U.S. policy on the Western Balkans

The Johns Hopkins/SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations today published Unfinished Business – The Western Balkans and the International Community.  Editors Dan Hamilton and Vedran Džihić and selected authors (I’ll be among them) will unveil the book, based in part on a conference last summer in Sarajevo, this afternoon at 4:45 pm at SAIS (BOB, 1717 Massachusetts, room 500) on the occasion of the Southeast European Economic Forum. 

I submitted my chapter on “U.S. policy on the Western Balkans” a month ago, so a few items may be dated, but here it is:

More than twenty years ago Secretary of State James Baker said after a failed mission to preserve Yugoslavia as a single country:  “We got no dog in this fight.” Half a dozen wars and about $30 billion later, the Americans are too discreet to repeat the Secretary’s judgment, but they are anxious to avoid further American commitments and want to turn the Western Balkans over to the Europeans.

Baker was correct.  There were no vital American interests at stake in the Balkans in 1991.  No one there was threatening the safety and security of Americans at home or abroad.  We expected the Europeans to manage the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.  Jacques Poos had declared:  “The hour of Europe has dawned.”  Fresh from signing the Maastricht Treaty that claimed to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Europeans followed the German lead in recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia over U.S. objections. The U.S. trailed after.

The Americans eventually took the lead in the Balkans, intervening repeatedly.  This started with the NATO-enforced no-fly zone over Bosnia in 1993 and continued through the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, the deployment of IFOR in Bosnia in 1995/6 and the NATO war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999.  American peacekeeping troops stayed in Bosnia until the end of 2004 and they remain in Kosovo today.

These military interventions in the Balkans happened not because of a single over-riding vital or strategic interest but because of an accumulation of secondary interests in a relatively benign international environment.  American goals included:

• Preventing atrocities and refugee flows that risked radicalizing Muslim populations and destabilizing neighboring countries,
• calming the consequent domestic U.S. political reaction,
• maintaining U.S., European and NATO credibility, and
• reducing tensions within the Alliance.

Starting soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Balkans interventions faced relatively little opposition from a Russia distracted by its own transition problems and a China still emerging as a major economic power.  America was in its “unipolar” moment and faced few direct challenges around the world.  It sought, and still seeks, a Europe whole, free, democratic and at peace.

But the global situation today is dramatically changed.  The Council on Foreign Relations list of prevention priorities for 2012 includes 30 risks to U.S. national security, none of which is in the Balkans.  Lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exhausted the American military.  A financial crisis and severe recession have depleted its economic resources.  It still faces serious challenges from nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Iran as well as the global challenge of violent Muslim extremism.  China and Russia are no longer quiescent.  Though its economy and military are still the largest on earth, America needs to reduce its lower-priority commitments, contain its budget deficit and regain its economic vitality.

As a consequence, Washington is trying to extract itself from the Balkans gradually and prudently, turning over management of the relatively few remaining problems there to the Europeans, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The European Union took over the military role in Bosnia in 2004.  The Europeans also provide most of the troops in Kosovo, where only 13% are Americans.  The United Nations continues to try to resolve the Greece/Macedonia dispute.  The OSCE maintains democracy support missions in Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia.

American diplomatic goals in the Balkans focus today on four objectives:

• Maintaining stability and preventing any return to armed conflict;
• Preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
• Building the Kosovo state and establishing it as sovereign on its entire territory.
• Enabling all Western Balkan countries to qualify for and, if they wish, enter NATO and the EU.

The Americans are also seeking to pass off as much responsibility for the Balkans as possible to the EU, without compromising these objectives.

Maintaining stability and preventing any return to armed conflict

Only Bosnia and Kosovo present any serious visible threat to stability in the Balkans today.  The threat comes from those who would like to change borders to accommodate ethnic differences.  The fundamental Balkans quandary is this:  “why should I be a minority in your country, when you can be a minority in mine?”  The United States has gone along with changing the status of existing internal boundaries in the Balkans to international borders (all six of the former Yugoslav republics became independent in this way, as well as Kosovo), but it has staunchly resisted moving borders to separate ethnic groups, convinced that this would lead to instability and a return to armed conflict.

Republika Srpska (RS), an entity established on 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has undertaken a concerted effort to weaken the “state” (the central government in Sarajevo) and maximize its own autonomy.  Its current effort is directed mainly at detaching the RS courts from the state judicial system.  RS President Milorad Dodik has made no secret of his desire for eventual independence, but he is constrained from achieving that goal:  even Serbia would not risk its relationship with the European Union by recognizing RS as independent, and the international community would block overt moves in that direction.

If there is any risk of serious violence in Bosnia, it comes mainly from frustrated ambitions on the Federation side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line.  Some Bosnian Croats would like their own “entity,” and some Bosnian Muslims would like to see the end of the RS and its pretensions to independence.  Croatia, which sometimes flirts with supporting the idea of a “third entity,” can be expected to restrain the Bosnian Croats from violence.  The Americans are vital to restraining the Bosnian Muslims, who could conceivably react to Dodik’s provocations by trying  to seize Brcko, the northeastern Bosnian town that links the RS’s eastern wing (contiguous with Serbia) and its more populated Western wing (including its capital Banja Luka).

