Month: December 2011
Is Iraq really open for business?
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki spoke today to a warm welcome at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Iraq, he said, is open for business and it welcomes American companies, which risk losing out if they don’t get more aggressive. So far, so good. I can’t agree with Donald Trump, who thought it remarkable we didn’t take the oil with us as we left, but I am surprised how few American companies (other than the Blackwaters of security protection fame) have pursued Iraqi business.
There was something missing in Maliki’s remarks: he made no promises about a level playing field, about accountability or transparency, about doing business cleanly and on the merits. Instead he underlined that he and his Iraqi government colleagues will be glad to help American companies do business, a promise that skeptics like me view as dubious at best and downright illicit at worst. Call me cynical, but if you have to come to the right people in government to help you do business, there is something wrong with the way government has set up business to be done.
I don’t mean to rain on the Iraqis’ parade. It is good for Maliki, as part of the overall noralization of relations, to court U.S. business and to promise assistance. It is also good for American companies to get busy competing. But in an open and competitive system, assistance should only rarely be needed.
What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
Governing well is the best revenge
I was asked to speak on a panel this afternoon (2-3 pm) about the evolution of democracy in the Balkans at the AID Democracy and Governance conference at George Washington University. Here are my instructions from the organizers, and the notes I plan to use, though I confess I often depart from them:
Balkans Democracy
GWU, 12 December 2011
Organizers’ instructions: We will be looking for your views on the common challenges and opportunities for democratization within your designated sub-region. What have been the obstacles or inhibitors of democratization? To what extent does the ‘neighborhood’ itself influence possibilities for political liberalization? What are realistic goals and/or scenarios for improvement on democracy and governance in the near to medium term? Are there region-specific approaches that should be considered? What might assistance efforts and democracy, human rights and governance programs do to address key challenges in this sub-region?
1. Looked at in a 20-year time frame, democracy in the Balkans has to be judged as a success.
2. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia were at war, Bosnia was close, Serbia was a somewhat liberal autocracy, Montenegro and Kosovo were under Milosevic’s thumb, Macedonia was shaky, Albania was just emerging from a miserable dictatorship, Romania and Bulgaria were not much better off.
3. Let me count the ways things have improved: four of these countries are EU members or about to be, five are members of NATO (two more are qualified).
4. Two use the Euro, at least two others have their own currency pegged to the Euro.
5. Only Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia remain in a kind of uncertain transition phase, even if Albania, Romania and Bulgaria continue to have problems meeting European expectations.
6. How did this happen? The big obstacles to democracy disappeared: Tudjman succumbed to natural causes, Milosevic to an election, Ceausescu to execution, the Bulgarian communist regime to a series of see-saw elections.
7. The neighborhood was unquestionably a big influence: Slovenia set out with determination to become an EU member, European and American assistance to Montenegro had a big influence inside Serbia, international intervention worked somewhat well in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Christmas warning and UNPREDEP gave Macedonia the breathing space it needed, Italian assistance saved Albania more than once.
8. Above all: the prospect of membership in NATO and the EU, while sometimes too weak to overcome domestic political strife, has proven a magnet that never entirely stops working, even if it at times seems inadequate.
9. The remaining problems can be solved: Bosnia needs constitutional reform, Serbia needs to acknowledge the loss of Kosovo, Kosovo needs treat its Serbs and other minorities well and reintegrate the north in a cooperative effort with Belgrade.
10. There is no reason why all those who want to be NATO members should not be within five years.
11. For the EU, it will take longer: Montenegro in less than 5 years, Serbia and Albania in 5-10 years, Kosovo in 15 and Bosnia in 10 years from whenever it fixes its constitution.
