Day: April 5, 2012
Empty threat?
Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani in a soft-spoken but hard-hitting performance today at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy touted Iraqi Kurdistan’s political, economic, commercial and social success, underlining its safe and secure environment as well as its tolerance, relative prosperity, literacy and attractiveness to foreign investors, including American oil companies.
But he lambasted Iraq, describing its central government as headed towards dictatorship, unwilling to implement its constitution (by proceeding with the Article 140 referenda in disputed territories) or abide by the November 2010 Erbil agreement that was supposed to institute serious power-sharing among Kurdish, Shia and Sunni dominated political forces. Prime Minister Maliki is accumulating all sorts of power: over the security forces, the intelligence services, the judiciary and even over the central bank. If a constitutional solution to the current political impasse cannot be found, Barzani threatened to “go back to the people,” by calling as a last resort a referendum on a question to be posed by Kurdistan’s parliament at a time unspecified.
The threat was clearly stated, but left a lot of open questions. In addition to the timing and content, it was not clear how Kurdistan would handle the disputed territories in a referendum scenario or whether it was prepared to defend itself by military means from strengthening Iraqi security forces. Barzani foreswore the use of force, but indicated that an eventual clash might be inevitable. He did not comment on how he thought Ankara and Washington would react to an independence referendum.
On other issues, Barzani made it clear Kurdistan is trying to mend fences with Turkey, which has changed its tune on Kurdish issues. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would cooperate “without limit” he said with non-military, non-violent efforts against the PKK (Kurdish insurgents who use Kurdistan as a safe haven but attack inside Turkey).
Barzani promised moral, political and financial assistance to the Syria’s Kurds, but said the decision whether to join the revolution would be left to them. The KRG would not provide weapons, he said.
Barzani noted the KRG’s common interest with the United States on Iran issues. Presumably Kurdish assistance in this respect was discussed in some detail in official meetings. Kurdistan supports UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, including those regarding sanctions in particular. U.S. influence in Iraq, Barzani said, depends not on the presence of American troops but on the degree of commitment in Washington. He clearly hoped to see more commitment to diverting Maliki from his current course.
Barzani declined to criticize Iraqi Parliament Speaker Nujayfi, noting that he has not accumulated or abused power the way Prime Minister Maliki has. On Iraqi Vice President Hashemi, who fled to Kurdistan to avoid arrest in Baghdad, Barzani said the Iraqi judicial system is inadequate to the task because the Prime Minister controls it.
Barzani sounded determined, but a referendum threat is only as credible as the likelihood that an independent Kurdistan will gain significant recognition. He may be buttering up Turkey and the U.S. in hopes of neutralizing their opposition to such a move, but he has a long way to go before they will contenance it.
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David Kanin responds
David Kanin writes, in response to my last:
Dan–
Thank you for sending me your twist on our discussion–it’s your blog, of course, and so you can post any interpretation you desire. In my view, you conceded a great deal more to me than I did to you (for example, over the failed US diplomatic efforts to replace 1244, and the fact that the error of forcing an asterisk on Kosova makes it essential to get the recalcitrant 5 EU members to recognize the new state and to convince the EU to make it clear Serbia does not get in without a solution to the question of Kovosar sovereignty–which, whether you admit it or not, remains contested).
Still, I am disappointed that you chose to misstate my position so baldly. From the beginning (by which I mean the piece I wrote that drew your ire), my position on the asterisk had nothing to do with the contents of 1244. My choice not to challenge your legalistic defense or the asterisk was based–as I said repeatedly but you chose not to mention in your blog–was that the details of the resolution were irrelevant. You are welcome to disagree with my opinion, but you really should at least reflect the views you are disagreeing with accurately.
In fact, I thought about bringing up 1244’s security annexes, because they provide a stronger Serbian claim to residual sovereignty than the language you noted, but–because I do not consider the 1244 argument important–I did not want to get bogged down in the minutiae of the resolution.
