Month: April 2012
Brčko needs EU forces, not vowels
Last week saw a lot of journalists in Sarajevo for the 20th anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war. They tended to emphasize the downside: persistent ethnic division and tension. Tim Judah, who has never stopped going to Bosnia, sees the glass as half full, or better.
This is especially true for the northeastern Bosnian town of Brčko and the surrounding “district” (population about 80,000), the object of many bad wartime jokes about the need for a humanitarian shipment of vowels. It was the site of terrible atrocities at the beginning of the war and much skirmishing nearby during it, due to its strategic position in the narrow corridor linking the two wings of what is now Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.
Brčko was the hard nut that could not be cracked at Dayton, so it became the subject of a post-war arbitration process and American-led “supervision,” which provided decisions on issues the local politicians found too difficult and ensured more inclusive power-sharing arrangements than they would have concluded on their own. A U.S.-led arbitral tribunal decided in 1999 that Brčko would belong to both the RS and the Federation, which controls the other 51% of Bosnia’s territory. This really meant it belonged to neither. International supervision has gradually eased off, and later this spring the assembled powers that still guide the Dayton peace process (the Peace Implementation Council) will consider whether to end it. They likely will keep in place the arbitral tribunal, which decides the larger strategic questions concerning Brčko’s status (now formalized in the Bosnian constitution).
Things are far from perfect in Brčko–I am told it is still governed under an ethnic “key” that gets down to the level of interns and even its hotels sport ethnic identity–but its children go to more integrated schools than in the rest of Bosnia and power is shared in a way that each of the three ethnic groups seems to accept. The place has gone from the nut that couldn’t be cracked to the glue that holds Bosnia together. The RS cannot hope to leave Bosnia unless it controls Brčko. Federation control would spell the end of RS. Brčko District has to remain distinct.
This makes the end of supervision a more delicate moment than would otherwise be the case. The European Union, some of whose more powerful members are anxious to get rid not only of Brčko supervision but also the High Representative who oversees Dayton implementation, would be wise to take notice. The EU still has troops stationed in Bosnia but spread around the country in militarily insignificant contingents. Better to concentrate them in Brčko, thus signaling to both Bosniaks (Bosnia’s Muslims) and Serbs that no effort to “take” Brčko will be tolerated. Such a move might also satisfy Turkey, which supplies a good number of the troops and has hesitated to end Brčko supervision.
Some will argue that no one is prepared to start a war, so why is EUFOR (the European force) needed at all? Certainly neither Croatia nor Serbia, the neighbors most inclined towards war in the 1990s, is interested in blotting their EU copybook by trying to gain territory in Bosnia. Milorad Dodik, the RS president, wants independence and says so repeatedly, but Serbia won’t back him. He can gain more by cooperation with the EU on membership than he can by going to war. Zagreb is disinclined to support Bosnian Croat pretensions, since Croatia is scheduled for EU membership next year.
The Bosniaks, so unprepared for war in 1992, are another question. It should not be assumed that they will be as passive as they were 20 years ago. A serious Dodik move toward de jure independence would provoke some Bosniaks to violence. Taking and holding Brčko would be vital to prevent RS from leaving Bosnia.
If the EU wants the Americans and the Bosnians to take it seriously, it will concentrate its remaining forces in Brčko District, signaling to all concerned that Bosnia will not be allowed to fall apart, or fall into conflict. The move would also help convince the Americans that the Europeans know what they are doing. We’ve all learned to do without the vowels. Brčko needs EU forces.
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Make sure time is not on his side
President Obama issued a statement Friday (that’s when we say things we don’t want too widely noticed) marking the 18th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide:
…we pause to reflect with horror and sadness on the 100 days in 1994 when 800,000 people lost their lives. The specter of this slaughter of mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters haunts us still, and reminds the nations of the world of our shared responsibility to do all we can to protect civilians and to ensure that evil of this magnitude never happens again.
The irony here should not be lost: we are in the midst of a much slower and less bloody but still brutal repression of civilian dissent in Syria, where the toll amounts to something over 10,000 during the past year. No one has called it genocide, but it is certainly what the trade knows as politicide: an effort to murder political opponents, especially of the Sunni Islamist persuasion, into submission. Human Rights Watch reports today on extrajudicial executions.
