Month: January 2012
Serbian nationalism today
I’ve asked Milan Marinković, who lives in Niš, to begin writing on the Balkans for peacefare.net. His name should be familiar to you from some of the perceptive comments he has submitted over recent months. Here is a first piece, to which I’ve contributed a bit as well:
Many in Serbia tend to equate nationalism with patriotism. It would be more accurate to say that they confuse the two.
Patriotism is devotion to a country. A patriot seeks to make it more prosperous, more modern, more stable and secure. In fewer words: into a generally better place to live.
Nationalism regards the nation as a group under permanent threat from others. The group is thus forced to defend itself repeatedly, sometimes against nonexistent or fairly harmless enemies. The most prominent among these “enemies” in Serbia today is none other than Angelina Jolie. Her film on the war in Bosnia, In the Land of Blood and Honey, is regarded as an attack on Serbs and Serbia.
Regardless of who is perceived as the dangerous “anti-Serbian element” at a given time, several political parties readily accept and exploit nationalism. Election campaigns–the parliamentary election is to be held in May–intensify nationalist sentiments. Serbian politicians find it useful in gaining votes to manipulate and exploit fear.
Those who play the nationalist card are not uniform. At least three types of nationalists exist in Serbia: militant, conservative, and moderate.
Militants and conservatives both believe Serbs should avoid integration into the Western world in order to preserve their religion, tradition and customs as vital aspects of national identity and culture. Where they differ is in means. Militants are prepared to use violence.
The best recent example is the violence in Belgrade during the Gay Pride parade in 2010, when several thousand members of ultranationalist groups–including football (soccer) hooligans–rioted for hours, leaving more than a hundred injured policemen, who had been ordered to abstain from using force. Also, in 2008, during demonstrations against Kosovo’s declaration of independence, militant nationalists stormed and set ablaze the U.S. embassy. On a smaller scale, street attacks on LGBT activists, Roma, journalists and others take place on a weekly basis in Serbia, especially in multiethnic Vojvodina in the north.
Conservatives do not publicly advocate the use of violence, though they may sometimes support it tacitly. Former Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica is a conservative nationalist.
Moderate nationalists agree with their conservative counterparts on the importance of national identity and tradition, but believe that Serbia nevertheless needs to be more flexible if it is to achieve its somewhat contradictory goals, which include EU membership. This requires never-ending attempts to strike a balance between East and West, leading to chronic indecision. The two most notable moderate nationalists on Serbia’s political scene today are President Tadić (Democratic Party) and his main political rival, Tomislav Nikolić of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Some believe that Tadić’s most influential coalition partner, Interior Minister Ivica Dačić, also belongs to this group, though others would regard him as a chameleon who adapts to whatever the environment requires.
What all the nationalist factions have in common is the assumption that Serbia and Serbs, being the largest among former Yugoslav republics and peoples respectively, are destined to dominate the region, either through territorial expansion (the creation of so-called “greater Serbia”) or by more subtle methods. Anything that interferes with this ambition is regarded as a threat.
The last time this idea served as the foundation of Serbia’s national policy, wars left many thousands dead. Armed conflict today is far less likely—the Serbian armed forces are just not up for it, the moderate nationalist politicians don’t want it, and the international community is watching more carefully than in the 1990s. But it is not clear whether a moderately nationalist Serbia will fit a European Union suit tailored to patriots rather than nationalists.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ambiguities in Egypt and Syria
It’s only two days since I attempted a summary of where things stand in the Arab world. Already things are changing. As one of my colleagues notes, that’s just the point: politics are going to be dynamic in the Arab world in the future. The decades of stasis are over.
In Egypt, large crowds are turning out today (the first anniversary of the revolution) to insist on transfer of power to the newly installed parliament. It looks as if the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is going to have trouble holding on to as much power as it would like. Will the SCAF make the mistake of forcibly dispersing the demonstrators, or has it begun to understand that it needs to reduce its own visibility and delegate more authority to the popularly elected representatives of the people? The soldiers would be wise to let them take the rap for the lousy economy and political strife.
In Syria, developments are also ambiguous. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have yanked their human rights observers from the Arab League team, which is likely to eviscerate that effort, or at least de-fang it. The Syrian Foreign Minister is welcoming the observers back, which is not a good sign for their likely effectiveness without the GCC participants. That is a great irony: the GCC as the guardian of human rights?
