Pyramid scheme

I am indebted for this post to a Facebook note from Tamara Wittes pointing out her optimistic testimony on Egypt, in contrast to the pessimistic testimony of Eric Trager that I had tweeted previously.  Both spoke at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia on February 15.  Rarely have I seen sharper, or more intelligently framed, contrasting views on an issue of major importance to the United States.

Trager argues that Egypt is headed definitively in an anti-Western direction, due to the strong showing by Islamists in its parliamentary elections and the unreliability of the Egyptian army.  He thinks the Muslim Brotherhood will remain uncompromising, citing the way it selects its candidates, its earlier performance in parliament, and its unwillingness to be outflanked by more extreme Islamists, who also did well in the elections.   He argues for a tightened focus of U.S. policy on top priorities, including maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, protection of religious minorities and fighting terrorism.  He also argues for being prepared to use the $1.3 million in annual military funding and U.S. support for Egypt in international organizations as leverage.

Wittes, less certain of the direction Egypt is heading and hopeful the ideals and youth of the revolution will not be betrayed , argues for the opposite:  a broad partnership with the Egyptian people as well as the government they elect.  She wants to focus on the long-term and not over-react to the current Egyptian crackdown on foreign, including American, democratization programs.  Egyptians, she points out, reject terrorist violence, treasure regional stability, oppose nuclear proliferation and need a thriving economy.  These factors align their interests with the U.S., which can be helpful on all these fronts.  She sees particular promise in the economic pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood, which will be under pressure to deliver improved conditions sooner rather than later.  Implicitly at least, she would oppose use of our leverage, at least for now.

Who is right?  It seems to me Trager has the advantage when it comes to analyzing the Muslim Brotherhood’s likely inclinations.  He has studied the organization with care and knows of what he speaks.

But that does not mean he is entirely correct in his policy choice, which runs the risk of pushing the Muslim Brotherhood in the very direction we don’t want to see it go.  Already some in the Muslim Brotherhood, in response to noises from the Congress about the U.S. assistance, are promising abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel if the assistance is cut off.  Use of leverage can be self-defeating, especially if the antagonist has an alternative.  At current oil prices well over $100/barrel, it would not be difficult for Saudi Arabia or another Gulf country to take out a checkbook and replace U.S. assistance.  A billion and change just isn’t what it used to be.

It seems to me our best bet is to combine Trager’s realism about the Muslim Brotherhood’s inclinations with some of Wittes’ perceptiveness about common interests.  John McCain and other Congresspeople who were in Cairo yesterday will have already tested our $1.3 billion in bilateral military leverage to try to spring the Americans involved in democratization efforts there.  The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces as well as the Muslim Brotherhood will have told them how unproductive it would be for Washington to cut off the assistance.  It will take some time before we can reload that musket and use it again.

If the Muslim Brotherhood is going in a more pragmatic direction, which more than one report reaching my ears suggests is true, it is largely because of the Egyptian economic situation, which is going off a cliff.  The key there is not the bilateral American assistance but rather the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which have vastly greater resources at their disposal.  Trager is right to suggest that U.S. leverage in those organizations can be mobilized in support of top priority objectives.  The IMF and World Bank would be foolish to put money on the line for Egypt if the peace treaty is in doubt.

The fundamental problem in Egypt is that there is still no social consensus on where the revolution to go.  The military takeover cut short the conversation and diverted it into debates over how and when the constitution should be written and the president should be elected.  But those are means towards broader ends. The country still needs a broad national dialogue on the kind of society and government its citizens want to see.

The parliament will now choose a committee to write the constitution.  This should not be done behind closed doors, as just about everything else has been done since the army took over.  A broad public consultation would serve Egypt’s interests, and ours, much better.  In the meanwhile, the United States would be wise to heed Trager’s warnings, but try to move patiently and cautiously towards the realization of Wittes’ goals.  Call it an American-style pyramid scheme.