I can imagine the discussion among the White House staff. Some will have argued: let’s get the President to put out a statement on Rwanda that is also applicable to Syria today. Maybe that will get some action. Others will have added that phrase at the end about the magnitude of the evil, hoping to avoid the obvious implication that we really ought to do something to stop Bashar al Assad. The result is a statement that sounds vigorous but implies nothing.
Don’t get me wrong: I understand full well why the White House would hesitate to take military action in Syria. But we should be asking ourselves if we are doing everything in our power short of military force to end Bashar’s brutal crackdown as soon as possible. The Obama Administration will claim it is doing its best. Here is a checklist to make sure:
1. Provide financial, communications and intelligence support to the Syrian opposition provided it unifies and keeps its efforts as peaceful as possible. This should include real-time intelligence on the operations of the Syrian army, which is necessary for protection of civilians.
2. Encourage the opposition to flesh out its National Covenant with more specific provisions to protect minorities and regime loyalists from revenge killing should Bashar al Assad step aside.
3. Make sure sanctions are implemented strictly not only by the United States but also by other countries , especially members of the Arab League. Iraq, which has not signed up for them so far as I can tell, should be high on this list. Syrian oil reportedly traversed the Suez Canal recently, contravening sanctions.
4. Use our significant information operations capabilities to ensure that Syria’s dissident voices are heard throughout the country and that the Syrian military and business elite are encouraged to defect from the regime. If we have begun such efforts, they are a deep, dark secret.
5. Work diplomatically to bring the Russians around to the view that their interests in port access and arms sales will be served best by abandoning Bashar. This we are surely doing, but are we ready to offer Moscow a serious quid pro quo?
6. Get Kofi Annan to beef up his request for ceasefire observers to 1000 and help him deploy them quickly, with the capability to move quickly around the country and communicate instantaneously from wherever they are.
7. If the ceasefire fails to take hold by April 15, as now seems likely, return to the UN Security Council to seek a resolution condemning the Assad regime, calling for Bashar to step aside and instituting an arms embargo against the regime.
8. Seek to block arms and money transfers from Iran to Syria, even if there are no formal multilateral restrictions.
9. Prepare for a major post-conflict Arab League peacekeeping mission, which will be necessary to separate the Syrian army and the Free Syria Army and to protect minorities, in particular Allawis, Druze, Christians and others who have supported the Assad regime.
I doubt any of this will work quickly. Bashar al Assad feels he is winning, has started to back away from the Annan ceasefire supposed to go into effect this week, and no doubt hopes to restore his authority, as his father managed to do after killing tens of thousands in Hama in 1982. Splits in the opposition, including a Kurdish walkout, will give him renewed confidence. But the Syrian regime is on the economic ropes and will not be able to eliminate a resistance that is now widespread and broadly (but not universally) supported by the population. We need to hang tough for the long haul, as we did in Burma, making sure time is not on Bashar al Assad’s side.
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Peace picks this week
Hard to know what to say about CSIS’s Global Security Forum 2012, but I’ve listed at least one session below. Lots of other events too:
1. Panel Discussion on Arab Countries in Transition, Stimson, 10-11:30 April 9
| Date | Monday, April 9 |
| Time | 10 – 11:30am |
| Location | Stimson |
Stimson Center, Marshall Foundation, and Safadi Foundation USA
are pleased to announce a panel discussion on
ARAB COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION:
An Update on International Support
One Year after the Deauville Partnership
As international leaders prepare to gather next month for the U.S.-hosted G8 summit in Camp David, Arab nations in transition continue to face significant economic challenges. The Deauville Partnership launched in France at the previous G8 summit in May 2011, established a political and economic framework to support the historic transitions launched by the “Arab Spring.” What progress has been made since then? How do G8 members plan to address the deepening economic challenges? What is the role of international financial institutions? What are the prospects for this initiative to evolve into a sustainable partnership between the West and the Arab world that ensures the region’s successful transition?
Panelists will discuss the latest initiatives and highlight areas that are in need of greater support.