At the same time, the Arab League is asking for the UN Security Council to act. The Assad regime, having rejected the Arab League plan for a peaceful transition, is buying lots of Russian trainer aircraft, a sale that directly contradicts Moscow’s indications that Syria has reached the end of its rope. While those aircraft will presumably not be delivered for some time, their sale would certainly be a political signal of Moscow’s support for Damascus.
It will be interesting to see how the Americans react if Syria begins to use its existing aircraft against the demonstrators. President Obama in last night’s State of the Union address paired Bashar al Assad with Muammar Qaddafi. Will their ends be similar? I have generally discounted the possibility of military action to protect the protesters, but if Assad starts using aircraft that could change the equation quickly.
.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Arab world: positive balance, still teetering
I need a scorecard to keep track of political change in the Arab world, so here it is:
- Egypt: New Egyptian parliament led by Muslim Brotherhood met for the first time yesterday. It needs to choose a commission to write the new constitution and call elections for president in June. Other powers are uncertain. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces still running things and holding on to perks and power.
- Yemen: President Saleh has left for the U.S. for medical treatment. I still find it incredible he would come here given the risks of a court deciding to hold him accountable for crimes for which he has immunity in Yemen. A single-candidate “election” February 22 is scheduled to elevate his vice president to the presidency. It is unclear to me what good this will do. Protests continue, his relatives cling to power and dissident parts of the armed forces control parts of the capital.
- Libya: Demonstrators in Benghazi Sunday attacked National Transitional Council offices in a protest over lack of transparency in deciding the electoral law to be used in May elections and in disbursing money. That’s the good news. Occasional strife among the armed militias is the bad news.
- Syria: The Arab League, much criticized because its human rights observers have failed to stop the violence, proposed a serious transition plan, which the Syrian National Council accepted and the Assad regime rejected. The Russians are saying that their patience has run out. A strong UN Security Council resolution would be a fine way to show that they mean what they say.
- Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom is cracking down hard on demonstrations in the majority Shia, oil-producing east.
- Bahrain: Despite the Bassiouni report‘s frankness about human rights abuses during last year’s repression of protests, the monarchy shows no sign of letting up and the Americans, anxious to keep the Fifth Fleet there, aren’t complaining too loudly.
- Morocco, Algeria, Jordan: All attempting various degrees of reform to forestall revolution. Largely succeeding so far. In forestalling that is. Reforms are modest.
So what once looked like a wave of Arab spring protest has now broken into rivulets moving in many different directions as they hit harder and softer obstacles. A few regimes are gone, but most are still holding on, in some cases just barely. Tunisia is the great success story, so far.
There are quite a few shoes that haven’t dropped yet, but likely will: Egypt’s economy is devastated, shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles are circulating in and beyond Libya, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may well expand further in Yemen, sectarian war threatens in Syria. The new regimes, especially in Egypt, look likely to be tougher-minded towards Israel, even if domestic issues predominate in the short term. 2012 is likely to be even more challenging than 2011.
Still: the overall direction is clear enough. There will likely be more freedom of speech and expression in much of the Arab world once this tide goes out. There will also be more Islamists in power and fewer supposedly secular and pro-Western autocrats. There will likely be more political competition, though how long it will be permitted to last is uncertain. It is also unclear how much governance will improve, in particular whether accountability and transparency will triumph over cronyism and corruption, and whether human rights–especially minority rights–will be respected. The balance for the year is positive, but there are still a lot of things to sort out.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The diplomatic screw turns
While Americans are distracted today by Newt Gingrich’s South Carolina primary victory over Mitt Romney and the entry of the New York Giants and New England Patriots into football’s “Superbowl,” the big international news is the European Union agreement to halt imports of Iranian oil within six months. Yawn. No wonder it hardly gets a headline.
This may not be the final turn of the diplomatic screw, but it is an important one. Iran’s economy and currency are in a tailspin. The stage is now set for P5 (that’s U.S., UK, France, Russia and China) + 1 (Germany) talks with Iran on its nuclear program. Turkey wants to host, but a date has not been announced.
