Month: January 2012
I condemn excessive force
This is the third in a series of posts about violence in Kosovo Saturday. I wrote yesterday:
I may need to adjust my view, but I’d like someone who was there to tell me that there was no physical provocation of the police, even after the police started to try to disperse the protesters.
Today, Amnesty International has condemned excessive use of force by the police, but noted:
Some media reported that protestors started to throw plastic bottles and other objects at the police at Besian, but all reports confirmed this took place only after the Kosovo police had intervened.
Good of Amnesty to add this bit, but it leaves me in a complicated situation. I join Amnesty in condemning any excessive use of force by the police, but that does not negate the main point of my posts yesterday and the day before: violence by the demonstrators is not justified, permissible, advisable, or otherwise a good idea. The Amnesty press release demonstrates my point: if the demonstrators had not resorted to violence, there would be nothing but an unequivocal condemnation of excessive police force.
I should note that I am a paid-up (not actually card-carrying) member of Amnesty International, so obviously I think they generally do a fine job. But I confess also to be suspicious about the assertion plastic bottles were thrown at the police: only plastic bottles? Numerous press accounts mention rocks and metal bars.
I also find it moderately annoying that Amnesty International does not list Kosovo as a country (it does list Taiwan, so it is not General Assembly membership that determines the list). There is something for deputy prime minister Paciolli to concern himself with: recognition by Amnesty International, and while he is at it he should try for Googleanalytics as well.
So there you have it: my adjusted view is that I condemn any use of excessive force by the Kosovo Police. In fact, I wonder on reflection why they did not just leave the demonstrators where they were–it was cold enough to make them move sooner or later. But I repeat what I said earlier: nonviolence is nonviolent. It needs to stay that way, almost no matter what the provocation.
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This week’s peace picks
2. US-Israel and Iran: Looming Military Confrontation? Atlantic Council, January 17, 3-4:30 pm January 17, 2012
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force on January 17 for a public briefing on the rising conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran. Tensions are mounting as the United States and Europe tighten economic sanctions against Iran, and Iran responds with a ten-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, and threatens to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel are preparing for their own joint military exercise, “Austere Challenge 12.” Are the chances for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran and between the United States and Iran increasing? Would Israel consult the United States before attacking the Iranian nuclear program? What would be the consequences for the region and world economy?Panelists will discuss these issues, the impact of the domestic political climates in Israel and the United States on Iran policy, and possible diplomatic approaches to the Iranian nuclear program.
The Iran Task Force, co-chaired by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West.
A discussion with
Michael Eisenstadt
Director, Military and Security Studies Program
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow
Brookings Institution
Introduction by
Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
Moderated by
Barbara Slavin
Senior Fellow, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
To attend, RSVP with your name and affiliation (acceptances only), to southasia@acus.org.
3. “The Western Balkans and the 2012 NATO Summit,” U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing, B318 Rayburn, January 18, 2 pm
As the United States and other NATO allies prepare for their summit in Chicago on May 20-21, this hearing will assess the current relationship with NATO of each of the countries of the Western Balkans with the goal of deeper engagement and further enlargement. While further enlargement of the European Union after Croatia’s entry next year remains a more distant goal, greater Euro-Atlantic integration has the potential to increase stability in the Western Balkans now, and strengthen the Alliance in the process. The focus of the hearing will be on what Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia need to do meet their respective Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including the building of democratic institutions and adherence to the rule of law at home. The hearing will also look at the potential contribution each could make to the NATO alliance, as well as NATO’s continuing role in deterring further violence and conflict in the Western Balkans.
Witnesses Scheduled to Testify:
Nida Gelazis, Senior Associate, European Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Daniel Serwer, Professor and Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (will particpate via Skype)
Ivan Vejvoda, Vice President for Programs, German Marshall Fund of the United States
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, is an independent agency of the Federal Government charged with monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords and advancing comprehensive security through promotion of human rights, democracy, and economic, environmental and military cooperation in 56 countries. The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. Senate, nine from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.