In Kosovo, the principal remaining threats of instability come from the north:  Belgrade continues to control “north Kosovo,” the area north and west of the Ibar river populated mostly by Serbs and contiguous with Serbia; Albanian militants are challenging the transit of goods from Serbia at eastern border posts.  Maintenance of stability in north Kosovo depends on NATO’s KFOR troops and the European Union’s rule of law mission (EULEX).  The Kosovo Police Service has primary responsibility for law and order in the rest of Kosovo.  It was accused of using excessive force in January 2012 to clear roads and disperse Albanian demonstrators organized by Albin Kurti, a firebrand who advocates “self-determination,” including the right of Kosovo to join Albania.

The only other problem posing a remote risk to stability in the Balkans arises from the “Macedonia name dispute.”  Since Macedonia’s independence in 1991, Greece has contested the use of the name Macedonia by its neighbor to the north, claiming that it represents an infringement on Greece’s heritage and even sovereignty.  Athens and Skopje agreed in 1995 that Greece would not block membership in international organizations of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” or The FYROM, the name by which the country became a UN member.  Athens’ refusal to implement this bilateral agreement at the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 kept Skopje out of NATO and has blocked Macedonia from receiving a date to begin EU membership negotiations.

Despite many years of UN talks (mediated by an American) and a December 2011 International Court of Justice opinion in favor of Skopje on use of The FYROM to enter international organizations, this issue has resisted resolution.  Ethnic Macedonians have become ever more nationalist as a result, a reaction that tends to aggravate tensions with ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, who constitute about one-quarter of the population.  Most Macedonian Albanians seek NATO and EU membership as quickly as possible, demur from nationalist Macedonian moves, and regard the dispute as a serious hindrance to their ambitions and welfare.  Albanian/Macedonian ethnic tensions boiled over into a near civil war in Macedonia in 2001.  That conflict ended in the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation over the past 11 years has redressed many Albanian grievances.  A repetition of violence appears unlikely, but the name issue should not be allowed to fester.

Preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton agreements that ended the Bosnian war in 1995 left Bosnia with a weak state that the international community worked hard to strengthen for the subsequent decade.  It is now generally recognized that the problem is a constitutional one.  The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has outlined more than 20 ways in which the Dayton constitution needs to be amended in order for Bosnia to become a European Union member.

The Americans tried hard in 2005/6 to encourage the Bosnians to revise the Dayton constitution with EU membership negotiations and responsibility in mind.  This effort (the April package) failed.  Two more attempts (Butmir I and II) were made in 2009, with the Swedish European Union presidency and a Deputy Secretary of State acting in tandem.  These also failed.

At this point, it seems unlikely that Washington will undertake another effort in the foreseeable future.  It appears to be focusing now on improving the functionality of the Federation, on the theory that doing so will eventually make it possible to strengthen the state government in the process of qualifying for European Union membership.

Little is being done at this point to push the RS into a closer relationship with the Federation or to strengthen the state-level government.  The international community “High Representative,” who at times in the past has used his powers to enforce the Dayton agreements and to strengthen the Sarajevo government, has lost the ability to intervene except in the most direct and obvious challenges to Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  EUFOR, the weak military presence that is now responsible for Bosnia, has little military capability to ensure that the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected. 

Building the Kosovo state and establishing it as sovereign on its entire territory

Kosovo, whose Albanian population in large part governed itself separately from the official Serbian institutions for ten years before 1999, found itself at the end of the NATO/Yugoslav war the subject of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.  This set up a UN administration to prepare the former province of Serbia for self-government and an eventual political decision on its status.  The UN proceeded gradually to turn over governing authority to the “Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,” seeking along the way to require that they meet elaborately defined standards (“standards before status”).

Subsequently, the EU led and the U.S. supported an extensive negotiation between Belgrade and Pristina on Kosovo’s “final status.”  This negotiation concluded with the “Ahtisaari plan,” which includes strong protection of minority rights and self-government for Serbian and other minority communities in Kosovo.  Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari plan, which it anticipated would resolve the final status question and lead to UN membership for Kosovo and recognition by Belgrade.  Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari plan, saying it will never recognize Kosovo.

This process ended in February 2008 with Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which had been coordinated with the United States, major European powers and others.  Eighty-five countries now recognize the Republic of Kosovo.  The International Court of Justice, in response to a Serbian government request, has advised that the declaration was not inconsistent with international law, including UNSCR 1244, which treats Kosovo as a single, undivided territory whose boundaries/borders are well established. Kosovo is a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank but not of most other international organizations.

Kosovo is still developing its state institutions.  It has implemented virtually all aspects of the Ahtisaari plan in the territory it controls.  The plan however allows it to form an armed security force only in 2013, which it will no doubt want to do.  The courts and police in Kosovo remain under EU supervision.  International prosecutors and judges try inter-ethnic criminal and property cases in Kosovo courts.  International advisors remain in many ministries.  Air traffic control and some other functions remain international responsibilities.

