Month: March 2012
Time to go
Is there anyone still out there who thinks we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan? Yes is the short answer. Michael O’Hanlon for example. So I’ll try to reiterate why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we need to get out as quickly as possible, without however destabilizing the situation.
Far be it from me to suggest that the homicidal behavior of a single American staff sergeant should determine what we do, or don’t do, in Afghanistan. The fact however is that incidents like the one Sunday, in which 16 Afghans appear to have been murdered by a single American, really do have a broader significance. It is just no longer possible for many–perhaps most–Afghans to support the effort we have undertaken supposedly for their benefit. The Afghan parliament has said plainly that patience is running out. Wait until they realize how long it will take before the alleged perpetrator is tried and punished!
Of course we left Afghanistan to its own devices once before, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. That did not work out well, for us or for them. The risks are great that the scenario will be repeated. I’m not sure President Karzai will last as long the Soviet-installed President Najibullah, who managed three years. But I trust Karzai will not stay on in Kabul if the Taliban appear at its gates, as Najibullah did. The Taliban castrated him and dragged him to death with a truck, then hung his body on a lamp post.
I doubt the Taliban, who would certainly gain control of at least parts of Afghanistan upon American withdrawal, would again make the mistake of inviting in al Qaeda. There isn’t much in it for them: al Qaeda is a pan-national movement with pretensions to uniting all Muslims in a revived caliphate.
As Rory Stewart notes, we are not going to be able to get the support we need from Pakistan or create the kind of government in Afghanistan that can gain the confidence of the Afghans. The only thing we’ve got going for us is that the Afghans hate the Taliban more than they hate us, but that is cold comfort.
It may also be in some doubt: the Taliban are having at least some success in governing areas they control. Their courts dispense justice, private and even state schools use their curriculum, and some nongovernmental organizations are allowed to operate. The Taliban district and provincial governors operate with increasing visibility and some degree of legitimacy.
To combat this kind of capillary presence of the Taliban, we would need to continue to distribute Americans widely in the countryside. It just isn’t going to be possible. With U.S. troops already withdrawing, the risk to Americans embedded in Afghan villages and ministries is going to rise sharply. Last month’s attacks on advisors embedded in the Interior Ministry, and the rising frequency of Afghan security force attacks on Americans, make that clear.
Like many Iraqis, at least some Afghans will come to regret U.S. withdrawal. The Pushtuns will not like dealing with the Northern Alliance, which defeated the Taliban in 2001 with help from the U.S., better than dealing with us, and many in the Northern Alliance would already prefer that we stay. Women–still not treated equally with men–stand to lose some of the enormous gains that they have made since the Taliban’s fall.
It would be a mistake to await the outcome of the negotiations with the Taliban, which could drag on for a long time. Better to go into these negotiations stating a willingness to withdraw–by the end of this year if feasible, or shortly thereafter–provided a satisfactory political solution can be agreed. That could actually accelerate the diplomacy rather than hinder it. And in any event the Taliban will know full well that public and political support for the war is fading in the United States.
What we have wanted is an Afghanistan that can defend itself and prevent the return of al Qaeda. It is hard for me to believe that we’ll get any closer to those goals by staying another three years. It is time to go. It should be done deliberately, not precipitously. But it should be done.
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This week’s peace picks
Quiet until Thursday, when there is a boom of interesting events:
1. Domestic Politics and Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: A Perspective of Taiwan, Johns Hopkins/SAIS, 812 Rome, noon-2 pm March 12.
2. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, Rumi Forum, noon-1:30 March 13.
Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants.
Dr. Rabasa will discuss the findings of the RAND monograph, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. The study analyzes deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these programs, and makes recommendations to governments on ways to promote and accelerate processes of deradicalization.
BIO:
Dr. Angel M. Rabasa is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has written extensively about extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. He is the lead author of The Lessons of Mumbai (2009); Radical Islam in East Africa (2009); The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (2008); Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (2007); Building Moderate Muslim Networks (2007); Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement and Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (2006); and The Muslim World After 9/11 (2004). He has completed the research on patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe, and is currently working on a project on deradicalization of Islamist extremists. Other works include the International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 358, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorists(2003); The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power(2002), with John Haseman; and Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (2001), with Peter Chalk. Before joining RAND, Rabasa served in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Studies Association, and the American Foreign Service Association.
Rabasa has a B.A. and Ph.D. in history from Harvard University and was a Knox Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University.
3. Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity, Dirksen 419, 10 am March 14.
