Month: April 2012
Syria can get worse
NATO preparations for military intervention in Syria are again in the news. The Obama Administration is looking for Plan B. Even my former colleagues at US Institute of Peace are calling for suppression of Syrian air defenses. That’s spelled W-A-R.
I am feeling the need to repeat what I’ve said before: half measures won’t work and could make things worse. If removal of Bashar al Assad from power is your objective, and you propose to achieve it by military means, don’t trick yourself into thinking it will necessarily be easy or quick. Certainly a humanitarian corridor is not an obvious or direct means of getting rid of Bashar. It is a target-rich environment that is only safe if military force makes it so.
It would be folly for NATO to waste its resources on such a half-baked non-solution. That is certainly one of the lessons of the Libya experience, when a humanitarian intervention had to refocus on Qaddafi in order to bring about the desired, but not stated, result.
If you want Bashar al Assad out, the thing to do is take him out. A massive attack on Syria’s command and control facilities would force him underground–as a lesser effort eventually did to Qaddafi–and all but guarantee that the regime changes, though in which direction is unpredictable. To control that, you’ve got to put boots on the ground. But you will also need to write off any prospect of Russian or Chinese support for action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which are certainly a greater threat to U.S. national security than Bashar al Assad.
Arming the opposition is another option. There is lots of mumbling from Senators McCain and Lieberman about how the Free Syria Army (FSA) hasn’t gotten any help from anyone and are running out of ammo. The French call that de la blague. The Turkish and Iraqi borders have seen lots of arms flowing. Others want to manage the process despite the chaotic conditions. The FSA is not a threat to the Syrian regime in the short-term. It is an insurgency that will be difficult to defeat entirely but offers little immediate prospect of displacing Bashar al Assad, whose army is stronger than the Libyan one and notably more loyal.
A long, violent, drawn-out and increasingly sectarian conflict in Syria is not a good outcome for the United States. I am second to none in wishing Bashar al Assad gone from a country in which I studied Arabic and enjoyed remarkable hospitality from people who have suffered a half century of privation, economic and political. Yes, we should certainly support the on-the-ground opposition and do everything possible to protect their right to protest and determine their own political future.
But the best bet for now is to play out Annan plan and the UN observer scenario for what it is worth: either it will lead to a serious reduction in violence, and I hope a corresponding increase in peaceful protest, or the observers will give up like the Arab League observers before them and abandon the field. If the former, we’ll all be able to celebrate, as nonviolent protest will provide by far the best foundation for a successful transition to something like democracy. If the latter, we should not be surprised to find that things get worse, much worse, as they did after the Arab League observers withdrew.
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What good are UN observers?
That was my title for a piece The Guardian published this morning as UN observers in Syria must show courage in their actions and words:
By insisting on moving freely, and reporting what they see, the observers can deter violence and help to restore stability in Syria
As Kofi Annan rushes to deploy the first 30 UN observers to Syria, it is important to ask what good they might do. How can a few dozen unarmed soldiers monitor a ceasefire in a country of more than 22 million? Even at their anticipated full strength of 250, what can they really accomplish? Won’t government minders lead them around by the nose, showing them only what President Bashar al-Assad wants them to see? How can they possibly understand what is going on in a situation that is chaotic at best, homicidal at worst?
These doubts are well-founded, especially in today’s Syria. Observers are most useful where there is a peace to keep. If both sides in a conflict conclude that they cannot make further gains by fighting, then observers can increase mutual confidence in a ceasefire and reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings or miscommunications leading to violence.
Those conditions do not exist today in much of Syria, where the government is still purposefully attacking its own population. Violence has declined in some places, but fighting continues in others. The government has already made it clear it wants the observers to go where and when it is safe, as determined by Damascus. On Sunday, Assad’s spokeswoman said: “Syria cannot be responsible for the security of these observers unless it co-ordinates and participates in all steps on the ground.” This is as much threat as warning. The government security forces have always tried to focus on one major community at a time. Damascus will try to take the observers to those communities where relative peace prevails.
To be effective in this situation, the observers will need to take a proactive stance, reaching out to the Syrian opposition, insisting on going where they want when they want, and reporting amply on what they find. This takes courage. The UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, is providing the top cover. “It is the Syrian government’s responsibility to guarantee freedom of access, freedom of movement within the country,” he said. The observers will need to focus their attention on the violence, report on its origins and course, and demand that it stop.