A key issue for Kosovo will be formation of its new security force, which is expected to evolve from the existing unarmed civil defense corps into a small land army.  The Americans will no doubt play an important role in conceiving, equipping and training the new forces, with a view to ensuring their professionalism and limiting their offensive capabilities.

Serbia has refused to recognize Kosovo as sovereign and independent but has agreed to discuss “practical” issues with the Pristina authorities, in talks led by the EU and supported by the U.S.  These talks have produced agreement on a limited number of issues, including mutual recognition of documents and enforcement of customs and tax laws at the Serbia/Kosovo border posts.  Serbia’s current constitution (adopted in 2006, post-Milosevic) defines Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.  Despite the ICJ advisory opinion, Serbia claims sovereignty over all of Kosovo, but at present it physically controls only three and a half north Kosovo municipalities contiguous with Serbia proper.

The three municipalities were majority Serb before the 1999 war, but the half of Mitrovica municipality lying north of the Ibar river was not.  In July 2011 the Pristina-controlled Kosovo Police Service briefly seized the border posts in the north, seeking to collect customs duties and enforce Kosovo law at the border with Serbia.

The international community, including the Americans and especially the Germans, has tried to squelch all talk of “border adjustments” or partition.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it clear that resolution of northern Kosovo issues without partition is required before Serbia can qualify for EU candidacy, a position the Americans have supported.

Enabling all Western Balkan countries to qualify for and enter NATO and the EU

Several Western Balkans countries have made rapid progress in meeting NATO and EU standards.  Slovenia entered the EU in 2004.  Croatia has completed its membership qualifications and negotiations and approved a referendum on membership in January 2012.  It is expected to accede to the Union in 2013.  Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already NATO members.  Montenegro has achieved candidacy for the EU and is approaching the last phase of its NATO Membership Action Plan.  Macedonia, while fully qualified for NATO membership, has been blocked by Greece from both NATO membership and receiving a date for start of its negotiations for EU membership.

Others are moving more slowly, and EU membership is generally a tougher and longer road than NATO membership.  A dispute over defense property has blocked Bosnia from receiving a Membership Action Plan from NATO.  It has not yet qualified for EU candidacy.  Albania and Serbia are likewise not yet candidates for EU membership.  Serbia has not expressed an interest in NATO membership, due mainly to bitter memories of the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999, but it participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.  Kosovo is far from both NATO and EU membership.

The EU’s current financial crisis has diminished the credibility of EU membership as an incentive for reform in the Western Balkans.  In Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo few believe that EU membership is in the foreseeable future.  They also fear that membership criteria are being tightened.  Under these conditions, NATO membership has taken on new importance, as it is the only credible nearer-term incentive.  Keeping the door to NATO open—in particular at the Chicago Summit in May 2012—is important to maintaining momentum for reform.  An invitation to Macedonia, and a strong statement of readiness to invite Montenegro when it completes its Membership Action Plan, would help to convince other Western Balkans countries that NATO membership is a realistic prospect while the EU puts its financial house in order.

Passing responsibility to the EU

The Americans have succeeded in passing off the bulk of the military responsibility for Bosnia and Kosovo to the Europeans and others, who constitute all but a small fraction of the international forces still on the ground in the Balkans.  Major civilian responsibilities are also in European hands.  The High Representative in Bosnia has been a European continuously since the signing of the Dayton agreements.  The EU has recently separated and beefed up the role of EU Special Representative, responsible for helping prepare Bosnia for EU membership.  In Kosovo, the Americans maintain a minimal military presence of fewer than 800 mainly National Guard troops but the UN, EULEX and OSCE missions are manned principally by non-Americans.

Where American commitment is still required is in the diplomatic effort to ensure that the goals cited above are not lost sight of.  The EU, because it requires unanimity for many important decisions, can be maddeningly slow and clumsy as a diplomatic actor, even after the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty.  In Bosnia, the EU lacks the clarity of purpose that the Americans bring to the table.  To the dismay of the Americans, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in May 2011 cut a deal directly with then Prime Minister Dodik (without discussion with the state government in Sarajevo) to allow the RS to discuss its own courts and those of the state government with the European Commission.  The five non-recognizing members of the EU that do not recognize Kosovo (Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece) have prevented rationalization of the EU presence there and limited its effectiveness.  Greece has single-handedly blocked resolution of the Macedonia name dispute.

Thus the EU has the leverage, but it sometimes lacks the clarity and unity of purpose so important to getting things done in the Balkans.  The United States in principle has the clarity of purpose, but it lacks the leverage and sometimes compromises its principles as a result.  Only a tandem U.S./EU effort succeeds in the Balkans, which often requires as much diplomacy among Brussels, European capitals and Washington as with Balkans capitals.  There is at least another 10 years of mainly civilian efforts required in the Western Balkans, with the Europeans providing most of the muscle and the Americans providing most of the backbone.