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Full Committee
Presiding:
Senator Kerry
Panel One
Special Envoy for Sudan
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project, Enough Project
Washington, DC
4. Two New Publications Examining Iran, Stimson Center, 10-11:30 am March 15
Iran in Perspective:
Holding Iran to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology
By Barry Blechman
Engaging Iran on Afghanistan:
Keep Trying
By Ellen Laipson
Stimson scholars, co-founder and distinguished fellow Barry Blechman and president and CEO Ellen Laipson have completed new studies that consider how to engage Iran in constructive negotiations. Dr. Blechman will discuss how to achieve greater progress on the nuclear front, while Laipson will outline ways to engage Iran over the future of Afghanistan.
** This event is on the record **
Please RSVP to RSVP@stimson.org – or call April Umminger at (202) 478-3442.
5. Why Does Russia Support the Assad Regime? Middle East Institute, noon-1 pm March 15
Location:
Russia’s relations with Syria – even under the Assad regime – have been more troubled than current press accounts of Moscow-Damascus ties indicate. But despite the internal and external opposition to the Assad regime that has risen up over the past year, the Russian government has defended it staunchly via its Security Council veto and other means. In his talk, Mark Katz will discuss why Moscow supports the Assad regime so strongly as well as why it is willing to incur the costs of doing so.
Bio: Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University who writes and lectures extensively on Russia and its relations with the Middle East. He is the author of Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), Reflections on Revolutions (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1999), Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1997) and Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), among other publications.
Moderated by NPR’s Tom Gjelten
1:00-2:30 p.m., March 15, 2012
American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St. NW #1100 Washington, DC
CNN.com will livestream each event. On Twitter? Follow #natsecurity2012for updates throughout the series.7. South China Sea in High Resolution, CSIS 1:30-2:30 March 15
CSIS Southeast Asia Program is pleased to present the inauguration of its innovative new policy tool “South China Sea in High Resolution”.
Presented by
Ernest Z. Bower
Senior Adviser & Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS
Followed by an expert panel featuring:
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Admiral Timothy J. Keating
Former PACOM Commander, U.S. Department of the Navy (Retired)
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia
Thursday, March 15, 2012
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
CSIS B1 A/B Conference Facility
1800 K ST NW, Washington DC
We are honored to invite you to witness the inauguration of the innovative new CSIS policy tool called “The South China Sea in High Resolution” presented by Ernest Bower, the senior adviser and director of the CSIS Southeast Asia program. An outstanding panel of experts will discuss the presentation and key trends in the South China Sea and its importance to the United States.
The South China Sea in High Resolution presentation will address the myriad issues — ranging from geopolitical to economic to legal — arising from the disputes in the sea. The South China Sea is a topic of vital importance for the Asia-Pacific. American foreign policy rebalance towards Asia has further emphasized the significance of this region. The South China Sea connects the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, but it contains sizeable natural resources and hosts the world’s busiest trade routes. Concerns about maintaining peace in the sea were raised by President Obama and other Southeast Asian leaders during the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit in 2011.
Ernest Z. Bower is senior advisor and director of CSIS’s Southeast Asia Program.
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson (USMC, Ret.) most recently served as assistant secretary of defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Admiral Timothy J. Keating (retired) is former commander of Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. Navy’s U.S. Northern Command.
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy is former U.S. ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia. He is currently the director of the Kissinger Institute on China at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.
Please RSVP to the Southeast Asia Program by noon on March 14. If you have questions, please contact Mary Beth Jordan at (202) 775 3278.