Liaison with the opposition, while desirable, is also problematic. Anyone the UN observers contact may be tracked and monitored by the Syrian security forces. Arbitrary detention, torture and extrajudicial killings are common in Assad’s Syria. Some courageous individuals will speak up no matter what. Others, who are prepared to talk with the observers, will need to move quickly to protect themselves thereafter, changing residences, cell phones and even identities. This will make it difficult for the observers to maintain continuity.
Despite these very real problems, the presence and persistence of the observers can deter violence and encourage non-violent protest. The opposition will become less bold in provoking the security forces, fearing provocations will be visible internationally. Peaceful demonstrations, which are already common, will become larger and more frequent. The security forces will gradually realise that the observers cannot be intimidated and that they will return to check and re-check what is going on, reporting their findings in ways that will embarrass anyone who is continuing the violence. The commanders may begin to behave with less abandon.
The UN observers, in addition to doing whatever they can to report on violations of the Annan plan, need to keep in mind their own broader significance. They are the living symbols of international community engagement, the only token so far of the UN security council’s commitment to restoring peace and stability in Syria. They will need to try to maintain a good working relationship with the Syrian government, but they also have to insist on their own independence. This includes the freedom to meet with the Syrian and foreign media and report fully what they have found.
The ceasefire, already fraying, cannot, however, succeed for long on its own. The UN security council resolution requires humanitarian and media access as well as the start of a political dialogue. This is where Annan’s job gets really hard. Even though the security council was silent on the future of Assad, he has to be convinced to step aside, because there can be no serious transition if he remains in place. The ceasefire can only be a bridge to a broader political solution, not an end in itself.
If the observers come to the conclusion that current conditions do not permit them to do their work effectively, or if they determine that one side or the other is primarily responsible for the violence and mayhem, then they need to say so plainly. Failure is a possibility, but even failure can sometimes have a positive impact. The Arab League observers, whose mission failed during the winter, played a useful role despite their pro-Assad Sudanese leader. They talked with the opposition, their presence encouraged peaceful demonstrations, some reported accurately on what was going on, and others resigned in protest over the restrictions the Syrian government put on them. In the end, it was the withdrawal of the Arab League mission that escalated the Syrian situation to the UN and ultimately forced the security council to act.
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Droning on
The Washington Post reports today that the CIA wants to expand drone attacks in Yemen:
Securing permission to use these “signature strikes” would allow the agency to hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.
The United States has long used this less discriminating approach in Pakistan, where I am told we killed a lot of tall guys in long white robes before finding Osama bin Ladin holed up in his Abbottabad villa.
This is not an easy policy choice, but the right course is to err on the side of caution. The Post article emphasizes the risk of drone strikes putting the U.S. on the government side in Yemen’s wars with several groups of insurgents. I don’t see that as the main issue. After all, we recognize and support the government in Sanaa, even if we don’t intend to get involved in Yemen’s internecine battles. None of the insurgents are going to think we are not on the government’s side.
The Post also emphasizes that the drone strikes have killed a lot of the “right” people, more than are killed in strikes based on specific intelligence about their whereabouts. That, too, is not pertinent to the decision-making. We’d kill a lot of the “right” people by mowing down whole villages too, but it wouldn’t be morally correct or wise.
The issue is the impact of the strikes. Do they work, or do they not? Do they reduce risks to the United States or American forces? A recent quantitative analysis of the drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan suggests that they have reduced militant violence, BUT:
Finally, it is important to reiterate that any reduction in terrorist activity associated with the drone campaign appears modest in scope. Although a decline in violence in FATA in 2010 coincided with the peak of the drone campaign, FATA militants remain active and violence remains high. To the extent drone strikes ”work,” their effectiveness is more likely to lie in disrupting militant operations at the tactical level than as a silver bullet that will reverse the course of the war and singlehandedly defeat al Qaeda.
Others find more ambiguous results.
The bigger question is the impact on the population in areas where drones strike, and on the broader political context . This is where things get dicey, in particular if you hit the wrong people (no matter how many “right” ones you kill). Joshua Foust warned about these consequences earlier in the year. While some Pakistanis and Yemenis may celebrate the deaths of particular militants, there will always be collateral damage, the more so if the “rules of engagement” are loosened. It is difficult to imagine that most Pakistanis and Yemenis will welcome the deaths of innocent countrymen in U.S. drone attacks intended to protect Americans. How long will their governments put up with us? We’ve seen in President Karzai the negative consequences of too many mistaken strikes (not only by drones) and night raids.
