Syria can get worse

NATO preparations for military intervention in Syria are again in the news.  The Obama Administration is looking for Plan B.  Even my former colleagues at US Institute of Peace are calling for suppression of Syrian air defenses.  That’s spelled W-A-R.

I am feeling the need to repeat what I’ve said before:  half measures won’t work and could make things worse. If removal of Bashar al Assad from power is your objective, and you propose to achieve it by military means, don’t trick yourself into thinking it will necessarily be easy or quick. Certainly a humanitarian corridor is not an obvious or direct means of getting rid of Bashar.  It is a target-rich environment that is only safe if military force makes it so.

It would be folly for NATO to waste its resources on such a half-baked non-solution.  That is certainly one of the lessons of the Libya experience, when a humanitarian intervention had to refocus on Qaddafi in order to bring about the desired, but not stated, result.

If you want Bashar al Assad out, the thing to do is take him out.  A massive attack on Syria’s command and control facilities would force him underground–as a lesser effort eventually did to Qaddafi–and all but guarantee that the regime changes, though in which direction is unpredictable.  To control that, you’ve got to put boots on the ground.  But you will also need to write off any prospect of Russian or Chinese support for action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which are certainly a greater threat to U.S. national security than Bashar al Assad.

Arming the opposition is another option.  There is lots of mumbling from Senators McCain and Lieberman about how the Free Syria Army (FSA) hasn’t gotten any help from anyone and are running out of ammo.  The French call that de la blague.  The Turkish and Iraqi borders have seen lots of arms flowing.  Others want to manage the process despite the chaotic conditions. The FSA is not a threat to the Syrian regime in the short-term.  It is an insurgency that will be difficult to defeat entirely but offers little immediate prospect of displacing Bashar al Assad, whose army is stronger than the Libyan one and notably more loyal.

A long, violent, drawn-out and increasingly sectarian conflict in Syria is not a good outcome for the United States.  I am second to none in wishing Bashar al Assad gone from a country in which I studied Arabic and enjoyed remarkable hospitality from people who have suffered a half century of privation, economic and political.  Yes, we should certainly support the on-the-ground opposition and do everything possible to protect their right to protest and determine their own political future.

But the best bet for now is to play out Annan plan and the UN observer scenario for what it is worth:  either it will lead to a serious reduction in violence, and I hope a corresponding increase in peaceful protest, or the observers will give up like the Arab League observers before them and abandon the field.  If the former, we’ll all be able to celebrate, as nonviolent protest will provide by far the best foundation for a successful transition to something like democracy.  If the latter, we should not be surprised to find that things get worse, much worse, as they did after the Arab League observers withdrew.