Featuring:
Masood Ahmed, Director, Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund;
Inger Andersen (invited), Vice-President, Middle East and North Africa, World Bank;
Dr. Peter Howard, Coordinator for the Deauville Partnership, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State; and
Mona Yacoubian, (Moderator), Director, Pathways to Progress: Peace, Prosperity, and Change in the Middle East Project at the Stimson Center.
Click here to RSVP
or
follow the event live on Twitter at @StimsonCenter
2. Promise and Peril in Nigeria: Implications for U.S. Engagement, CSIS 3-4:30 pm April 9
3. Integrating Official and Crowdsourced Crisis Information, WWC, 4-5 pm April 9
Crowdsourcing crisis information gathered via the Internet is not new to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Since 1999, the USGS Earthquake Hazards Program has been generating Community Internet Intensity Maps (CIIMs) using geographic data submitted to the Did You Feel It? website. This open call to the public is a notable example of how USGS facilitates the sharing of critical crisis information by members of the public not only to provide valuable data for earthquake research at USGS, but also to provide immediate situational awareness for emergency management stakeholders. CIIM is one of the early instances of “crowdsourcing,” consciously developed long before the coining of this term by Jeff Howe in 2006.
New opportunities and challenges are emerging as members of the public use pervasive information and communication technologies, including social media and social networking sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, and user-generated maps), to help in the immediate aftermath of major disasters. The USGS Earthquake Hazards Program has already begun to investigate how to harness crisis data from the crowd via social media sites like Twitter to rapidly detect and characterize earthquake effects. However, as we increasingly have access to ever-growing streams of content online, how can crisis data from government agencies, satellite imagery companies, volunteer technical communities, disaster-affected populations, and the general public be integrated together to better facilitate emergency response, recovery, and mitigation efforts?
In this talk, Dr. Sophia B. Liu will discuss the opportunities and challenges with integrating official and crowdsourced crisis information based on the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and what has happened since this catastrophe, which was the tipping point for crowdsourcing and social media use in the crisis domain. Specifically, Dr. Liu will unpack the different interface challenges at the social, technological, organizational, and political levels. She will also discuss the meaning of “socially distributed curation” and its application to information management in the emergency domain.
About the Speaker
Sophia B. Liu, PhD is currently a Mendenhall Postdoctoral research fellow at the U.S. Geological Survey investigating crowdsourced geographic information around earthquakes. She works with Paul Earle at the National Earthquake Information Center in Golden, Colorado as well as Barbara Poore in Saint Petersburg, Florida through the National Geospatial Program and the Core Science Systems strategy. Specifically, Dr. Liu conducts research on the integration of official and crowdsourced geographic information pertaining to earthquakes. In May 2011, she received her PhD from University of Colorado, Boulder (CU) in the Technology, Media and Society interdisciplinary program at the Alliance for Technology, Learning and Society (ATLAS) Institute. In 2006, Dr. Liu was awarded a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Her graduate advisor was Professor Leysia Palen in the Department of Computer Science at CU directing Project EPIC (Empowering the Public with Information in Crisis) and the Connectivity Lab, where we conducted research in the emerging area of Crisis Informatics beginning in 2005 working at the intersection of social, technical, and informational aspects of crises and disasters. Her dissertation research focused on the use of social media pertaining to historically significant crises and the emergence of socially-distributed curatorial practices as a way of managing crisis information in the social media landscape. She has given numerous invited talks and guest lectures on the emerging use of social media during mass emergencies and historic disasters.https://profile.usgs.gov/sophialiu
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistan and the United States entered into a new counterterrorism alliance. Yet ever since then, the relationship between the two nations has been a rocky one. Today, this marriage of convenience seems to be approaching a breaking point. Can the troubled partnership be saved? Or will it dissolve in a messy divorce, as has happened in the past? Zahid Hussain, an award-winning Pakistani journalist and writer currently serving as the Wilson Center’s Pakistan Scholar, will address these and related questions in a discussion about one of the world’s most fraught bilateral relationships.
This event is organized by the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, and co-sponsored with the Middle East Program and International Security Studies.
-
Zahid Hussain//Pakistan ScholarPakistan Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal and The Times of London.