General Petraeus, whom I know and respect, needs to repeat the question he asked himself about detention facilities when he took over in Iraq and later in Afghanistan: are we creating more terrorists than we are taking out of circulation? No RAND study will likely answer this question. We’ll have to rely on good judgment, which is in short supply as Washington gears up for its quadrennial blood-letting between Democrats and Republicans. There isn’t much mileage for an American politician in not doing the max to get the terrorists in Yemen, but restraint might in the end save more American lives.
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Fragility to possible stability
I spoke today at the World Bank on “Kosovo in 2012: Prospects for Turning Fragility into Long-Term Stability.” Here are the speaking notes I used.
1. Let me start by offering my bottom line: Kosovo, four years after independence, is still a work in progress but has decent prospects for long-term stability:
- The country has institutions: its government, parliament, constitutional court and municipalities are all functional and surprisingly vigorous on occasion.
- It has a vibrant civil society, including a press ranked by Reporters Without Borders as having “noticeable problems,” like those of all its neighbors.
- Freedom House gives Kosovo “partly free” rankings for civil liberties and political rights, on a par with some of its neighbors and lagging others.
- The last IMF mission in March concluded that fiscal targets were met and important progress in financial sector reform was made, while possible benefits for war veterans and political prisoners have been delayed, which I imagine is what the IMF preferred.
2. There are nevertheless very real problems.
- Kosovo suffers from endemic corruption, perceived as worse (though only marginally) than its neighbors according to Transparency International.
- Unemployment, underemployment and isolation of its very young and still rapidly growing population pose serious stability questions.
- Kosovo lags in moving towards the EU, due to its own lack of preparation, EU hesitation and resistance of the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo.
- Belgrade has prevented Pristina from establishing its authority in the 3.5 northern municipalities, where majority Serb populations reject Kosovo’s sovereignty.
- Serbia likewise rejects Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence, has blocked entry into the UN and hindered bilateral recognitions. They have nevertheless reached 89, a stone’s throw from the tipping point of 100.
- Kosovo has no means to protect itself even for a few days from a hostile Serbia, if Belgrade is prepared to use force.
3. The immediate threats to Kosovo’s stability boil down to two:
- The conflict in the north, which has repeatedly come close to the boiling point in recent months, both due to Serb demonstrations to block Pristina border controls and Albanian demonstrations to block Serbian traffic into Kosovo.
- The growing sense of isolation in Kosovo and increasing pan-Albanian political appeals, not only in Kosovo but also in Albania and Macedonia.
4. What is to be done?
- Accelerate Kosovo’s approach to the EU: Kosovo should get a road map of what it needs to do to qualify for visa liberalization. Nothing would take more steam out of pan-Albanianism than freeing up young Kosovars to visit and study in the EU. The feasibility study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU should be completed by the end of the year, with negotiation of the SAA following on quickly.
- Begin the process of establishing Pristina’s authority in the north: Kosovo Serbs who are also Serbian citizens should have the opportunity to vote in Serbia’s May 6 presidential and parliamentary elections but not municipal elections in north Kosovo, which are a violation of UNSC resolution 1244. The EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina talks should discuss reintegration of the north through the Ahtisaari plan, supplemented by implementation mechanisms, including elements of President Tadic’s four-point plan.
- Improve Kosovo’s own ability to handle security: With completion of Kosovo’s part in implementing the Ahtisaari plan by the end of this year, supervision of independence by the International Civilian Office is expected to end. Kosovo will then be entitled to its own security force, which will need to be configured to meet a reasonable array of national security risks and enable an eventual NATO withdrawal, even if NATO will remain essential to guaranteeing Kosovo’s security until Belgrade fully accepts its independence and sovereignty by allowing it into the UN General Assembly.
5. That leaves corruption.
- I am at a loss. The opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption but good governance.
- Small family-focused societies have particular difficulty with nepotism, conflict of interest, witness protection and central government imposition of rule of law.
