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Fragility to possible stability

I spoke today at the World Bank on “Kosovo in 2012:  Prospects for Turning Fragility into Long-Term Stability.”  Here are the speaking notes I used.

1.  Let me start by offering my bottom line:  Kosovo, four years after independence, is still a work in progress but has decent prospects for long-term stability:

•  The country has institutions:  its government, parliament, constitutional court and municipalities are all functional and surprisingly vigorous on occasion.
• It has a vibrant civil society, including a press ranked by Reporters Without Borders as having “noticeable problems,” like those of all its neighbors.
• Freedom House gives Kosovo “partly free” rankings for civil liberties and political rights, on a par with some of its neighbors and lagging others.
• The last IMF mission in March concluded that fiscal targets were met and important progress in financial sector reform was made, while possible benefits for war veterans and political prisoners have been delayed, which I imagine is what the IMF preferred.

2.  There are nevertheless very real problems.

•  Kosovo suffers from endemic corruption, perceived as worse (though only marginally) than its neighbors according to Transparency International.
• Unemployment, underemployment and isolation of its very young and still rapidly growing population pose serious stability questions.
• Kosovo lags in moving towards the EU, due to its own lack of preparation, EU hesitation and resistance of the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo.
• Belgrade has prevented Pristina from establishing its authority in the 3.5 northern municipalities, where majority Serb populations reject Kosovo’s sovereignty.
• Serbia likewise rejects Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence, has blocked entry into the UN and hindered bilateral recognitions.  They have nevertheless reached 89, a stone’s throw from the tipping point of 100.
• Kosovo has no means to protect itself even for a few days from a hostile Serbia, if Belgrade is prepared to use force.

3.  The immediate threats to Kosovo’s stability boil down to two:

• The conflict in the north, which has repeatedly come close to the boiling point  in recent months, both due to Serb demonstrations to block Pristina border controls and Albanian demonstrations to block Serbian traffic into Kosovo.
• The growing sense of isolation in Kosovo and increasing pan-Albanian political appeals, not only in Kosovo but also in Albania and Macedonia.

4.  What is to be done?

• Accelerate Kosovo’s approach to the EU:  Kosovo should get a road map of what it needs to do to qualify for visa liberalization.  Nothing would take more steam out of pan-Albanianism than freeing up young Kosovars to visit and study in the EU.  The feasibility study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU should be completed by the end of the year, with negotiation of the SAA following on quickly.
• Begin the process of establishing Pristina’s authority in the north:  Kosovo Serbs who are also Serbian citizens should have the opportunity to vote in Serbia’s May 6 presidential and parliamentary elections but not municipal elections in north Kosovo, which are a violation of UNSC resolution 1244.  The EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina talks should discuss reintegration of the north through the Ahtisaari plan, supplemented by implementation mechanisms, including elements of President Tadic’s four-point plan.
• Improve Kosovo’s own ability to handle security:   With completion of Kosovo’s part in implementing the Ahtisaari plan by the end of this year, supervision of independence by the International Civilian Office is expected to end.  Kosovo will then be entitled to its own security force, which will need to be configured to meet a reasonable array of national security risks and enable an eventual NATO withdrawal, even if NATO will remain essential to guaranteeing Kosovo’s security until Belgrade fully accepts its independence and sovereignty by allowing it into the UN General Assembly.

5.  That leaves corruption.

• I am at a loss.  The opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption but good governance.
• Small family-focused societies have particular difficulty with nepotism, conflict of interest, witness protection and central government imposition of rule of law.
• Internationals may be able to help Kosovo by providing some independent, private-sector oversight and design of mechanisms to combat corruption.
• But my sense is that Kosovo also needs a more courageous and independent judiciary, in particular at the lower court levels.
• Still, there is no substitute for citizens demanding transparency and accountability.
• That’s as true in the District of Columbia as it is in Pristina or Belgrade.

6.  I return to my bottom line.

• Kosovo is an imperfect but functioning state.
• Pieter Feith intends to close the International Civilian Office well before the end of this year, with all of Pristina’s obligations under the Ahtisaari plan fulfilled.
• That will leave the remaining issues—in particular the north—to the EU and the OSCE.
• This is a rare occasion:  an international mission that closes its doors having worked itself out of a job.  Let’s celebrate!