12. The best assistance efforts can do now is to support civil society, in particular watchdog functions.
13. However long it takes, whatever the obstacles and disappointments, governing well is the best revenge.
Next week’s peace picks
I am speaking tomorrow about the evolution of democracy in the Balkans (2 pm) at the AID Democracy and Governance conference at George Washington University, but I am not sure that really ranks among the week’s peace picks. Here is a still immodest list of the week’s best, which includes two other events at which I’ll be participating:
1. Syria Under Growing International Pressure
A CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AND SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY EVENT
Turkey, the Arab League, the United Nations and the European Union (EU) have escalated pressure on Damascus in an effort to isolate and punish the Syrian regime for its continuing repression of protesters. With the death toll now exceeding 4,000 civilians, Turkey and the Arab League recently joined the U.S. and the EU in imposing wide-ranging sanctions against Syria—a coordinated, international move considered inconceivable just six months ago.
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
3:00 PM to 4:30 PM
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Contact: Brookings Office of Communications
Email: events@brookings.edu
Phone: 202.797.6105
RELATED CONTENT
Getting Serious about Regime Change in Syria
Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh
The American Interest
July 29, 2011
The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East
Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Pavel K. Baev, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen R. Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Ruth H. Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Ömer Taşpınar, Shibley Telhami, Sarah Yerkes and Akram Al-Turk
November 18, 2011
America’s Strategic Goals in the Middle East and North Africa
Michael Doran
Foreign Policy
August 22, 2011
Introduction
Kate Seelye
Vice President
The Middle East Institute
Moderator
Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Panelists
Murhaf Jouejati
Professor of Middle East Studies
National Defense University
Andrew J. Tabler
Next Generation Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ömer Taşpınar
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
2. Kosovo’s President: What does She Represent?
A discussion with
Her Excellency
Atifete Jahjaga
President of Kosovo
Moderated by
Daniel Serwer,
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Visiting Scholar, Conflict Management Program , SAIS
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Kenney Auditorium
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Co-sponsored by the Center for Transaltantic Relations and
Conflict Management Program, SAIS
3. Incomplete Security Sector Reform in Serbia: Lessons for Democratic Transition
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
2:00– 3:30 pm
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
with
Jelena Milić
Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies,
Belgrade, Serbia
Comments by
Daniel Serwer
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Vedran Džihić
Moderator
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Jelena Milić, director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, will give an insight into the problems of the security reform in Serbia since the time of the Milosevic regime and democratic changes in 2000 until today. She will discuss the importance of transitional justice for security sector reforms as well as the consequences of current gaps and problems in the reform for Serbia. As the security sector reform is critical for the successs of all post-conflict and democratization efforts the event will outline possible “lessons learned” for democratic transition of regions like North Africa. Finally, Jelena Milić will elaborate on the implications of the recent European Council’s decision on Serbian EU-candidacy bid.
4. Proactive Deterrence: The Challenge of Escalation Control on the Korean Peninsula
Washington, DC 20008
After the attacks last year by North Korea on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island, the difficult debates continue over the best way South Korea should respond to these types of strikes by North Korea and on ways to deter them in the future. Fears arise that miscalculating the response to North Korean aggression could quickly escalate into war.
And even though South Korea and the U.S., along with other allies, would likely be able to defend South Korea and eventually reunify the Korean peninsula through force, the outbreak of war will likely have huge human, economic, and developmental costs for South Korea. Thus, proper deterrence mechanisms and response procedures are needed.
Please join KEI for a luncheon discussion with Abraham Denmark, Senior Advisor, CNA. Mr. Denmark will discuss his Academic Paper Series report on some of the issues involved with preemptive self-defense and proactive deterrence by South Korea. He will also present some possible policies for South Korea and the United States that could mitigate the potential for accidental escalation while sustaining deterrence over North Korea. We hope you will join us for this interesting event.
A light meal will be served.
To RSVP for this event, please click here.
5. Combating Botnets: Strengthening Cybersecurity Through Stakeholder Coordination
Friday, December 16, 2011
1:30 PM to 3:30 PM
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Presenters
Bruce McConnell
Counselor to the National Protection and Programs Directorate Deputy Under Secretary
U.S. Department Of Homeland Security
Ari Schwartz
Senior Advisor to the Secretary on Technology Policy and Member of the Internet Policy Task Force
U.S. Department of Commerce
Panelists
Jamie Barnett
Chief of the Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
Sameer Bhalotra
Deputy Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Staff
The White House
Yurie Ito
Director, Global Coordination
JP CERT
Michael Kaiser
Executive Director
National Cyber Security Alliance
Brent Rowe
Senior Economist
What is a normal relationship?
