Careful what you wish for
My friend in Niš, Milan Marinković, has been watching north Kosovo from a perch not far away. He writes:
Last summer Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić proposed that the problem of Kosovo should be solved by dividing its territory between Serbia and Albania. Dačić argued that there was no point in forcing Serbs and Albanians to live together when history had shown they could not coexist peacefully.
Minister Dačić should have been careful what he wished for. A few days ago, political representatives of Albanians from a region in southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo adopted a declaration in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the way Serbian authorities treated the ethnic Albanians and demanded the incorporation of the region into Kosovo. The idea of territorial division is thus threatening to turn into one of a territorial swap.
Such ideas are not only unacceptable from the perspective of European integration that both Belgrade and Priština aspire to. They also put at risk both Serbs and Albanians in areas where they are in the minority. In Kosovo, for example, the Albanians are the majority south of the Ibar, but the minority in the north; the opposite is true for the Serbs. Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s.
There is also a security concern. The Serb-dominated area in northern Kosovo is a no-man’s land ideal for smuggling and other illegal activities. Priština virtually wields no authority there, while Belgrade has only a limited impact. The local Serb politicians appear to be more loyal to nationalist opposition parties than to the Serbian government, as demonstrated by the referendum they held last month despite Belgrade’s strong disapproval.
The Ahtisaari plan, which provides for a wide degree of municipal autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, is increasingly proving to be a feasible solution for the Serbs from the enclaves. Nevertheless, those in the north refuse to give it even a thought, and Belgrade also continues to claim that the plan is unacceptable, even if it were supplemented to allow a special status for the northern Serbs.
Still, some positive signs are emerging. Belgrade and Priština finally reached the agreement on conditions under which Kosovo can be represented at regional conferences. This progress in the negotiations contributed decisively to EU candidate status for Serbia. More importantly, it provides hope that, with assistance of the international community, the two sides might find common ground on the issue of the north sooner than many would expect.
The Serbian elections in May will pose a critical test for Belgrade. Should Serbia abstain from holding the elections on the territory of Kosovo, it will be a clear indication of the country’s willingness to substantially change its policy toward the former province. In that event, the northern Kosovo Serbs would find themselves under unprecedented pressure to soften their position and become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
At the moment, all options remain open. In just a few months Serbia will get a new government. A new government at the beginning of its mandate is usually in a more comfortable position to take bold steps on sensitive issues than an outgoing one. If these bold steps happen to be the right steps, Serbia could be rewarded with a date for accession talks as early as in December.
A right step, to begin with, could be to explain to the Serbs from northern Kosovo that anything can be possible if you want to make it possible. When Mr. Dačić invoked historical experience to defend the assertion that they could not live together with Albanians, he apparently forgot the example of Germans and French. The formerly fiercest enemies jointly laid the foundation for what eventually would become the European Union.
Not only Serbia and Kosovo but all countries in the region share the same underlying problem which most of their troubles stem from. That problem is called – the economy. If they are to recover economically, they will have to cooperate closely rather than confront one another. The sooner we grasp this simple fact, the better.
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11 thoughts on “Careful what you wish for”
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Ditto! With a better economy on both sides, there would be less time and reason to worry about ethnic divisions.
In my opinion it works in the other side: with better or less worse ethnic divisions/relations, there would be more time and reason to worry about economy.
With regard to this I agree with what Milan Marinkovic writes: explaining to the Serbs from northern Kosovo that *anything can be possible if you want to make it possible* could be a good move to improve the situation. But why to discard the option to explain the same concept to the ethnic Albanians too? (instead of keeping to support their sort of micro-imperialism in the North, I mean)
Tadic tomorrow noon will officially call those May elections for all levels of government in Serbia, say the papers. Yesterday the State Secretary for the KiM Ministry – Oliver Ivanovic – said that holding elections in Kosovo “under the present conditions” would be unconstitutional as well as contrary to 1244, which the government hangs onto like a drunk the fence. (Except when it’s inconvenient, of course, and its own interpretation thereof, in any case.) It sounds like DS thinks they’ve found a dignified way out of the problem of not doing something they really don’t dare to do: the head of the Council of Europe is in town talking about “Serbia’s path to the EU,” which usually means somebody thinks the government is straying from it. (Ivanovic’s statement was reported in the Serb version of B92 yesterday, but like other interesting items in the past, wasn’t translated for the English version.)
