What Allawi can do

I had a visit today from Iraqis concerned about Prime Minister Maliki’s growing closeness to Iran and his push to concentrate power.  I thought it might be useful to record what I told them.

In my experience, the U.S. administration is well aware of Maliki’s push to concentrate power and concerned about it.  The Americans want the 2014 elections to be reasonably free and fair.  They know full well that the judiciary is not independent and that Maliki is pressuring the press.  But their primary focus has been on the election commission, which has to be truly independent in order to pull off a recognizably free and fair election.  The arrest of the head of the commission on a minor corruption charge and the threat of a parliamentary investigation led by Maliki’s own is creating anxiety.

The Americans don’t view Maliki as an Iranian stooge, as many Iraqi Sunnis see him.  He accepts their support when it suits him and helps him to stay in power.  Nor is he backing Bashar al Assad’s continuing rule in Syria.  Iraq has blocked overflights from Iran that were resupplying Damascus.  The Americans think Maliki is legitimately concerned with who replaces Bashar al Assad and determined that it should not be a sectarian figure, who would necessarily be Sunni.

What about Kurdistan President Barzani’s complaints that Maliki is in effect holding the Defense and Interior portfolios for himself?  The Americans know that is a legitimate complaint, even if I have been told that Maliki accepted an Iraqiyya nomineee for Defense who was then withdrawn.  But Barzani undermined his position by threatening to hold a referendum on independence for Kurdistan, even though he knows full well that the international community will not recognize the result.  It looks to some in Washington as if the Kurds, asked for an accounting of how oil money is being spent, responded belligerently, turned off the tap and took up a cry for independence that has no serious chance of success.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 Iraqi election, there was a good deal of support for Ayad Allawi.  Iraqis voted for change and people in Washington were inclined to think they should get it.  Only in the summer did the Americans seem to shift to support Maliki, largely because Allawi seemed unable to assemble a majority in parliament, which is what he needed to govern.

Allawi and Iraqiyya, I went on, have not proven to be effective either within Iraq or abroad.  Allawi’s many op/eds attacking Maliki in the English language press are fine–he is entitled to speak out.  But when was Allawi last in Washington to talk with people, both in public and in private?  And if he is going to speak out against Maliki, why are his people still in the government?  Iraqiyya is trying to have its cake and eat it.  It might do better to go into opposition.  If it won’t do that, it needs to focus on getting some things done within the government.

There are several areas on which they might focus.  First is ensuring that proper procedures are applied in nominating military commanders and procuring equipment for the Iraqi armed forces.  Iraqiyya complains about these issues, but it never seems to get anything done to change the situation.

Second is protecting human rights.  Iraqiyya is far from distinguishing itself in making human rights its signature cause.

Third is insisting that at least some significant portion of Iraqi’s oil leave the country to the north (to Turkey) rather than virtually all of its being exported in the south, where it has to pass through the strait of Hormuz under the watchful eye of the Iranians.  A big pipeline to the north would require agreement among all the political forces in Iraq, but that in my way of thinking is its greatest advantage.  In any event, those who want Iraq tied more tightly to the West should be pressing for it.