4. Author Event: Arsalan Iftikhar, “Islamic Pacifism” Busboys and Poets, January 18, 6 pm.
Arsalan Iftikhar will discuss and sign his book, “Islamic Pacifism: Global Muslims in the Post-Osama Era”. Arsalan Iftikhar is an international human rights lawyer, global media commentator, founder of TheMuslimGuy.com and global managing editor of The Crescent Post. Additionally, he is also a regular weekly legal affairs/political commentator for the National Public Radio (NPR) show Tell Me More with Michel Martin and a contributing writer for CNN.com and Esquire Magazine (Middle East edition). Co-sponsored by the Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). http://bbpbooks.teachingforchange.org/book/9781463553128. Free and open to everyone.
5. Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, U.S. Policy and Domestic Politics.
Featuring FPRI Senior Fellows
Shelley Rigger Davidson College
Vincent Wang University of Richmond
Terry Cooke GC3 Strategy, Inc.
Jacques deLisle Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Register for webcast/teleconference
In the January 14, 2012, elections, Taiwanese voters faced a choice between giving a second term to Ma Ying-jeou—who has pursued a policy of closer economic ties and broader rapprochement with the Mainland and who has drawn criticism for lackluster leadership, economic inequality and drawing to close to the PRC—and Tsai Ing-wen—whom Beijing and opponents in Taiwan portray as reckless proponent of independence and a threat to the economic gains achieved or promised by Ma’s policies. In voting for a legislature—for the first time held jointly with the presidential election, the Taiwanese electorate face a similar choice between retaining a supermajority for Ma’s KMT or giving Tsai’s DPP a larger share.
FPRI Senior Fellows Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wang, Terry Cooke and Jacques deLisle assess the elections’ meaning and implications: Why did the winners win and the losers lose? What does the outcome portend for cross-Strait relations during the next four years? What is likely to be the impact on U.S. policy toward, and relations with, Taipei and Beijing? What are the implications for the future of Taiwan’s democracy and for the significant economic, social and foreign policy decisions Taiwan’s government faces in the near term?
Shelley Rigger is the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. She has a PhD in Government from Harvard University and a BA in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University. She has been a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan (2005) and a visiting professor at Fudan University in Shanghai (2006). Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics: Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). She has published articles on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the national identity issue in Taiwan-China relations and related topics. Her current research studies the effects of cross-strait economic interactions on Taiwan people’s perceptions of Mainland China. Her monograph, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism’” was published by the East West Center in Washington in November 2006.
Vincent Wang is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department at the University of Richmond, specializing in international political economy and Asian studies. He has been a Visiting Professor or Fellow at National Chengchi University (Taipei), National Sun-Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung, Taiwan), El Colegio de Mexico, and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University (Seoul, South Korea). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. His latest and forthcoming publications cover the China-India rivalry, the rise of China, and China-Taiwan relations.
Terry Cooke is a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Asia Program and the principal director of GC3 Strategy, Inc., an international consultancy specializing in sustainability-related technologies and capital linkages between Asia and the U.S. Previously, Dr. Cooke was Director of Asian Partnership Development for the Geneva-based World Economic Forum. He has advised the Lauder Institute on global business outreach as a member of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School’s Department of Management. Dr. Cooke was a career-member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, with postings in Taipei, Berlin, Tokyo and Shanghai.
Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in US-China relations, Chinese politics and legal reform, cross-strait relations, and the international status of Taiwan.
Particpants will be able ask questions online or via the telephone. You may also submit questions via email: questions@fpri.org.
Friday, January 20
12:00 – 1:30 p.m. Eastern Time
This event is available exclusively
via webcast and teleconference.
Register for webcast/teleconference
- For more information contact 215 732 3774, ext 102 or fpri@fpri.org.
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Nonviolence is nonviolent
I’m taking flak for yesterday’s post on the violence between Albin Kurti’s demonstrators and the police in Kosovo yesterday. Most of the criticism is based on misunderstanding or distortion. I don’t know what RTK read over the air during the evening news, but I would urge those who were upset by it to read the entire original, then compose and submit a reasoned comment. I’ve published a few already. In the meanwhile, I’ll try to respond to what I have heard so far.
First, I wasn’t there, so I depended on news reports that the demonstrators were throwing rocks, which in my book is a violent act. Here is a BBC account:
Police said more than 30 officers were injured after protesters hurled rocks and metal bars at them in the town of Podujevo, and at the nearby border crossings of Merdare and Dheu i Bardhe….Police responded with tear gas and water cannon and a Reuters reporter saw several injured protesters in the ensuing clashes.