- Internationals may be able to help Kosovo by providing some independent, private-sector oversight and design of mechanisms to combat corruption.
- But my sense is that Kosovo also needs a more courageous and independent judiciary, in particular at the lower court levels.
- Still, there is no substitute for citizens demanding transparency and accountability.
- That’s as true in the District of Columbia as it is in Pristina or Belgrade.
6. I return to my bottom line.
- Kosovo is an imperfect but functioning state.
- Pieter Feith intends to close the International Civilian Office well before the end of this year, with all of Pristina’s obligations under the Ahtisaari plan fulfilled.
- That will leave the remaining issues—in particular the north—to the EU and the OSCE.
- This is a rare occasion: an international mission that closes its doors having worked itself out of a job. Let’s celebrate!
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Peace picks this week
1. What’s Next? Mali in the Aftermath of the March 22 Coup d’Etat, SAIS, 12:30-2 pm April 16
In collaboration with Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI) and a coalition of organizations concerned with the future of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), The Wilson Center’s Africa Program invites you to an event entitled “Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. This discussion will center on a report entitled Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, which was researched, written and signed by dozens of international groups from the US, EU and the DRC.
The report discusses the symptoms, causes and possible solutions to the lack of security and the violation of human rights in the country. “An effective security sector – organized, resourced, trained and vetted – is essential to solving problems from recruitment of child soldiers, internal displacement, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals” says the report. It concludes that the main reason for the failure of army reform in DRC is a lack of political will from parts of the Congolese government coupled with the lack of strong commitment and coordination from the international community.
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Director, Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity
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Eastern Congo Initiative Fellow
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Karl Wycoff //Deputy Assistant Secretary, United States Department of State
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Cindy McCain //Founding Member, Eastern Congo Initiative
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Network for Security Sector Reform and Justice (RRSSJ)
To RSVP for this event kindly send an email to Africa@wilsoncenter.org.
3. Conflict and Stabilization Operations: A Conversation with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rick Barton, Brookings, 10-11 am April 17
Where
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
On April 17, Global Economy and Development at Brookings will host Ambassador Rick Barton, the newly confirmed assistant secretary of state for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Assistant Secretary Barton will discuss his vision for the new bureau and the priorities on his agenda. Brookings Fellow Noam Unger will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, Assistant Secretary Barton will take audience questions.
Participants
Featured Speaker
Rick Barton
Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations
U.S. Department of State
4. World Military Spending: Recent Trends, Stimson, 12-1:30 April 17
Place: SIPRI North America, 1111 19th St. NW, 12th floor, Washington DC 20036
RSVP: Please click here.
The following key points and questions will be discussed by a panel of experts:
- Presentation of the newly-released SIPRI figures for world military expenditures in 2011, outlining some of the key figures and trends
- How is the global financial crisis impacting world military spending?
- Do military spending trends suggest a shift in the global balance of power?
- Can military expenditures be cut (or cut further) to redirect spending to other priorities? What are the obstacles to this in different countries and regions?
- As the US seeks to reduce its budget deficit, how far should the military budget be cut?
- What are the reasons for increasing military spending by some regional powers? Does this create a danger of regional arms races?
Speakers
- Dr. Sam Perlo-Freeman, Head of Military Expenditure Project, SIPRI
- Dr. Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow – Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense, Stimson Center
- Dr. Nora Bensahel, Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellows, Center for a New American Security
Moderator: Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Executive Director, SIPRI North America
If you have any questions, please contact Masha Keller at sipri-na@sipri.org.
5. The Arab Awakening: One Year Later, SAIS, 1740 MA, 12-2:30 pm April 18
The Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, along with the French Embassy to the United States and the Alliance française
invite you to
a French Embassy Rendez-vous
The Arab Awakening:
One Year Later
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
12:00 pm–2:30 pm
Kenney Auditorium
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
with
Keynote Speaker
His Excellency François Delattre
Ambassador of France to the United States of America
and
His Excellency Mohamed Salah Tekaya
Ambassador of Tunisia to the United States of America
Remarks about Tunisia: progress, opportunities and challenges since the revolution
The Arab awakening and the rapidity of the events which are irreversibly altering the face of the Middle East have unequivocally called into question the ability of political analyses to provide the necessary tools for understanding the global scenario and its underlying trends, especially when their basic assumptions are openly challenged. Civil society, left to itself after the revolution, has been confronted with several constitutional, institutional and socio-economic issues. One year after the beginning of the revolution, we will question the challenges raised by the democratic aspiration and faced by the new regimes.
