Luck needs a policy

We got lucky Friday:  the ceasefire in Syria mostly held.  But luck is not a policy.  Today things are falling apart.  Belligerents adhere to ceasefires for many reasons, including to give themselves a break and to reorganize and rearm.  When they see their antagonists doing likewise, they may figure they are losing relative advantage and go back to fighting.  Certainly it is unwise to rely on good intentions, especially when one of the antagonists is Bashar al Assad.

What is to be done?  The monitors the UN Security Council approved today are part of the answer.  Inserting them will give the international community eyes and ears that it today lacks.  That will tamp down violence and provide a means of holding one or the other side accountable when it happens.  Some may doubt whether the Arab League observers did much good, but certainly the situation in many places deteriorated badly after their withdrawal.  No ceasefire is going to last long in Syria without a means of policing it.

The Annan plan has important elements other than the ceasefire, which still need to be implemented.  Hillary Clinton is precisely correct to be arguing for withdrawal of heavy weapons from Syrian population centers, freedom of expression, humanitarian access and freedom of movement for international journalists.  But don’t expect Bashar al Assad to comply with these additional provisions of the Annan plan unless a lot of pressure is brought to bear and Moscow puts its foot down.

It is vital that Free Syria Army–the not so organized armed wing of the rebellion–hold its fire, giving the diplomatic machinery a chance to start up.  If the opposition turns to violence–even in response to regime violence–the prospects for a negotiated solution will dim quickly.

What the opposition needs to do now is show its strength nonviolently–yesterday’s widespread demonstrations were a great start–and prepare for negotiations.  Its lack of clear leadership and structure are an advantage while protesting, but fragmentation will turn to disadvantage once negotiations start.  It is also important that the opposition make as many friendly contacts with the security forces as possible while the ceasefire holds, hoping to prevent them from returning to repression once it breaks down.  If the opposition can make Bashar al Assad doubt the reliability of his security forces, good things can happen.

The critical wording of the provisional Security Council resolution was this (I haven’t yet been able to verify where this wording is in the resolution that passed within the hour):

…a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;

This is obviously, and importantly, intended to signal to Syria’s many minorities that they will be treated correctly in the transition.  Reference to the “whole spectrum” of the Syrian opposition opens the door to inclusion of groups not part of the Syrian National Council, which does not have adequate representation of on-the-ground protest groups.  But it will also open the door to what could be interminable arguing over who should be at the table.

Uniting the opposition behind a single set of negotiating positions and a broadly representative delegation is the next critical step, if the six-point plan has even partial success.  The responsibility is more for Syrians than foreigners, but I can at least hope that the U.S. and Europe are trying hard to insist on a single platform, carried to the negotiations by people representing the full spectrum of diversity in Syria.  Luck needs a policy if is to last.