It is Martin Luther King day tomorrow in the U.S., so this is a fine weekend to make this point: nonviolence is nonviolent. It requires the demonstrators to resist the temptation to throw rocks, push the police, whack them with baseball bats or attack them in any way. This requires training and discipline.
The first time I sat down in a street for a cause was 1964 in Cambridge, Maryland, then a segregated city in which the police and National Guard were not on our side. We were civil rights demonstrators advocating equal treatment for the Black population. The National Guard, which was under state (not national) authority at the time, was armed with tear gas and bayonets. Yes, fixed bayonets. Had we in any way provoked them, there would surely have been a much worse mess than yesterday in Kosovo, including deaths. Had we tried to remain seated in the street, they would have dispersed or arrested us, or both. We would have had to remain nonviolent throughout that process as well, not resisting arrest or trying to escape, even when the tear gas burned and the billy clubs (or the bayonets) got used.
It appears to me that Albin is not exerting the kind of nonviolent discipline that nonviolence requires. He seems to me to be trying to provoke the authorities, knowing full well that they will hesitate to use lethal force. If I am correct about that, I stand by every word of what I wrote yesterday. If I am wrong, I may need to adjust my view, but I’d like someone who was there to tell me that there was no physical provocation of the police, even after the police started to try to disperse the protesters. As a citizen, you are not entitled to use force against the authorities just because they use force against you. The monopoly on the legitimate means of violence is theirs, even when they are in the wrong. You have the right to resist passively (not actively!) and sue them in court after the fact.
Of course Albin may reject this view and challenge the authorities with rocks or other means. If he does, he can expect to be arrested and tried.
I’ve also been challenged on grounds that I showed bias toward the Serbs by opposing the Albanian blockage of the border crossings and not the Serb embargo of Kosovar goods. This is wrong. I have decried the Serbian blockade of Kosovo and urged that it be lifted.
I have been told the underlying cause of what happened is that Prime Minister Hashim Thaci has refused to implement a parliamentary resolution calling for reciprocity with Serbia. All the demonstrators were trying to do is ensure that reciprocity.
There is a big difference in the American system of government between a Congressional resolution, which the executive branch can ignore, and a law, which it cannot. Even with a law, there is often some leeway in implementation. In a case like this, where implementation requires the cooperation of another sovereign government, it may well take time and effort to get results. Thaci’s government has chosen the route of negotiation without (further) unilateral action. Whether that is wise or not, Albin is entitled to demonstrate against it, to speak against it in parliament, but not to try to implement the resolution by blocking the roads.
A final concern I heard yesterday was that this might lead to civil war within Kosovo. That I take very seriously. Kosovars, from Albin Kurti to Hashim Thaci, should take stock now and come to the realization that further incidents of this sort are in no one’s interest. The Serbs have already done themselves tremendous damage by blocking the roads in northern Kosovo and challenging the international authorities, which has put at risk their hopes for European Union candidacy. How much sympathy with Kosovo do you think will survive in Washington, Brussels or even Tirana if you continue to fight with each other when there are so many more important things to do?
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Burma gets real, but how real?
There can be no doubting the significance of Burma’s moves in the past day or two: a massive release of amnestied political prisoners and a ceasefire with Karen ethnic insurgents. There have already been some smaller prisoner releases and cancellation of a Chinese-built dam, which was the subject of local protests. Elections for a limited number of parliamentary seats are scheduled for April 1. Aung San Suu Kyi, a political prisoner for decades, has agreed that her political party will participate.
A military junta has run Burma for almost 50 years. It was only in March that the junta turned over some authority to a “civilian” government. The current president, Thein Sein, spent his entire career embedded in the autocratic regime, mainly as a military officer. Among other distinctions, he ran the much criticized relief effort after Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
Thein Sein seems to have the backing of the generals for a dramatic shift in Burma’s course, one that has already elicited from the United States a Secretary of State visit and an intention to name an ambassador. There has been none in Burma since 1990, in protest of military regime policies, but the embassy remains open under a Chargé d’Affaires.
