contact group (U.S., France, Germany, UK, and Turkey, which should be augmented with Arab countries) needs to consider humanitarian corridors or buffer zones. The protests should remain nonviolent to preserve political and moral advantage. Sanctions have to be targeted to “break off” key regime pillars. The most likely to fall are the Sunni businessmen, who are already hedging their bets.
The military options published by the Washington Institute range from the silly to the unpromising. Humanitarian corridors into Syria’s cities? Apart from the fact that they don’t appear to be needed, they would impossible to sustain if the regime decided it did not want them. Buffer zones or enclaves along the Turkish border? That requires suppression of a substantial Syrian air defense system and constant vigilance thereafter, in the air and on the ground. Without it, the buffer zones just become unprotected targets, like the Safe Areas during the Bosnian war. That’s where you are sure to find your enemies, so that is where you aim. No-fly zone? It’s a bad joke, since the regime is not using aircraft to repress demonstrations. It would just be the top of the slippery slope to broader intervention.
In the end, the Washington Institute resorts to that next to last refuge of scoundrels, covert action:
…even covert intervention would buoy the opposition’s morale, while signaling to Damascus that events are moving against it, that external powers are willing to run risks to aid the population, and that the opposition has important allies. Taken together, these developments could significantly alter the dynamic of the Syrian struggle.
I’m all for doing whatever we can to get the Syrian opposition the money, cell phones, fuel and other supplies they need to sustain nonviolent protest, but “covert action” has a serious record of compromising whoever accepts it and failing to produce good results.
My conclusion: the Arab League proposal for human rights monitors is the best idea out there. If Bashar rejects them, it is one more nail in his coffin. If he accepts them, they are likely to report on atrocities and help to end his regime. I just hope the Arab League has 500 of them ready and willing if he does accept. A UN Security Council resolution calling for their deployment would be a giant step in the right direction. That’s a tall order for our diplomats, but one worthy of their efforts.
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