I could correct your misstatement of my views on your blog, but that would just draw out a discussion on a topic that–on this I agree with you–is getting somewhat old. It would be nice if you would at least correct the dodgy strawman you misrepresented as my view (or choose to reprint this note on your blog), but I leave that to you.
All that aside, I very much enjoyed yesterday’s discussion and am grateful you proposed it. I stand ready to reprise the experience on any topic at any time you desire.
David
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Serbia*
Yesterday’s shoot out over the Kosovo asterisk surprised me. David Kanin conceded the merits of my argument that legally UN Security Council resolution 1244 does not guarantee Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but rather provides the basis for a decision on Kosovo’s final status. Nevertheless, he said, the asterisk was still a defeat for Kosovo because Pristina resisted it. Serbia, which has argued long and hard that 1244 preserves its sovereignty, somehow won the political match.
This is a bit like deciding who won a soccer game by listening to which team’s fans cheer louder rather than by the score. That’s not my way. I admit that I’d have liked to see reciprocity in the asterisk requirement: Serbia* with reference to both 1244 and the International Court of Justice opinion, which condition Belgrade’s sovereignty more than Pristina’s. But the score is at least 2-zip (1244 and ICJ), no matter how loud Belgrade cheers.
There is one aspect of 1244 that is negative for Kosovo: the continuing presence on its territory of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which has now been reduced to uselessness or worse. Pristina has been trying to get it out of there. Washington should help.
David also made two other points with which I can wholeheartedly agree: that the five EU states that have not yet recognized Kosovo should do so, and that the EU should make explicit that neither Kosovo nor Serbia will get membership until they have settled the outstanding issues between them.
But I disagree with David’s reasoning on the first point. On the second, it is already clear, to anyone whose eyes are open.
Contrary to David’s claim, the five nonrecognizing EU states (Cyprus, Romania, Greece, Spain and Slovakia) are no longer a serious obstacle to Kosovo’s relationship with the EU. So long as the asterisk is used, they cannot block Kosovo’s progress towards a visa waiver or a Stabilization and Association Agreement, unless there is good substantive reason to do so. They have in essence given up their vetoes now that there is a clear basis for Kosovo’s “contractual relationship” with the EU. The main reason now for the five to recognize Kosovo is that it makes no sense not to do so. This they will realize gradually and one by one will succumb, Cyprus last.
Several EU states have already publicly stated that Kosovo and Serbia will not enter as members until they’ve settled the issues between them. More say it privately. Just one (of the current 27) is really required to make this threat real. My guess is that more than 20 current members (plus Croatia, which will join next year) will insist on this point, which is consonant with the EU requirement for “good neighborly relations.” Presumably the reason the EU does not state this as policy is reluctance to pull the rug out from under Serbian President Boris Tadic, who has promised his country both EU membership and sovereignty over Kosovo.
Tadic is not blind and knows full well that he is making a promise he cannot fulfill. He may still to be hoping for partition of Kosovo, a proposition neither the Americans nor the Europeans will permit because of its broader regional consequences. But membership is a long way off still. As long as the EU doesn’t threaten too explicitly to keep Serbia out until it gives up Kosovo, Tadic can continue his charade. If I were a European diplomat, I would want that game to end as soon as the May elections are over.
One more thing: I understand that Belgrade is still holding Hasan Abazi, a Kosovo trade unionist it arrested in retaliation for Pristina’s arrest of several Serbs, now released. Abazi is being processed in a Serbian court whose jurisdiction is nominally in Kosovo. The very existence of this court is a violation of UNSC resolution 1244. This is an outrage. I trust the Kosovo authorities (prime minister and foreign minister) will mention this issue to the Americans during their current visit to Washington. I certainly encourage them to do so.
I promise: this is my last post mentioning the asterisk, which is an issue that has lost its charm. But I am tempted to have badges made up with a big * on them. Maybe I should parade with one in Mother Theresa Street on my next visit to Pristina?
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