I am not a great believer in brilliant diplomatic strokes. Most seem that way only in retrospect. Diplomacy is usually a long, hard slog. When the full story is told, this one too may turn out to be more Sisyphean than Herculean.
But I still can’t help but note the incredible difference with what is going on today in Syria or Yemen (and what went on previously in Libya). The Burmese autocratic leadership, after many years of using brutal repression, has decided to go in a different direction. The Middle East would look very different today if Bashar al Assad and Ali Abdullah Saleh had decided likewise before it was too late. Burma has at least an opportunity now to go down the well-trodden Asian road to a more open political system. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and others have achieved democratic reform and improved economic prosperity without violent revolution.
Still, it is not clear how far the Burmese generals intend things to go. Are they opening up the system in a way that will lead to their own loss of power? Or is this an effort to open a restricted space for civilian political competition and governance, with the generals keeping at least control of security and foreign policy? How will they react to efforts to establish accountability for past abuses of human rights? What if it proves difficult to extend the ceasefire with the Karen and other ethnic groups into political settlements? Some of the political prisoners released yesterday had been released years ago, only to be re-arrested. Could it happen again?
What is happening in Burma is real, but just how real is not yet clear.
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Violence answers the wrong question
People will ask, so I’ll answer: the efforts by Albin Kurti’s “Self-determination” to block road crossings between Serbia and Kosovo are violent and unacceptable. The Pristina authorities are right to counter it with their police forces. They should do it professionally to minimize injuries, but they need to do it. Albanians are no more justified in blocking roads than Serbs in northern Kosovo were several weeks ago.
Why is this happening? It is happening because Albin sees votes in it. He has staked out a position in Kosovo politics that includes sharply contesting Serbia at every turn, advocating union with Albania and rejecting the internationally imposed Ahtisaari plan under which Kosovo gained independence. He is entitled to take all these positions, with which I disagree. But he is not entitled to physically challenge the Kosovo authorities.
I have talked with Albin about this and many other issues. I have even pressed for the State Department to give him a visa to come to the U.S., where he would hear from a lot more people like me who think he is doing the wrong things. He wants the visa. But he isn’t going to get one until he stops the violence.
There likely isn’t much chance of that until the people of Kosovo make it clear that violence does not win their votes. Even then, Albin may be so addicted that he will continue, but hopefully associates will rein him in. They would do best to start now, before this ends in tragedy.
The right question for Kosovars today is not how they can best fight Serb oppressors, but how they can best govern themselves. Even in its current democratized form, Serbia has not made that an easy question to answer: it has refused to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence, to withdraw its security forces from the north and to allow Kosovo’s authorities to control the border. But those are issues that need to be solved by negotiation, not violent challenges to Kosovo’s legitimate authorities.
That said, Albin and Self-determination are products of the Kosovo political system. So long as they forswear violence, they are entitled to participate and press their perspective. But they won’t be helping to govern Kosovo the way it should be governed. Voters will have to decide whether to reward them, or not.
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Algeria: hoping for reform, not revolution
I missed parts of Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci’s presentation this morning at CSIS–urgent phone calls kept me out at the beginning and the end. But the overall tone was clear: Arab spring in Algeria will bring reform, not revolution.
The minister’s list of planned reforms included:
- the percentage of women in parliament will rise from the current 7% to 30%,
- judges (rather than the government) will run the spring elections,
- there are over 70 newspapers,
- radio and TV will be open to the private sector for investment in 2012,
- there will be increased transparency, economic and political freedom.
He was vague about reforms in the hydrocarbon sector and in the economy more generally. He also justified the rapid rise of imports as necessary to building infrastructure.
Asked about a possible Islamist victory in the elections, the minister said he was certain the military would respect the election results. He also noted that in accordance with the 2005 constitution, approved in a referendum, “those responsible Algeria’s tragedy” would not be allowed back into political life.
Big on non-intervention in internal affairs, the minister claimed Algeria is developing good relations with the new authorities in Libya and has improved relations with Morocco. On Syria, he noted that the Algerian who resigned as an Arab League human rights monitor came from civil society, not the government. Noting some cooperation from the Syrian government and some arming of the opposition, he thought the Arab League should continue its efforts with a view to a political resolution of the crisis.
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