Here’s what the Administration would like you to know about Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s visit next week.
Maliki and President Obama will be marking the end of the more than eight-year American military presence in Iraq and the beginning of a new, more normal relationship between Iraq and the United States. That is how senior officials yesterday framed their version of the visit, which will include a Wednesday event at Fort Bragg to thank the military for its sacrifices. My suggestion that the President add a word of thanks to the civilians who have worked in Iraq was welcomed. The “end of mission” ceremony will take place on Thursday, with the drawdown of the last troops occurring sometime thereafter.
By the end of the year, U.S. troops will be out of Iraq, except for the “normal” but large defense cooperation office headquartered in the Embassy. A total uniformed contingent of 250-400 plus supporting contractors will be stationed at 10 Iraqi bases around the country. The continuing security relationship will include substantial sales of U.S. equipment, to the tune of $11 billion (including F16s). The Iraqis are fully capable of handling internal security. The U.S. focus will be on external security, as well as police “train the trainers.” The war is ending “responsibly.”
The normalization of relations with Iraq will be based on the Strategic Framework Agreement, signed during the the Bush Administration. The Iraqis are enthusiastic about implementing it and have repeatedly pressed the U.S. for a stronger effort. There are now eight bilateral committees at work. The Iraqis want U.S. help in improving governance and restoring their regional role. Iraqis want a strong state that transcends ethnic and sectarian divisions. Americans will continue to advise in their ministries.
Maliki is no Iranian stooge–he left Iran during his exile from Iraq because his Dawa party colleagues were being murdered. Even many of the Shia in the south are none too fond of the Iranians, whose influence is generally overstated. We can and will be helpful to the Iraqis in dealing with the Turks, Kuwait, Bahrain and the Arab League. We failed to line up the Iraqis on Syria in recent months. That mistake will be corrected. The U.S. will still have lots of leverage in Iraq: they need and want us for many reasons.
Iraq is a functioning multiethnic state (the echoes of the Bush Administration were noted with irony) that faces a lot of problems, including the territories disputed between Baghdad and Erbil and failure to implement the agreements on which the current coalition government was based. But the issues are being worked out through politics rather than violence. Maliki is frightened of Ba’athist resurgence and does not always behave like a democrat, but there are countervailing forces in the parliament and elsewhere that restrain his actions. He is no worse than Richard Nixon when it comes to rival political parties, or Franklin Delano Roosevelt when it comes to the constitutional court.
Iraq has tremendous economic potential, due largely to its oil and gas resources as well as its strategic geopolitical location. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is hosting the Prime Minister, and a good deal of emphasis will be put on commercial prospects (and also jobs, jobs, jobs, I imagine). The Iraqis will be vastly increasing their oil export capacity, not only through the strait of Hormuz but also to the north.
The State Department is ready to take over the mission in Iraq. It has developed its capacity for deploying expeditionary diplomats and other needed personnel quickly. The administrative and logistical challenge of supporting the big embassy and 13 other posts (10 defense cooperation and 3 consulates) has been significant, but the problems have been solved.
So what did I think of all this?
There is a good deal of wishful thinking involved, especially when it comes to the capacity of the Iraqis and the U.S. embassy to fill the vacuum the military withdrawal will leave behind. The State Department has repeatedly failed on police training; it would be refreshing if it succeeded this time around. It would also be surprising if there were not other hiccups, or worse. Both Maliki and Obama are running risks.
