peacefare.net

Silence on the main issues

Sometimes the things that don’t happen are more important than the things that do.  What did not happen last month were talks between the P5+1 (that’s the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China + Germany) and Iran.  Turkey announced repeatedly its willingness to host such talks, but the Iranians apparently never responded to a European Union letter stating that the talks would have to focus on access to all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and demonstrating that it is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Likewise, sometimes the things not said are more important than what is said.  Hossein Mousavian, in a Foreign Affairs article last week proposes a grand bargain between Washington and Tehran:

The United States and Iran should also work together on establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban’s full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq; creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability; cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by strengthening the ties between their people through tourism, promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.

This is not new:  it is well known that Iran and the U.S. have many common interests.  But Mousavian, who has been associated with the Iranian nuclear program in the past but is on the outs with President Ahmedinejad and is now at Princeton, has only the vaguest things to say about it:

Together, the two countries should draft a “grand agenda,” which would include nuclear and all other bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed; outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side can gain by achieving it.

He nevertheless declares:

There is a peaceful path — one that will satisfy both Iranian and U.S. objectives while respecting Iran’s legitimate nuclear rights.

There may be such a peaceful path, but the only way of finding out is to open the Iranian nuclear program completely to international scrutiny, as the EU letter required.  At this point, no one believes the Iranian claims.  Silence on the issue does not bode well for an agreement.

Mousavian also calls for the U.S. to drop regime change as a goal.  This is the issue on which the American Administration is silent.  It is the primary issue for the Iranians, who no doubt see what is going on in Syria today as a proxy war fought with the U.S.  If Bashar al Assad is forced to step down, it would not only hurt Iranian interests in Syria and in Lebanon but also, they fear, presage regime change in Tehran.  In addition, they fear use of Iran’s many minority populations–Azeri, Kurdish, Baloch and others–to incite rebellion and weaken the regime.

It is not clear whether this or any American Administration can give up on regime change.  Especially in the lead-up to the American presidential elections, all the political pressure is for a tougher stance on Iran, not a weaker one.  The same is likely to be the case in Iran, where the political pressure will weigh heavily against opening the nuclear program to international inspection.

I fear that it will only be in November that political conditions in the U.S. will permit a serious dialogue to take place.  It should focus on what really counts for both sides:

• for the Americans, that means guarantees that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons (even if it continues to have enrichment technology);
• for the Iranians, it means guarantees that the U.S. is not pursuing regime change.

How would the U.S. guarantee it is not pursuing regime change?  I imagine mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations would be involved, and there might need to be a bilateral agreement of some sort pledging mutual non-interference in internal affairs. That would be very difficult for the U.S. to swallow.

Of course November is a long time in the future–perhaps past the time Israel is willing to wait before taking military action.

In the meanwhile, it may be wise to reach out to elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as Mehdi Khalaji suggests, though he is notably silent on how and where to do this.  The symmetrical advice to the Iranians would be to reach out to the Republicans.  It is not obvious that will be any easier.

For a far more detailed treatment of the nuclear issues, see Mark Hibbs:  “Engage Iran”–What Does It Mean?  He does not treat the regime change part of the equation, which so far as I can tell is left out of all Western writing on the subject of Iran.