Bear apparent

The Russian role in the Balkans has long been of great concern to some of my Western-oriented friends there, even though it arouses little interest in Washington, DC.  Milan Marinković tries to explain why it is important:

Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin is chiefly known for incidents he occasionally makes. His public warnings to Belgrade as to the consequences Serbia will face should it dare to join NATO no longer raise eyebrows.

The more aggressive stance Konuzin takes, the more popularity he wins among Serbs. At a recent pre-election convention of the Serbian progressive party (SNS), Konuzin was a guest together with several Western diplomats. Even though SNS declares itself pro-EU, the party stalwarts booed the Westerners in attendance but greeted Konuzin with a standing ovation.

According to opinion polls, SNS is the most popular party in Serbia and the main rival to the currently ruling Democratic party (DS) of President Boris Tadic in the forthcoming elections. SNS’s possible rise to power could afford the Kremlin an opportunity to further increase its influence in Serbian politics.

Serbia hopes to benefit from the risky tactic of balancing between Moscow and Brussels.  In 2008 Belgrade sold its oil monopoly NIS to Russian state-owned behemoth GAZPROM – many believe in return for Russia’s support on Kosovo.  Whatever was behind the decision, the transaction has allowed Moscow to pursue its interests in Serbia more assertively.

The monopoly in energy supplies is one of several levers Russia has at its disposal. Others include various historical ties between the two nations, most notably religious and cultural ones.  Serbia is dubbed “little Russia” in the Balkans. Russophilia is widespread among Serbs, which facilitates lobbying for Russia’s interests. The most active pro-Kremlin lobbyists in Serbia are senior officials of conservative nationalist parties along with several prominent members of the dominant faction within Serbian Orthodox Church – by far the most influential (nominally) non-governmental institution in the country.

At this point, Serbia is not counted among top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Russia plans to expand its sphere of influence in concentric circles.  Moscow is currently looking to consolidate its power in the former Soviet Union’s periphery in order to set the stage for a prospective “Eurasian union.”

The second phase of Russia’s geopolitical expansion would involve ex-member states of the Warsaw Pact from Central and Eastern European.  Serbia – and Balkans in general – most likely are scheduled for the third round. Until then, the Kremlin will seek to maintain the level of influence it already has in Serbia and will not hesitate to augment it whenever an opportunity presents itself.   Keeping Serbia out of NATO is a vital part of this strategy.

The natural counterbalance to Russian power in the Balkans is Turkey.  The two countries already compete in Bosnia.  Belgrade and Ankara have significantly strengthened bilateral relations in recent years, as Serbia wants to attract Turkish investment.  Pro-Russian circles in Serbia vehemently oppose Turco-Serbian rapprochement as harmful to Serbia’s national interests.

Russia’s Balkan aspirations could be undermined by the country’s internal constraints. Moscow is already facing serious challenges, such as growing discontent over corruption and social inequalities, as well as seething Islamist militancy in the Caucasus region. Whether Russia will manage to regain its old glory and continue to expand its influence in the Balkans largely depends on how it deals with its own domestic issues.