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U.S.-Iraq relations after the withdrawal

I’m speaking at noon with Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman and former Iraqi UN Deputy Perm Rep Feisal Istrabadi at the Middle East Institute (the event is at SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts).  Here are the notes I’ve prepared for myself  (but I’ll vary it depending on what they say):

–Tony Blinken, speaking last month at Center for American Progress, said:  “Iraq today is less violent, more democratic and more prosperous…than at any time in recent history.”

–There are some indications that violence, especially from Al Qaeda in Iraq, is up since late last year.  But even if true, Tony’s statement sets a low bar and the gains are still reversible.

–If our goal is a “sovereign, stable, self-reliant country, with a representative government that could become a partner in the region, and no safe haven for terrorists,” we are not there yet.

–On security, Iraq still endures an unacceptably high number of attacks:  deaths per month in politically motivated attacks are way down from the peak, but they are still sufficient  to keep sectarian tensions high, which is what Saddam Hussein loyalist Izzat al Duri said was intended in his recent video.

–The economy is not really in good shape.  High Iraqi oil production helps Baghdad’s budget and moderates world prices, which Americans like, but it does not an economy make.

–Democracy in Iraq does not yet include an independent judiciary, protection of basic human rights, vigorous parliamentary oversight, effective provincial and local governments or fulfillment of many constitutionally mandated procedures.

–Looking to the future, there are three fundamental threats to Iraq that might vitiate U.S. efforts there:

• First is the threat of breakdown:  an Iraq that becomes chaotic and dysfunctional, a more or less failed state like the one Prime Minister Maliki took over in 2006.
• Second is the threat of breakup:  an Iraq that fragments along ethnic and sectarian lines, with broad regional consequences as each of the neighbors seeks advantage.
• Third is autocracy:  fear of breakdown or breakup may motivate Maliki, or someone else, to centralize power and refuse to transfer it in accordance with the will of its people, expressed in verifiably free and fair elections.

–None of these Iraqs can be the kind of partner the United States seeks, but I won’t spend much time on the first two possibilities.  It is the third that worries people these days.

–We need an Iraq that respects the rights and will of its people.

–The question is what influence we have, apart from the usual diplomatic jawboning, which Jim Jeffrey and the embassy have mastered beyond a shadow of doubt.

–There are four specific potential sources of U.S. influence in today’s Iraq:  arms, aid, oil and what—for lack of a better term—I would call relationships.

—Arms transfers, some people say, give us “leverage”:  we should make providing our support conditional on Iraqi adherence to democratic norms, or meaningful power-sharing, or depoliticization of the security forces.

–Those are all worthy objectives, but this seems to me easy to say and difficult to do.  Once you’ve embarked on a program of transferring F-16s, it is going to take a big issue to override the vested interests involved.  Conditionality would encourage the Iraqis to get their arms elsewhere.

–The best we can do it seems to me is to make it clear—preferably in writing in advance—that none of the weapons systems the U.S. provides can be used against Iraq’s own citizens exercising their legal rights.

–We should also make it clear that we will cooperate only with a professional army under civilian control.  But Iraq’s specific governing arrangements are no longer ours to determine, so long as they remain representative and democratic.

—Aid is a more flexible tool.  It should be targeted towards democracy and rule of law.  I would focus on encouraging a more independent judiciary and promoting a civil society that will demand real democracy while carefully monitoring government expenditures and corruption.

–To be clear:  there is no reason why the U.S. should still be spending hundreds of millions in Iraq for economic and agricultural development.  The Iraqis have more than enough incentive, and their own resources, to do those things.

–Iraqi resources come from exported oil, more than 90% of which is shipped through the Gulf under Iranian guns, even when the existing pipeline to Turkey is operating.

–This is where we have so far failed clamorously:  shipment of Iraq’s oil by pipeline to the north and west—once Syria undergoes its transition—would help to reduce Iranian pressure on Iraq and align Iraqi interests with those of Europe and the United States.

–Of course this means Iraq’s oil, and eventually gas as well, would have to traverse Kurdish and Sunni-populated territory, which means domestic political reconciliation is a prerequisite.

–Some will see that as an insurmountable obstacle.  I see it as a challenge, one well worth overcoming.  Iraq should be tied umbilically to Turkey and the Mediterranean, not to Hormuz.

–Finally:  relationships.  American influence inside Iraq comes in part from good relationships with the main political players, with the obvious but I hope declining exception of the Sadrists.

–While they may still resent the occupation, Iraqis of most stripes look to the Americans for protection.  Iraqis of all stripes believe that the United States is vital to re-establishing their country’s regional role.

–We should be ready and willing to help, expecting however that Iraq will align with the United States where it really counts:  right now, that means supporting the P5+1 effort on Iran’s nuclear program and the Arab League plan for Syria.

–And it means pumping as much oil as possible into a world market concerned with the prospect of war with Iran.

–Just a word in conclusion about the long term.  Maliki, whatever his virtues and vices, is not for ever if democracy survives in Iraq.

–We need to use the Strategic Framework Agreement to ensure that our institutions and Iraq’s institutions, our people and Iraq’s people, our economy and Iraq’s economy, our culture and Iraq’s culture, are tied closely together.

–I’ll be glad if the Assistant Secretary tells me I am wrong, but I have the impression that we still have not learned how to fully exploit the potential of this agreement to sharply increase the interconnectedness between Iraq and the United States.