The revolution needs better terrain
How do you know when the revolutionaries are losing? When the world starts lining up to arm them. The latest to join this parade is the respected former National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, who rightly argues that the moral argument is overwhelming. The problem is that the strategic argument is not.
To his credit, Steve recognizes the counterarguments:
Arming Syrians seeking their freedom would have its costs. Bashar al-Assad will brand it as outside intervention and wrap himself in the Syrian flag. His efforts to rally especially uncommitted Syrians in defense of Syrian sovereignty will further divide an already-riven society. And it may not force the Assad regime from power anytime soon.
He even adds:
Saying that Assad has lost legitimacy and ultimately will fall is cold comfort. The longer this struggle goes on, the more militarized it will become. The more militarized it becomes, the more Syria’s future will be dictated by who has the most guns, not who gets the most votes. Look at the Libyan Transitional National Council’s struggle to control that country’s militias, and contrast that with the more democratic evolution in Tunisia.
And the more militarized the Syrian struggle becomes, the greater the opportunity for al-Qaeda. Events in Somalia and Yemen show how al-Qaeda thrives on chaos and violence. For the sake of preserving human life and a democratic future for Syria, the Assad regime needs to go now.
I agree with all of that, but the fastest and most effective way of making him go quickly is not arming the opposition. That would take years and at best create an insurgency, one that will frighten away the business and minority support that is so vital to the revolution’s success in Syria. There is no sign yet of NATO, U.S. or EU interest in intervening militarily to support it. Historically, most insurgencies are defeated, though it takes a long time for that to happen. That is the worst of all possible worlds for the United States: a lengthy military contest, increasingly fought along sectarian lines, with likely spillover to Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.
What is the alternative? Those who want to displace Bashar al Assad need to shift the contest from the terrain on which he is strong–the military battlefield–on to the terrain where he is weak: political legitimacy and authority. This requires massive shows of popular support for displacing him, which are impossible under the wartime conditions the regime created in Homs over the past month.
The first requirement is a ceasefire. But a ceasefire is meaningless without neutral observers. The 160 or so Arab League observers/peacekeepers who have been withdrawn since the defeat of the UN Security Council resolution are nowhere near sufficient. Thousands will be needed. Why would Bashar let them in? Because he does not want the responsibility and expense of maintaining law and order, or feeding and housing people in the neighborhoods his forces have battered. He’ll want to keep close tabs on the effort and complain repeatedly about its ineffectiveness.
That’s all right so long as the international presence creates a relatively safe space for the citizens of Syria to begin governing themselves without respecting the authorities in Damascus. There will be less need for strikes or demonstrations–far better to focus on establishing and operating education and health systems that deliver services more effectively than the regime’s, which will have all but disappeared in the most ruined areas. Essentially, the internationals would be helping to create liberated areas. Bashar could object and even attack them, but if he does so he runs a far greater risk of international intervention than he has so far.
International legitimacy is another area in which Bashar is vulnerable. The Russians are the key in that sphere. Here is Putin’s latest:
“We don’t have a special relationship…It is up to the Syrians to decide who should run their country. We need to make sure they stop killing each other….”
Asked if Mr. al-Assad can survive, he said: “I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s obviously a grave problem. The reforms are long awaited and should be carried out. Whether the Syrian government is ready to reach a consensus, I don’t know.”
It is almost quaint for Putin to be talking about an autocratic government needing to reach a consensus, but apart from that false note this gives Bashar al Assad something important to worry about: whether he can hold on to the Russian veto in the Security Council after this weekend’s Russian presidential elections.
Internal and external legitimacy: that is the terrain on which Syria’s citizens need to contest Bashar al Assad.
PS: If you mix demonstrations with regime force, this is what you get (allegedly today in Homs):
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