Month: February 2012
The UN poised to act on Syria
Turtle Bay has helpfully posted the latest UN Security Council draft resolution on Syria. It does many good things (condemns the regime’s repression, calls for access for the Arab League monitors, international journalists and the UN, endorses the Arab League efforts, calls for accountability), but the key question is whether it is sufficient to initiate a transition in Syria away from the Assad regime. Here are the most relevant provisions:
6. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, without prejudging the outcome;
7. Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States;
The text fails to call for Bashar al Assad to step down or transfer authority to his vice president, an apparent concession to the Russian view that the UNSC is not about regime change. The real clinker here is “without prejudging the outcome,” which is intended to shield Bashar.
My guess is that this is nevertheless sufficient to initiate a transition, provided the Arab League, the Americans and the Europeans stay firm and united (and the text is not watered down further). This means maintaining sanctions and pushing for Bashar to step aside, even though the resolution is not explicit on this point. The UNSC may not want to call for his ouster, but the Arab League and individual member states are entitled to press for it. It is impossible to picture “a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition” unless he does, since at least some of the Syrian opposition will be unwilling to meet under Bashar’s auspices.
The resolution rules out any authorized use of force: “nothing in this resolution authorizes measures under Article 42 of the Charter.” But for now at least that is fine. No one outside Syria is prepared to use force there.
The concluding provision for an Arab League report on implementation within 21 days and every 30 days thereafter is a yawn to most of us, but of course it is important to ensure that this issue get back regularly to the Security Council without the Russians running interference. If the Russians defy my prediction and don’t veto, this resolution could set the snowball in motion and we may well see the back of Bashar al Assad before spring.
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Belgrade has to bite the bullet
I could quibble about details in the ICG’s latest report on Kosovo and Serbia. It minimizes Belgrade’s role in north Kosovo too much, it is too critical of the EU’s current posture on candidacy for Serbia, and it fails to take adequately into account the political pressure Albin Kurti is generating inside Kosovo. I disagree with ICG’s advocacy of “Ahtisaari plus,” a rubric guaranteed to face rejection in Pristina and lead eventually to partition. “Ahtisaari implementation” is a better approach.
But I won’t quibble. This is a good report full of interesting details and basically sound analysis, with some good policy conclusions. A little good will would go a long way, and good will is absolutely necessary. The problem in north Kosovo will not be solved until there is solid cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina as well as decent rapport between Pristina and the Serbs in the north. These are main messages of the report, and they are correct.
None of it is likely to happen any time soon. The referendum February 14-15 in the north on acceptance of the Pristina-based institutions will further poison an already toxic political environment. So too will Serbia’s spring parliamentary elections, especially (as ICG notes) the effort to hold them in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. Albanian firebrand Albin Kurti will no doubt find a way to embarrass Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for not preventing the referendum and elections from happening. Northerners will continue to block routes and prevent implementation of the EU-sponsored customs agreement, unless Belgrade makes a truly concerted effort to cut them off.
ICG is at pains to suggest that Germany, the Netherlands and the UK should ease up a bit on their conditions for Serbia’s EU candidacy. My guess is that won’t happen. None of those countries is particularly anxious to proceed apace with EU enlargement. All have reasons to want to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are prepared to play hard ball and not lower the bar for EU candidacy. And Serbia’s refusal to allow proper customs collection at its boundary/border with Kosovo is a serious disqualification for candidacy. A bit more consistency in the EU approach would be helpful, but I don’t think that is really the heart of the problem.
ICG has it right when it says the fundamental issue is sovereignty. This is the bullet Belgrade has to bite. It doesn’t have to recognize Kosovo or establish diplomatic relations, but it has to accept the fact that the Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo. As ICG quite rightly points out, Serbia cannot otherwise continue to appeal to Security Council resolution 1244, which has no provision for dividing authority and no provision for continuing the presence in Kosovo of Serbian institutions.
This does not mean that Pristina would or could govern the Serbs in the north, who under the Ahtisaari plan that Pristina has accepted have ample room for self-governance. No doubt there will be some need for additional implementation agreements to reassure the northerners that money will flow to them from Belgrade without interference and that they will get fair treatment in Pristina-based institutions, especially the courts. These are legitimate concerns that Pristina should be prepared to discuss, provided the sovereignty question is resolved.
Until Belgrade is prepared to acknowledge that it has lost the right to station security forces or other state institutions anywhere in Kosovo without Pristina’s permission, I fear we won’t see much good will or the good things it could produce. But I am glad ICG, which I have criticized sharply in the past for its reports on Bosnia, has given me good reason to offer props this time.
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Threats should drive responses
I’m not big on Administration testimony in Congress, as it tends to the soporific. But I enjoyed skimming Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony Tuesday in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This “Worldwide Threat Assessment” is worth a glance.
First the obvious caveats: this is unclassified testimony lacking in vital details. Clapper would not want to tip our policy hand by saying too much about Iran, China, Al Qaeda or any number of other challenges. This is testimony meant to give a broad picture of many challenges, not a deep dive into even the top priorities. The fact that the media has focused principally on its mention of the possibility of Iranian terrorist acts in the U.S. tells us more about the U.S. media than about Clapper’s view of the threats.