Event Schedule
10:15-10:30am: Welcome
10:30am-12:00pm: Panel 1, How Repression Breeds Religious Extremism – and How Religious Freedom Does the Opposite
Panelists: Johanna Kristin Birnir, Brian Grim, Mohammed Hafez, and Monica Duffy Toft (moderator)
12:00-12:30pm: Lunch
12:30 – 2:00pm: Keynote Discussion, Religious Freedom, Religious Extremsim, and the Arab Spring: Bush and Obama Administration Perspectives
Participants: Dennis Ross, Stephen Hadley, Elliott Abrams, and William Inboden (moderator)
2:15-3:30pm: Panel 2, Fostering Religious Freedom & Curbing Religious Extremism in the Arab Spring – Lessons for US Policy
Panelists: Jillian Schwedler, Samer Shehata, Samuel Tadros, and Thomas Farr (moderator)
Featuring
Stephen Hadley
Dennis Ross
Elliott Abrams
Participants
Johanna Birnir
Thomas Farr
Brian Grim
Mohammed Hafez
William Inboden
Jillian Schwedler
Samer Shehata
Samuel Tadros
Monica Duffy Toft
The Brookings Institution
August 04, 2011
Participants
Panelists
Khaled Elgindy
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shadi Hamid
Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Tamara Cofman Wittes
3:00 to 4:00 Panel 1: Domestic Issues
Scott Shemwell, Retired Business Professional, “ Challenges for the International Oil and Gas Markets: A Business Perspective ”
Xu Liu, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Visiting Scholar, GW; Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, “The Environmental Factor in Russian Energy Policy ”
4:00 to 4:15 Coffee Break
4:15 to 5:45 Panel 2: Foreign Policy
Keun-Wook Paik, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, ”East Asia Energy Cooperation”
Dicle Korkmaz, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; University of Tampere, “Russian-Turkish Energy Relations ”
Oleksandr Sukhodolia, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; Fulbright Scholar, “Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations ”
Discussion Chair: Robert Orttung, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Assistant Director, GW
RSVP at: http://tinyurl.com/PanelGWU
Sponsored by the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies
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Careful what you wish for
My friend in Niš, Milan Marinković, has been watching north Kosovo from a perch not far away. He writes:
Last summer Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić proposed that the problem of Kosovo should be solved by dividing its territory between Serbia and Albania. Dačić argued that there was no point in forcing Serbs and Albanians to live together when history had shown they could not coexist peacefully.
Minister Dačić should have been careful what he wished for. A few days ago, political representatives of Albanians from a region in southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo adopted a declaration in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the way Serbian authorities treated the ethnic Albanians and demanded the incorporation of the region into Kosovo. The idea of territorial division is thus threatening to turn into one of a territorial swap.
Such ideas are not only unacceptable from the perspective of European integration that both Belgrade and Priština aspire to. They also put at risk both Serbs and Albanians in areas where they are in the minority. In Kosovo, for example, the Albanians are the majority south of the Ibar, but the minority in the north; the opposite is true for the Serbs. Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s.
There is also a security concern. The Serb-dominated area in northern Kosovo is a no-man’s land ideal for smuggling and other illegal activities. Priština virtually wields no authority there, while Belgrade has only a limited impact. The local Serb politicians appear to be more loyal to nationalist opposition parties than to the Serbian government, as demonstrated by the referendum they held last month despite Belgrade’s strong disapproval.
The Ahtisaari plan, which provides for a wide degree of municipal autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, is increasingly proving to be a feasible solution for the Serbs from the enclaves. Nevertheless, those in the north refuse to give it even a thought, and Belgrade also continues to claim that the plan is unacceptable, even if it were supplemented to allow a special status for the northern Serbs.
Still, some positive signs are emerging. Belgrade and Priština finally reached the agreement on conditions under which Kosovo can be represented at regional conferences. This progress in the negotiations contributed decisively to EU candidate status for Serbia. More importantly, it provides hope that, with assistance of the international community, the two sides might find common ground on the issue of the north sooner than many would expect.
The Serbian elections in May will pose a critical test for Belgrade. Should Serbia abstain from holding the elections on the territory of Kosovo, it will be a clear indication of the country’s willingness to substantially change its policy toward the former province. In that event, the northern Kosovo Serbs would find themselves under unprecedented pressure to soften their position and become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
At the moment, all options remain open. In just a few months Serbia will get a new government. A new government at the beginning of its mandate is usually in a more comfortable position to take bold steps on sensitive issues than an outgoing one. If these bold steps happen to be the right steps, Serbia could be rewarded with a date for accession talks as early as in December.
A right step, to begin with, could be to explain to the Serbs from northern Kosovo that anything can be possible if you want to make it possible. When Mr. Dačić invoked historical experience to defend the assertion that they could not live together with Albanians, he apparently forgot the example of Germans and French. The formerly fiercest enemies jointly laid the foundation for what eventually would become the European Union.
Not only Serbia and Kosovo but all countries in the region share the same underlying problem which most of their troubles stem from. That problem is called – the economy. If they are to recover economically, they will have to cooperate closely rather than confront one another. The sooner we grasp this simple fact, the better.
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What now?
Bashar al Assad and his opponents have now both rejected Kofi Annan’s mission impossible. On behalf of the UN and the Arab League, he sought a ceasefire, followed by humanitarian aid and dialogue on a political solution.