If this next stage of the diplomatic efforts fails, as the effort a year ago did, the slide towards war will accelerate. Iran is rattling its saber, which is long enough to try to close the strait of Hormuz to outward-flowing traffic, thus denying the world oil market about 20% of its supplies and causing a sharp price spike. They will also make trouble for Americans in Iraq and possibly elsewhere. The Americans and Europeans, whose warships traversed the strait today in a show of force, will then draw their oil stocks to dampen the price and use military force to keep the strait open, and possibly to deny its use to the Iranians (who need it to import oil products).
While talking about military action less than at times in the past, the Americans and Israelis are conducting a “stealth” war against the Iranian nuclear program, blocking supplies of vital materiel, infecting software with at least one computer worm and assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists. None of this effort can stop the Iranians in their tracks if they are committed to nuclear weapons. Even bombing of their nuclear facilities won’t do that–they will almost surely react by redoubling their efforts. In the absence of an agreement, the best we can hope for is to slow Iran down.
Today’s turning of the diplomatic screw is intended promote a negotiated solution. It is unrealistic to imagine that Iran will cease and desist from trying to obtain all the technology it needs to build nuclear weapons. But it is still possible they will agree to abide by the terms of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) they have signed and ratified. Many other countries have stopped on the threshold of nuclear weapons–the ones I know best are Brazil, which acquired the necessary technology but reached an agreement with Argentina for a mutual standdown, and Italy, which opted for a dual key arrangement for control of American weapons deployed on Italian territory.
Arrangements of these sorts are not possible with Iran. No matter how much my idealist friends press the idea of a Middle East nuclear free zone, it is impossible to imagine the Israelis going for it, especially under the current Netanyahu government. And if the Americans, who asked Israel decades ago not to build nuclear weapons in the first place, can’t even get the Israelis to stop building settlements, what are the odds of success in getting Israel to give up nuclear weapons? “Never again” is not only a slogan–it is an objective that all Israeli governments will adhere to. Nuclear weapons are an important means to that end.
So is there no hope? On the contrary, I think there is. Iran gains little and losses a lot if it actually deploys nuclear weapons: it gets targeted by both Israel and the United States, with the former likely to launch on warning. The United States is committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Against nuclear weapons states, first use is not prohibited in American doctrine.
What does Iran hope to gain by developing nuclear weapons? Prestige, to be sure, and a more secure and powerful role in the Middle East. But most important is that the Iranians believe that nuclear weapons will guarantee no American invasion and thus survival of the theocratic regime. This is a perception problem: even if we resort to bombing, there isn’t going to be an American invasion of Iran, which is far too large and populous a country for the Americans to imagine that things would come out better than in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the price of blocking Iran from developing nuclear weapons is a pledge that the United States will not invade, it is not too much to pay.
We need however to be cautious. We should not sell out Iran’s Green Movement, or the rebellion against Bashar al Assad in Syria. Nor should we do anything that will help Hamas and Hizbollah to continue their trouble-making. We should not be guaranteeing regime survival in Tehran, only saying what we all know to be true: America hasn’t got the resources or the desire to take on another major ground war in the Middle East.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This week’s “peace picks”
Still a bit slow on international affairs this week in DC. Maybe it’s domestic politics and the State of the Union? But still some good picks, unfortunately some clustered on the same day:
1. Is Foreign Aid Worth the Cost? Woodrow Wilson Center, 5th floor, January 23, 2012, 4-6 pm
There will be a live cast of this event.
Many Americans think foreign aid consumes 25 % or more of the federal budget when in fact it costs less than 1%. Some presidential candidates are calling for the elimination of all foreign aid. Yet as the U.S. moves into the global economy that depends increasingly on the economic development and growth of all countries, American aid, trade and investment all play vital parts in the well-being of the U.S. economy. What is the outlook for foreign assistance funding in the current Congress and how are Members’ attitudes shaped by new budgetary constraints being forced by the growing national debt? This panel of experts will explore the value of foreign aid, its successes and failures and how it might be better targeted for maximum effectiveness in the future.