His introductory remarks give a hint of where he is going:
Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to US national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies.
It is nevertheless striking that many threats have receded and others have developed more slowly than many of us imagined they might. According to Clapper, global jihad is fragmenting, a mass casualty attack in the U.S. is unlikely, Al Qaeda central is in decline, Iran and North Korea are not imminent nuclear threats, Afghanistan faces problems that arise as much from its own government as from the Taliban… Of course the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, as the sign in our high school coaches’ room said, but this is not the worst of all possible worlds.
It behooves us to use this respite well. It won’t last. The odds are for trouble with Iran this year, and there is no ruling out a successful terrorist attack, no matter how weak Al Qaeda gets. Clapper is remarkably silent on Pakistan and even China–I imagine that most of what he had to say is classified. Either one could cause serious difficulty, Pakistan by continuing to exploit the Taliban inside Afghanistan and China by challenging U.S. efforts to contain its growing military and political presence in the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa.
In the meanwhile, it would be wise to prepare well for the priorities Clapper cites. Their distinguishing characteristic is that none of them are amenable to purely military solutions. Terrorism, proliferation, cybersecurity and counterintelligence all fall in the unconventional warfare box. They are far more amenable to policing, diplomacy, strategic communications, and cooperation with allies than the more conventional military threats.
This is the context in which we should be evaluating the Defense, State and intelligence community budgets. The civilian side of the budget equation should be strengthened, in the name of national security. The military side should be maintained and even improved in important respects, but the notion that current cuts in personnel and hi-tech conventional weaponry are sufficient is not likely to hold. Fighter aircraft are just not very useful in dealing with the main threats, and the improved performance of the new ones is bought at a very high price.
What we need to do is begin considering the defense budget in a broader context. What can the weapons we are buying do to counter the threats we are facing? This is such an obvious question it is almost embarassing to ask it. But threats should indeed drive responses.
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The likely Russian veto
Russia faces a big decision in the UN Security Council: whether to veto the draft resolution on Syria, or use the threat of a veto to extract further concessions in the text and then go along, maybe by abstaining.
There are ample reasons for Moscow to veto. In its current form the resolution foresees “delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his Deputy to fully cooperate with the national unity government in order to empower it to perform its duties in the transitional period.” If seriously implemented, this would mean the end of Bashar al Assad, though not necessarily of his sidekicks. Farouk al-Sharaa, the vice president, is a solid Assad regime type. But once a transition is set in motion, it will be difficult for Moscow to prevent it from gathering momentum.
That is not something Prime Minister Putin would like to see happening, especially in the run-up to Russia’s own March 4 presidential election. Putin will want to maintain his image as strong, unmoveable and defiant of the West. Russian protesters will view any concession on Syria in the Security Council as an incentive to up their game: if Syrians can displace an autocrat, why can’t Russians follow suite?
So the odds are in favor of a Russian veto this week, but there is still a slim possibility they would allow a defanged resolution to pass. The text is already less than crystal clear on what is supposed to happen. It reads like an obfuscated “puzzler” on Car Talk. The part immediately preceding the text on delegation of powers to the vice president reads this way:
Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ initiative set out in its 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States, aimed at:
So the delegation of powers is not to happen right away. There is to be a serious political dialogue aimed at the delegation of powers. There is lots of wiggle room here: what is the “whole spectrume of the Syrian opposition?” Elements of the opposition will likely refuse to take part. Who is to blame if the dialogue doesn’t happen? What if it takes a long time?
The main Russian concern will be to ensure that any resolution passing the Security Council cannot be interpreted as authorizing the use of force against the Syrian regime. While the Arab League has been at pains to emphasize that it is not asking for military intervention but rather indicating a way forward that will avoid it, the resolution still has a few points on which the Russians can be expected to balk. For example:
stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to resort to the use of force or the threat of force,
Moscow will want that to read “nothing in this resolution permits States…” Nor will Moscow like this bit at the end:
Decides to review Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 15 days and, in the event that Syria has not complied, to adopt further measures, in consultation with the League of Arab States;
Moscow will read “further measures” as opening the door to military intervention.
But these points seem to me negotiable: the West and the Arab League are far from pressing for the use of force against Bashar al Assad, even if some of the Syrian opposition would support it. How would President Obama justify another war in the Middle East in the midst of an election campaign? Only if Bashar al Assad is dumb enough to commit truly mass atrocities, which he so far has avoided on a daily basis, even as the numbers add up to well over 5000. Washington does not want to engage militarily–it is far more likely to make the mistake of throwing its weight behind the Free Syrian Army, perhaps clandestinely.
If the Russians can get a real commitment to no use of force, and if they would like this problem to go away and not come back before their own elections, they might even abstain on a resolution that, while changed from the current draft, is not too far off in its general outlines. I’m not holding my breath, just hoping that somehow the UNSC can finally move on what is a major threat to international peace and security. Getting the outlines of a transition plan through the Security Council is only a first step, but that’s how journeys start.
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