If elections are not held in Kosovo, then the terms of those current holders of positions in the parallel institutions will soon expire, a neat solution to the problem of getting rid of what the present government must view as a major headache. They may be hoping that Prishtina will call elections and then have to deal with these same people under Ahtisaari.
On the other hand, Serbs employed in Kosovo by the Serbian government reputedly have been buying residences and businesses in Serbia proper for years now, and may see this as a sign to pack up and move on out. The old settlers will probably stay, as many have south of the river, remembering how many centuries they did manage to live in peace with the Albanians.
Elections will be held in Kosovo, the President of Parliament declared – in conjunction with UNMIK, as provided for under Resolution 1244. But, as Ivanovic pointed out in his statement, UNMIK has already turned over responsibility for holding elections to Prishtina. (No immediate response from the usual suspects.)
If I were writing fiction, I’d have Prishtina declare at this point that it’s perfectly willing and capable, with a little help from its international friends, to run special elections throughout Kosovo for the Serbian parliament, and help make Cedo the next PM. Careful what you wish for, indeed.
The northern Kosovo Serbs might have given greater consideration to some elaboration the Ahtisaari Plan if Pristina and its international friends – in the form of EULEX and KFOR – did not try to use force to impose it on them. But the Quint has not shown itself clever enough to be more patient and less confrontational.
And what would be wrong with a land swap anyway? Or a Greater Albania? Maybe redrawing ethnic borders where they can be and with agreement of those concerned would lesson ethnic tensions? http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/2012/03/just-whats-wrong-with-greater-albania.html
“And what would be wrong with a land swap anyway? Or a Greater Albania? Maybe redrawing ethnic borders where they can be and with agreement of those concerned would lesson ethnic tensions?”
I think it’s explained in the 3rd passage of the article, especially in its last sentence: “Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s”.
But even if the scenario of chaotic mass migrations was avoided somehow, the creation of virtually ethnically homogenous nation-states would not solve the common underlying problem of all of the region’s countries, which is the economy (as explained in the last passage). While the idea of land swaps may, arguably, prevent further interethnic conflicts, it certainly cannot prevent potential internal clashes between citizens of any country caused by continued deterioration of domestic socio-economic conditions.
There is never one magic bullet. Changing borders would not necessarily improve economies. But perhaps without the distraction afforded to political leaders to use stirring ethnic tensions, they might have to answer for their economic failures.
“The Ahtisaari plan, which provides for a wide degree of municipal autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, is increasingly proving to be a feasible solution for the Serbs from the enclaves.”
In fact the Ahtisaari Plan is a big fig leaf, hiding that some 250,000 people cannot return to their former homes, hiding that new pogroms are always possible in Kosovo (they are unthinkable in the Presevo Valley) and hiding that for Kosovo’s Serbs there is a big difference between having rights on paper and having them enforced in a court of law.
South of the Ibar the Ahtisaari Plan has been imposed mainly with a mix of violence and blackmail. The Serbs north of the Ibar have just shown in a referendum how they think about it. One can be sure the Serbs south of Ibar would do the same if they had the opportunity.
“The local Serb politicians appear to be more loyal to nationalist opposition parties than to the Serbian government, as demonstrated by the referendum they held last month despite Belgrade’s strong disapproval.”
Why must this be some conspiracy to undermine Tadic? Might it not be that these people are thinking about their own interests first? And did you notice that Leposavic – that is governed by Tadic’s party – took part in the referendum too?
“Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s.”
Dacic is no fool. He will be perfectly aware that if there is a discussion about Kosovo’s Northern border the Albanians will want to talk about Presevo too.
The “mass migrations” and the conflicts of the 1990s all started because the West wouldn’t allow any changes from the existing Yugoslav borders. We all know how that ended: because we were not prepared to change the borders in the end the people were moved to fit the borders. I can’t call this a very successful policy and I don’t see the need to apply this proven failure to Kosovo.
There is nothing in international law that forbids border changes. Do you really believe that the people who compiled those laws were fools?
Where do you get the 250,000 figure?
The figure of 200 to 230,000 as the number of exiles is already quite old and well known. In this case I added the internal refugees. I don’t have figures for their number but my estimate is very conservative.
If you see any reason to doubt those numbers please let me know.
Yet the Ahtisaari Plan provides a framework for those southern Kosovo Serbs that they would be foolish to not use as much as they can. Unfortunately, the moribund ICO and often biased EULEX have not done much to ensure the Plan is followed in detail and in spirit.