But I don’t think we are making a mistake to withdraw completely: it is what democratic politics and shifting priorities in both Washington and Baghdad demanded. Americans are having trouble with the idea of continuing the effort in Afghanistan. Iraq is long forgotten. I also think it is important to get U.S. troops out of harm’s way before we deal with Iran, a challenge that is now coming on fast. No military option with Iran has much credibility if American troops are vulnerable to Iranian proxies in Iraq. I trust the new configuration, which includes 14 sites at which Americans will be present in numbers, will be far more defensible than the hundreds (even thousands at one time) that used to exist.
I also worry about Iraqi democracy, such as it is (which is admittedly more than in much of the region). The counterweights to Maliki are still weak institutions. The courts and provincial governments are particularly feeble. His paranoia could well evolve in harmful directions. If it does, the Americans will need to be ready to coax him back to a less self-destructive path. Sunnis and Kurds should not be expected to accept a new autocracy.
The problem with the Iranians is not so much their clout in Baghdad. It is their more pervasive influence at the local level, especially in the south but also in Kurdistan. The GCC reluctance to engage seriously with post-war Iraq is allowing this pervasive influence to grow. Despite repeated Administration assertions that the Arabs are beginning to engage with Maliki, there is precious little sign of it. Getting Iraq on side about Syria is crucial, not only because it will discomfort Bashar al Assad but also because it will help heal Maliki’s relationship with Arab League states and put Tehran on its back foot.
Naturally nothing was said in this unclassified briefing about continuing intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation. I assume there is a classified side to this “normal” relationship, one that will give the United States ample access to both information and opportunities, if they arise, to attack Al Qaeda and other terrorists. Normal means different things to different people, but to Maliki it would certainly include our providing information that would help him protect the Iraqi state and his providing opportunities for the United States to do in its enemies if the Iraqis don’t want to do it themselves.
PS: I should have included in this post a word about Arab/Kurdish tensions, which are not so much between Arabs and Kurds as between high officials in Baghdad and Erbil. The Kurdistan Region has good reason to be disappointed with the failure to implement many of the items it thought Maliki had accepted as conditions for forming his government. Baghdad has good reason to be upset that Kurdistan has signed an oil production-sharing agreement with Exxon, one that includes resources that appear to lie in disputed areas. But these very real sources of irritation are not manifesting themselves in military confrontation so far as I can tell. That is a really good thing. But can it last?
The EU gives Serbia time
The European Union today decided to postpone a decision on Serbia’s candidacy for membership. According to B92:
…Serbia will get the EU candidate status by March 2012 if the European Council is convinced that Serbia is showing genuine commitment, that it has achieved progress in the implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue (with Priština), including integrated border management, that it has reached an agreement on overall regional cooperation and is actively cooperating in enabling EULEX and KFOR to perform their mandates.
The same article says that the Council has noted significant progress Serbia has made in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, adding that the cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is completely satisfactory.
When it comes to determining the date for the beginning of Montenegro’s accession talks, the article 15 says that the talks could begin in June 2012, when the Council will review the country’s progress in implementing reforms, with a special focus on the rule of law, respect for fundamental rights and suppression of corruption and organized crime.
The postponement was the right thing to do, and this all sounds eminently reasonable, but too foggy, to me. What does it mean to reach an “overall agreement on regional cooperation”? How is “genuine commitment” to be judged? What constitutes enabling EULEX and KFOR to perform their mandates?
I might hope that greater clarity lies under the fog, along the lines Angela Merkel suggested last summer: Belgrade needs to cooperate with Pristina in eliminating the Serbian parallel structures, establishing border/boundary controls and reintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo. But I doubt it. What we are seeing here is a lowering of the bar, with the hope of getting Serbia candidacy status two months before its parliamentary elections in May, so as to boost the chances of Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party.
Boris Tadic would do well to use the time this postponement gives him to exert his authority over the Serb population in northern Kosovo, which seems to be more beholden to his political rivals and Serbia’s secret services than to the institutions of the Serbian state that pays many of their salaries. It once upon a time served his purposes well to deny he controlled them. Now it is becoming a serious embarrassment that threatens to cast doubt on whether Serbia can in fact control its own borders and meet other EU requirements.