Welcoming Remarks: Aude Jehan, French Embassy Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Moderator: Ambassador Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Panelists: Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institute, The implications of the Arab awakening for the regional balance of power
Ömer Taşpınar, SAIS and Brookings Institute, Europe’s Approach to the Arab awakening and Turkey
Julie Taylor, RAND, The Arab Awakening: A Double-edged Sword for Moderate Islamists
Manal Omar, U.S. Institute of Peace, The role of Women in post-revolution societies
A light reception will follow with the kind support of Paul’s Bakery
6. The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are, WWC, 12:30-2 pm April 18
To attend this event, please send an RSVP to maria-stella.gatzoulis@wilsoncenter.org
The Islamists Are Coming is the first book to survey the rise of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring. Often lumped together, the more than 50 Islamist parties with millions of followers now constitute a whole new spectrum—separate from either militants or secular parties. They will shape the new order in the world’s most volatile region, more than any other political bloc, yet they have diverse goals and different constituencies. Sometimes they are even rivals.
In this book, Robin Wright offers an overview and 10 experts identify Islamists in Algeria, Egypt (two chapters), Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Tunisia. Each chapter is designed to help both a general audience and specialists.
A book website at www.theislamistsarecoming.com, to launch on the day of the event, will provide updates and an ongoing conversation among these and other experts.
The National Conversation at the Woodrow Wilson Center series provides a safe political space for deep dialogue and informed discussion of the most significant problems and challenges facing the nation and the world.
To attend this event, please send an RSVP to maria-stella.gatzoulis@wilsoncenter.org.
Location:
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Robin Wright//USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished ScholarJournalist and Author of seven books, most recently “Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World”
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Nathan J Brown//FellowProfessor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University
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Les Campbell //Senior Associate & Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute
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Samer S. Shehata//FellowAssistant Professor of Arab Politics, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
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Jane Harman//Director, President, and CEO
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Steve Inskeep//ModeratorHost, Morning Edition on National Public Radio
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Low expectations met
The P5+1 (permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) finally met in Istanbul today with Iran and brought forth the squeak of a mouse. According to EU High Representative Katherine Ashton:
We have agreed that the non-proliferation treaty forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement to ensure all the obligations under the treaty are met by Iran while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Saeed Jalili, the chief Iranian negotiator, put it this way:
We expect that we should enjoy our rights in parallel with our obligations (toward the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty).
At least there is overlap in those two statements about what little happened. They also agreed to meet again in Baghdad May 23, with some expert meetings likely in the meanwhile.
For those with low expectations, consider them met. But if you are feeling urgency for a clear and unequivocal Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, or to come clean on their past activities, or to end uranium enrichment, or stop enrichment at 5% (or at 20%), or to dismantle the underground enrichment facility at Fordo, you’ll need to wait longer. None of those things seem to have been discussed, despite their salience in Washington.
If the Europeans think that proceeding in this ambiguous way at an excruciatingly slow pace will somehow keep the dogs of war at bay, I’ve got bad news for them. Delay is surely one of Tehran’s objectives. Unless there is a good deal more agreed than the parties have acknowledged in public, the Iranians will likely get their delay, but have to suffer the consequences of impending sanctions as well. If they also continue to enrich, in defiance of the UN Security Council, it seems to me likely that someone will try to stop them.
The Europeans prefer to call these meetings “E3+3” rather than P5+1. I guess that’s three Europeans plus three unidentified also-rans (U.S., China and Russia). I’d be the first to claim that the Europeans have in the past played a useful moderating role vis-a-vis Iran. But I expect it won’t be long before the Americans or the Iranians, or both, decide that they need to try to settle the matter without three European countries that are supposed to have a common foreign policy and whose instincts call for misty generality rather than solid specificity. It was reported and denied that the Americans sought a bilateral meeting in Istanbul that the Iranians refused.
Yes, the Istanbul meeting has to be counted a “constructive” step forward, but the Europeans are kidding themselves if they think they can “manage” this conflict as they do their own disputes or those in the Balkans. They need to pick up the pace and meet far higher expectations if they are going to succeed in avoiding a sad end to this worthy initiative.
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