The Panel
Charles O. Flickner, Jr. is former staff director of the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, a position he held from 1995 to 2003. Prior to coming to the House, he served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee from 1974 to 1994. From 1969 to 1970, he served in a mechanized infantry unit of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. He is author of the chapter, “Removing Impediments to an Effective Partnership with Congress,” in Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership (CSIS, Brookings, 2007). He earned a B.S. degree from Loyola University in 1969, and pursued graduate studies at the University of Virginia from 1970 to 1974.
Donald M. Payne is a Democratic Representative of the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives where he has served since 1989. He is the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere. He is also a senior member of the House Education and Labor Committee where he serves on the Subcommittee on Early childhood, Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. He also serves as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation whose mission is to advance the global black community by developing leaders through internships and fellowship programs, and to inform policy and educate the public. He previously served as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. Prior to his election to Congress as the first elected African American from New Jersey, he served on various municipal and county offices in and around Newark, as an executive of the Prudential Insurance Company, Vice-President of Urban Data Systems, Inc., and as an educator in the Newark and Passaic Public School Districts. He is a graduate of Seton Hall University, and pursued graduate studies at Springfield College in Massachusetts.
Carol J. Lancaster is Dean of the School of Foreign Service and a Professor of Politics at Georgetown University. She previously directed Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown from 2005 to 2009 and before that GU’s African Studies Program from 2004 to 2005. During the Clinton administration she served as the Deputy Administration of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1996, and during the Carter administration as a member of the policy planning staff at the Department of State from 1977 to 1980, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of African Affairs. She has published numerous books and articles on the politics of foreign aid and development including, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development and Domestic Politics (2007), and, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (2008). She earned a BSc degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and MSc and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from the London School of Economics.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran is senior correspondent and associate editor at The Washington Post where he has worked in various capacities since joining the paper in 1994 as a reporter on the metropolitan staff. His positions included being been a correspondent in Cairo and Southeast Asia, assistant managing editor, and bureau chief in Baghdad for the first two years of the Iraq war. He is the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a best-selling account of the troubled American effort to reconstruct Iraq. He recently completed his second stint as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, this time working on a book that focuses on counterterrorism in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Stanford University.
2. Regional Implications of the Conflict in Somalia, CSIS, January 24, 10-11:30 am
Freelance Policy Analyst, Horn and East Africa
David W. Throup
Senior Associate, CSIS Africa Program
Moderated by
Richard Downie
Fellow and Deputy Director, CSIS Africa Program
B1 Conference Center, CSIS
1800 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
Regional involvement in Somalia’s conflicts has reached a new level, with all of its neighbors directly engaged in combat operations. Please join the CSIS Africa Program for a discussion of how the conflict is reshaping political and security dynamics in the Horn and East Africa region.
Please RSVP to Katie Havranek at africa@csis.org
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Member of Congress
Michael O’Hanlon
Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Joshua Foust
Fellow, American Security Project and Correspondent, The AtlanticWith US troop withdrawals moving forward, is an end in sight for the decade long war in Afghanistan? Will peace talks with the Taliban yield results? Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel to discuss what the end of the Afghan War might mean for American interests and the people of the region.*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
4. The Syrian Uprising Seen From The Arab World, IISS, January 24, 2-3:30 pm
Emile Hokayem
Senior Fellow for Regional Security
IISS-Middle East
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Coffee 1:45 pm – 2:00 pm
Discussion 2:00 – 3:30 pm
IISS-US
2121 K Street NW
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20037
Emile Hokayem will discuss developments in the Levant region, specifically Syria’s descent into civil war.
Mr Hokayem is the Senior Fellow for Regional Security at the IISS-Middle East in Manama, Bahrain. Previously, he was the Political Editor and international affairs columnist of The National and a resident fellow at the Henry L Stimson Center. He holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He recently returned from Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey and Lebanon, where he met with members of the Syrian opposition and the Free Syrian Army.
This meeting will be moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
5. Yemen’s Stalemate, January 25, GWU, 12:30-2 pm
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street NW
Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Richmond
Laurent Bonnefy, Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, France; Centre français d’archéologie et de sciences sociales de Sanaa, Yemen
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs; Director, Institute for Middle East Studies; Director, Middle East Studies Program, GW
Three leading political scientists discuss political dynamics and prospects for Yemen.
A light lunch will be served.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/yemenstalemate
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) and the Institute for Middle East Studies
RSS - Posts
