Nonviolence in Syria revisited

Yesterday was busy on peacefare.net, with some vigorous comments and tweets about my post on Syria.  I thought I might review the bidding this morning.

First my own error:  I meant the first line to say that TheAtlantic.com‘s headline on my piece, “Why the Syrian Free Army should put down their guns,” was infelicitous, not felicitous (and I’ve made that change in the post).  The piece never calls for them to put down anything.  What I said was this:

It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed.

Taking guns away from people in the midst of war just doesn’t work, in Syria or anyplace else.  Only when Syrians feel secure will they give up their weapons.

That day I fear is a long way off.  One of my critics writes:

Assad will not go until there is a gun to his head, period.

That may be correct, but there is no telling when some brave soul will do the necessary. I believe the odds of that happening increase if the protesters can maximize the numbers of people demonstrably joining their effort. Violence by the regime is intended to keep their numbers down.  But violence by the FSA does too.

One tweet yesterday asked if I would send my children off to a demonstration in Syria given the behavior of the regime. The answer is no, I would not. Nor would any responsible parent. That is why I suggested less dangerous forms of protest. If all the ones I have mentioned have been tried, maybe it is time to try some new ones.

Another commenter says:

Nonviolence may work where the government either worries about its international reputation (the British in India, the U.S. South, So. Africa), or where it has decided in advance to retreat (Russians from Eastern Europe), or where the power structures are willing to give up an unpopular ruler to preserve their own position (Romania, Serbia, Egypt).

I don’t think this accurately describes the situations cited, or exhausts the possiblities. All governments, even autocratic ones, depend on the consent of the governed. In autocracies, that consent is compelled through fear. Bashar al Assad is trying–with considerable success–to re-instil fear in the Syrian population. That is what the protesters need to counter: not the use of force, but the fear it engenders. Thinking strategically about how that can be accomplished–something I admit only Syrians can seriously do–is vital.

That is what I am not seeing, though of course it may be happening behind the scenes. It would require careful analysis of the regime’s main pillars of support (some minorities, middle class, army, intelligence services, police, Iran, Russia?) and definition of courses of action to undermine them. Some will of course prove “softer” targets than others, but all have a stake in the regime and need to be weaned from providing it support. I don’t see how the little violence of which the FSA is capable today contributes to the strategic objective.

Nor do I think the constant refrain of those calling for “safe areas” is wise.  Safe areas aren’t safe.  They have to be made safe.  They did not succeed in Bosnia.  They utterly failed to protect the people who were in them and exposed them to the worst genocidal behavior of the war.  The failure brought international intervention, which I suppose is what some advocates of a safe areas in Syria hope will happen.  I’m convinced it won’t.  Eliminating Syria’s air defenses and destroying its artillery would be a major military operation conducted against a Russian ally a few weeks before Putin’s re-election.  It isn’t going to happen, before the elections or thereafter.

A word about covert support to the FSA, which is what people I have a lot of respect for over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs are touting as a “least worst” military option. Presumably the Turks, who apparently have “lost” some military officers on the wrong side of the border, are already engaged in this. Without air support (NATO’s contribution in Libya), I have little confidence that supplying weapons will do much for the FSA, which seems to have quite a few already. Organization and discipline count for a lot in war, and that is what the FSA lacks (and will find hard to obtain under current conditions).

Even if they manage somehow to get organized and under more centralized control, the best the FSA is going to be able to manage is a military contest that amounts to civil war, which from the American perspective is the worst of all possible worlds.  Far better to support a ceasefire, withdrawal of the Syrian army from population centers, and return of the Arab League observers in far larger numbers than before, preferably with UN support.  That won’t put Homs back to the status quo ante, but it will give Syrian citizens another chance at demonstrating nonviolently that they have withdrawn their consent from the murderous regime of Bashar al Assad.