This failure was not surprising. His was always a low-probability proposition. But the rejection came faster than I anticipated. I’d have guessed that Bashar would see some benefit in stringing Annan along.
Instead he slapped Annan’s proposition down without hesitation, grabbing some World Health Organization support for a Syrian Red Crescent mission to assess health needs in conflict areas. Not bad: wage war against your own population, then get the internationals to pay for your own cronies to assess the damage.
Bashar is feeling his cheerios. Russian support is holding. Arab threats to arm his opponents seem not much more than hot air at this point. Lots of small arms are getting in to Syria, but they won’t do much against Bashar’s armor and artillery. Defections are growing, but the numbers are small and they still have not reached into the inner circle.
It is a bit harder to explain the attitude of the opposition, which is feeling abandoned by the West and not much supported in the East. They’d have gained more from supporting Annan’s initiative, and then having Bashar reject it, than by opposing it from the first. They want Bashar out before dialogue can take place, which I understand perfectly well. But they just don’t have the horsepower at the moment to make it happen.
Many, though not all, in the opposition want arms for the Free Syrian Army, the network of defectors who have refused to fire on demonstrators and taken up the cudgels against Bashar. The problem is that arming the opposition will prolong the civil war and make it ever more sectarian, which is precisely what the West does not want.
The opposition’s main hope is international military intervention against Bashar, which still seems to me a distant prospect. An American military attack on Syria without Security Council approval and in the midst of a high-stakes diplomatic duel with Iran over its nuclear program is unlikely. Washington will want to keep its powder dry for the main battle. Europe is absorbed in its defense of the Euro.
A combined Turkish/Arab attack on Syria is theoretically possible. But without Security Council approval and extensive U.S. support, it risks political and military failure. There are already far too many hints of a broad and prolonged Sunni/Shia war in the Middle East. Do we really want to throw fuel on that fire?
This leaves us with few alternatives other than continuing to support the opposition, to isolate the Syrian regime and to press the Russians and Chinese to stop shielding Bashar from even a mild UNSC resolution. The only big question is whether the support should include whatever the opposition needs to take up arms. This includes not only the arms themselves but also intelligence support and training. The opposition lacks real-time information on the disposition of the army and its checkpoints, a deficiency that is too often deadly to militants trying to move around Syria.
I’ve opposed arming the opposition, on grounds that doing so militarizes the fight and shifts it to means that favor the regime. The same argument does not work for intelligence support, which is vital to protecting the opposition whether it takes up arms or not. Our overhead capabilities are stunning. If the opposition can organize itself to make effective use of real-time intelligence data to protect its adherents, we should be providing it.
I am at a loss as to what to recommend beyond that. This is one of those situations where there are bad options and worse ones. I don’t see a route out of the current impasse, other than the one Annan failed to sell to both sides.
What is happening in Syria is extraordinarily cruel and ugly. Bashar is mowing down people who are asking for no more than the freedom to decide their own fates. His moment of accountability will arrive, but for the moment we don’t seem to have a way of making it arrive sooner rather than later.
PS: Annan declared himself optimistic after a second meeting with Bashar al Assad today (Sunday). Hard to know what to make of that. The Arab League seems to have softened its demand that Bashar step aside, leading the Russians to sound a bit more helpful. The opposition should be getting ready to have its arm twisted to talk with the regime before Bashar is removed. Meetings at the UN Security Council this afternoon and tomorrow are likely to lead in that “optimistic” direction.
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Right direction, long road ahead
Libya’s interim prime minister, Abdel-Rahim el Keib, at the Carnegie Endowment this morning laid out a clear and unequivocal vision of a well-governed democracy adhering to the rule of law. El Keib is an electrical engineer who spent decades in the United States before dropping everything to join the revolution in Libya last year. He cited some steps in the right direction that have already been taken:
- The National Transitional Council (NTC), which is now the interim legislative body, has passed the election law and the election commission appointed.
- Elections for a constituent assembly that will prepare the constitution will take place in June.
- An interministerial committee on human rights has been formed to ensure equal treatment under the law and equal opportunity.
- Youth and women will play a strong role in Libya’s future.
- Civil society will help to ensure transparency and accountability.
- Tripoli is to become a Mediterranean financial center.
None of this will be easy, as the Libyan state has to be rebuilt from scratch.
Asked about the NTC chairman’s statement that the first legislation in the new Libya will reintroduce polygamy, the Prime Minister made reference to hypocritical behavior by Westerners (married men with mistresses) and said bluntly that polygamy will not be important in Libya.
