No nukes or war

Tomorrow’s P5 + 1 (that’s the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China + Germany) talks in Istanbul with Iran promise to be the beginning of the end of the story of the Iranian nuclear program.  Either these talks will open the door to negotiating a settlement over the next few months that definitively ends Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, or we’ll be headed down a path that leads to an Israeli or American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, with unforeseeable consequences.

According to David Sanger and Steven Erlanger, the opening P5 gambit will ask for closing a recently completed underground enrichment facility at Fordo, no enrichment above 5% and shipment out of Iran of all uranium enriched to higher levels.

That is not enough for my friends at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs.  Michael Singh argues:

Rather than maintaining a narrow focus on closure of the Fordo plant and suspension of Iran’s program of highly enriched uranium, the United States should insist that Iran suspend all of its uranium enrichment activities, take steps to address International Atomic Energy Agency concerns about its nuclear work, including coming clean about its weaponization research, and submit to intrusive monitoring and verification. Far from extreme, these points are what are required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 and preceding resolutions, to which Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany (the P5+1) have previously agreed. The Obama administration should also insist that Iran roll back the work it has done since those resolutions passed — such as by transporting its enriched uranium stockpiles out of the country, dismantling the Fordo facility and stopping work on advanced centrifuges.

Singh’s colleague Simon Henderson argues that allowing any enrichment in Iran would leave the door open to nuclear weapons development.

These are more like the terms that could be imposed on a thoroughly submissive Iran than on the defiant and feisty one that actually exists.  In Istanbul, several of the P5 are likely to be willing to accept significantly less.  While Singh and others argue that Iran is on the ropes and facing a credible military threat from Israel if not the U.S., there is no reason to believe that Israel has the capacity to inflict any more than a temporary setback to the Iranian nuclear program.  An American attack might be more consequential, but it would still have to be repeated every year or two ad inifinitum to prevent a redoubled nuclear effort in Iran from eventually succeeding.

The vital issue for the United States should be this:  has Iran committed itself clearly and unequivocally not to develop nuclear weapons and to allow the kind of intrusive inspections that would allow the international community to ascertain the current state of its nuclear weapons-related efforts and verify compliance in the future?  Iran is not going to give up enrichment entirely, and dismantling the Fordo plant is really unnecessary if it is subject to tight IAEA inspections.  Even the 5% enrichment limit should be negotiable, provided Iran demonstrates that it needs more highly enriched material and the enrichment facilities are under inspected regularly.

We have every reason to expect Iran to compromise, but it is not wise to seek its surrender.  Doing so will split the P5 and wreck the prospects for multilateral approval of military action, should Iran be unwilling to commit itself unequivocally and veriably not to develop nuclear weapons.