How bad could Syria get?

It is hard to be optimistic about Syria.  The question is, how bad could it get?  The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:

• the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
• the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.

These two factors yield four scenarios:

1. Divided sovereignty:  Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others.  Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas.  A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
2. The regime wins:  Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail.  The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
3. Protesters win:  international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not.  The regime loses control of the country and has to yield.  Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
4. Civil war:  Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection.  Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines.  Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.

1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.

2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid.  Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government.  The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.

2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns.  We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent.  But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.

The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4.  Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help.  If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.

Let there be no doubt:  “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities.  Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better:  “protesters win.”  For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.