Day: April 10, 2012
Dačić’s shameful revenge
A friend of Hasan Abazi, an Albanian labor unionist arrested in Serbia March 28, has provided the following update:
After 13 days in prison, the ILLEGAL detention of Hasan Abazi continues without word from the Serbian government regarding the case other than obtuse and inflammatory statements made in the media by [Interior] Minister Dačić regarding his intention to “continue arresting Albanians”.
Procedural regulations that have been violated:
- Mr. Abazi was unlawfully detained for 53 hours before being brought before a judge—Serbian law dictates that within 48 hours a person needs to be either brought to court or released
- He was arrested without him or his attorney being given his charges for 53 hours while Serbian law dictates that it must be done within 12 hours
- He was denied access to a lawyer and to his family for 53 hours
- Mr. Abazi’s prison term was extended for 30 more days even though no evidence or witnesses have been presented
- The appeal filed by Mr. Abazi’s attorney has yet to be reviewed one week later, even though court practice dictates it should be done within 3 days
- Mr. Abazi’s attorney is still being denied access to his client’s full file with no explanation as to why
- According to the decision extending his detention, Mr. Abazi is being held on the basis that there is danger of his escape due to his “permanent place of residence” (i.e. Kosovo). The same document calls for the interrogation of other witnesses, namely Kosovo Albanians, and does not take into account the same fact use against Mr. Abazi—that they too reside outside of Serbia, namely in Kosovo.
Mr. Abazi is being charged for alleged crimes committed in 1999 under Milosevic-era laws and based on witness statements taken during the war when Milosevic’s structures were in charge of interrogation. The indictment was abolished after the democratic transition in Serbia but for unknown reasons it was renewed in 2005 by a prosecution that no longer exists and did not even have jurisdiction over Kosovo at that time.
Mr. Abazi is a TRADE UNION LEADER. He has never been affiliated with any militant or armed groups such as the KLA. It is shameful that the government of Serbia would blatantly exploit this case for pre-election vote-mongering. It is incumbent upon EU officials, as stewards of Serbia’s EU candidacy process, that they immediately demand Mr. Abazi’s release in accordance with Serbian and international laws.
PS: If anyone asks, yes I would publish a similar plea concerning the arrest of Serbs in Kosovo, who however I understand to have been released some days ago.
Brčko needs EU forces, not vowels
Last week saw a lot of journalists in Sarajevo for the 20th anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war. They tended to emphasize the downside: persistent ethnic division and tension. Tim Judah, who has never stopped going to Bosnia, sees the glass as half full, or better.
This is especially true for the northeastern Bosnian town of Brčko and the surrounding “district” (population about 80,000), the object of many bad wartime jokes about the need for a humanitarian shipment of vowels. It was the site of terrible atrocities at the beginning of the war and much skirmishing nearby during it, due to its strategic position in the narrow corridor linking the two wings of what is now Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.
Brčko was the hard nut that could not be cracked at Dayton, so it became the subject of a post-war arbitration process and American-led “supervision,” which provided decisions on issues the local politicians found too difficult and ensured more inclusive power-sharing arrangements than they would have concluded on their own. A U.S.-led arbitral tribunal decided in 1999 that Brčko would belong to both the RS and the Federation, which controls the other 51% of Bosnia’s territory. This really meant it belonged to neither. International supervision has gradually eased off, and later this spring the assembled powers that still guide the Dayton peace process (the Peace Implementation Council) will consider whether to end it. They likely will keep in place the arbitral tribunal, which decides the larger strategic questions concerning Brčko’s status (now formalized in the Bosnian constitution).
Things are far from perfect in Brčko–I am told it is still governed under an ethnic “key” that gets down to the level of interns and even its hotels sport ethnic identity–but its children go to more integrated schools than in the rest of Bosnia and power is shared in a way that each of the three ethnic groups seems to accept. The place has gone from the nut that couldn’t be cracked to the glue that holds Bosnia together. The RS cannot hope to leave Bosnia unless it controls Brčko. Federation control would spell the end of RS. Brčko District has to remain distinct.
This makes the end of supervision a more delicate moment than would otherwise be the case. The European Union, some of whose more powerful members are anxious to get rid not only of Brčko supervision but also the High Representative who oversees Dayton implementation, would be wise to take notice. The EU still has troops stationed in Bosnia but spread around the country in militarily insignificant contingents. Better to concentrate them in Brčko, thus signaling to both Bosniaks (Bosnia’s Muslims) and Serbs that no effort to “take” Brčko will be tolerated. Such a move might also satisfy Turkey, which supplies a good number of the troops and has hesitated to end Brčko supervision.
Some will argue that no one is prepared to start a war, so why is EUFOR (the European force) needed at all? Certainly neither Croatia nor Serbia, the neighbors most inclined towards war in the 1990s, is interested in blotting their EU copybook by trying to gain territory in Bosnia. Milorad Dodik, the RS president, wants independence and says so repeatedly, but Serbia won’t back him. He can gain more by cooperation with the EU on membership than he can by going to war. Zagreb is disinclined to support Bosnian Croat pretensions, since Croatia is scheduled for EU membership next year.
The Bosniaks, so unprepared for war in 1992, are another question. It should not be assumed that they will be as passive as they were 20 years ago. A serious Dodik move toward de jure independence would provoke some Bosniaks to violence. Taking and holding Brčko would be vital to prevent RS from leaving Bosnia.
If the EU wants the Americans and the Bosnians to take it seriously, it will concentrate its remaining forces in Brčko District, signaling to all concerned that Bosnia will not be allowed to fall apart, or fall into conflict. The move would also help convince the Americans that the Europeans know what they are doing. We’ve all learned to do without the vowels. Brčko needs EU forces.