Asked about “militias,” he underlined that these were groups that fought for Libya’s freedom. They do not have an ethnic or sectarian basis, he claimed. The government will try to take care of them through a major reintegration project that offers several alternatives: jobs in the Interior or Defense Ministries, or scholarships, loans and other assistance, provided they turn in their arms. He also noted that the celebrations last month of the first anniversary of the revolution were peaceful.
El Keib declared himself in favor of decentralization, citing a law for provinces in preparation in the NTC, central government offices already established in Sebha and Benghazi, location of the managed of the Great Man-Made River in Benghazi, and plans for “cyber” government. He did not comment explicitly on recent political agitation in Benghazi for autonomy.
Noting that Moscow failed to support the revolution, el Keib said Libya will respect contracts with Russian companies and welcome them back, provided there is no corruption involved and no taint of the Qaddafi regime.
On minorities, el Keib underlined the tradition of tolerance in Libyan society and the presence in his cabinet of two women and one Berber. He failed however to respond directly to a question on restoration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, noting only that it was important that minorities not have “hidden agendas.” His specific meaning was not clear, but the implication was negative.
Taken to task for failing to communicate the government’s work, el Keib emphasized that it is an interim body that neglected initially to do as much as it should and will now try to correct that mistake. He underlined the government’s commitment to transparency and interest in an upcoming “open government” conference in Brazil.
Despite the occasionally obscure and possibly problematic moment (especially the answers on polygamy and on Jewish property), this is about as good as it gets from leaders in the “Arab spring” countries these days. El Keib is unquestionably pointed in the right direction. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The question is whether he can deliver, and in particular whether other forces in Libyan society will allow it.
I’m headed now for another talk on Libya. I’ll supplement this post if there is anything new to be said.
PS: There wasn’t much new in the second, off the record event. The Libyans do not seem to fully understand that their respect for human rights and treatment of minorities, Qaddafites and other at risk populations will be important to how the rest of the world views the results of their revolution. We sent them home with a clear message to that effect.
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Iraq needs a shopping list
A couple of birdies have flown into Washington from Iraq recently. They had interesting, but very different, things to say.
One thinks Iraq is doing all right but the United States is missing big opportunities, due to its failure to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement that now governs bilateral relations. This has lots of potential for tying Baghdad more closely to the West, as does the export of more oil to the north and west rather than through the Gulf. Washington, this birdie thought, is worrying too much about Iraq’s sometimes tense internal political situation. It is only natural that the political forces that make up the current parliament are testing each other to see where the limits lie. Erbil/Baghdad problems are solvable. Things are settling down, problems are finding solutions and Washington should take a hint from the Iranians, who are actively projecting soft power. That is unavoidable, given their proximity, the long common border and the many Iranian pilgrims who visit Shia shrines in Iraq.
The other birdie thinks Iraq is severely handicapped in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Despite dramatic improvements in the Iraqi security forces (more jointness, a stronger non-commissioned officer corps, and decentralization of authority), its many intelligence agencies are no longer sharing information, partly due to sectarian and ethnic divisions that the U.S. presence used to bridge. Absent a clear national security strategy, Prime Minister Maliki is centralizing decisionmaking in ways that reward loyalty over professionalism and open the door to corruption, especially in military procurement. Iraq lacks a strong national identity. A return to sectarian war is unlikely, but the Sunni-majority provinces will insist on more decentralization. Iran has influence on some politicians but not on the army. Iraq would however oppose any U.S. raid on Iran and is unconcerned with Tehran getting nuclear weapons, since they won’t be targeted against Iraq. As things stand today, Iraq lacks the capability to prevent Israel (or the U.S.) from overflying Iraq to attack Iran.
I suspect there is a lot of truth in both these perspectives, which makes it ironic that they should be carried to Washington separately. The message from both–that Iraq still needs the United States to play a strong role–would make a deeper impression if carried jointly. The Iraqis need to understand that the initiative is now theirs, not ours. They need to create conditions in which Americans can train Iraqis, cooperate with them across a broad spectrum of activities, and invest in Iraq. If it is too risky or unwelcome, the Americans will turn their efforts elsewhere.
At the policy level, the Americans have moved on to other issues, Iran and Syria for the moment but also North Korea and the Afghanistan withdrawal. If Iraq wants U.S. help, it is going to need to plot out clearly what it needs and come shopping for it.
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