5. The Transformation of Political Islam in The Arab Awakening: Who Are the Major Players? Rayburn, 9:30 am April 11
The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 68th Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, April 11th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.
April 11, 2011. 9:30am – Noon
Rayburn House Office Building, Gold Room (Room 2168)
RSVP Acceptances only: (202) 296-6767 or info@mepc.org
Speakers:
John O. VollProfessor, Georgetown; Associate Director, Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for
|
Steven KullDirector, Program on International Policy Attitudes; Senior Research Scholar, University of Maryland |
Alexis ArieffAnalyst, Congressional Research Service |
Peter MandavilleDirector, Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason University |
Moderator:
Thomas R. Mattair
Executive Director, Middle East Policy Council
6. The Regional Implications of Shia-Sunni Sectarian Conflict In Middle East and South Asia, Georgetown University, 12:30 pm April 11
and
invite you to:
“The Regional Implications of Shia-Sunni Sectarian Conflict In Middle East and South Asia”
________________________
featuring
Vali Nasr
_______________________________________________
Wednesday, April 11, 2012
12:30pm – ICC 270
_______________________________________________
Over the past decade sectarianism has emerged as a major fault line in Middle east politics. Tensions between Shias and Sunnis have found new meaning in light of the Arab uprisings of the past year to define regional rivalries from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. The conflict in Syria, tensions in Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen, simmering violence in Iraq and the larger regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia all tell of the growing importance of the sectarian divide.
Vali Nasr is Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy at Brookings Institution, and a columnist at Bloomberg View. He served as Senior Advisor to U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke between 2009 and 2011. He is the author of Forces of Fortune: The Rise of a New Middle Class and How it Will Change Our World (Free Press, 2009); The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (W.W. Norton, 2006); and Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (Oxford University Press, 2006); as well as a number of other books and numerous articles in academic journals and encyclopedias. He is a Carnegie Scholar for 2006. He written for New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal,and The Washington Post, and has provided frequent expert commentary to media including CNN, National Public Radio, Newshour, Charlie Rose Show, Meet the Press, the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, The Colbert Report. He received his BA from Tufts University in International Relations, MALD from the Fletcher School of Law in and Diplomacy, and his PhD from MIT in political science in 1991.
Seating is limited.
Lunch will be served.
For directions to the Center and information on parking, please visit: http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/about/contact/
7. Global Security Forum 2012: Toward 2014: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the U.S. Role in the Region, CSIS, 11-12:15 April 11
The Global Security Forum 2012 is a forum on the top challenges facing U.S. and global security. In the coming years, U.S. Special Operations Forces are poised to take on new responsibilities and missions as they transition into a role as a truly “global force.” The panel will discuss the implications of this shift, the future of SOF, and proposed changes to the governing structure of these elite forces.
Toward 2014: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the U.S. Role in the Region
Anthony H. Cordesman,
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS
Kori Schake,
Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Amb. Ronald E. Neumann,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Moderator:
Robert Lamb,
Senior fellow and director of the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation at CSIS
8. Azeris of Iran: Their Condition, Status and Future Prospects, SAIS, 5:30-7 pm April 11
The Middle East Institute is proud to host Amb. Jeffrey Feltman, Amb. Feisal Istrabadi, and Daniel Serwer for a discussion about the state of U.S.-Iraqi relations in the wake of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. Panelists will explore both the challenges and opportunities presented by the transition of the U.S.-Iraqi partnership from a mainly military to a diplomatic one. What sort of working relationship is emerging between the U.S. and Iraqi governments? What kind of cooperation is taking place in the areas of domestic and regional security, diplomacy, trade, energy, and reform? How has the troop drawdown affected U.S. influence in Iraq and the region in general? Feltman, Istrabadi and Serwer will explore strategies and policies resulting from the new bilateral dynamics.
Bios: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman has served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs since 2009. A career member of the Foreign Service since 1986, Ambassador Feltman served as principal deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from February 2008 to his present assignment, serving concurrently as acting assistant secretary of state for the Bureau since December 18, 2008. From July 2004 to January 2008, Ambassador Feltman served as the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon. Prior to his assignment in Lebanon he headed the Coalition Provisional Authority’s office in the Irbil province of Iraq, serving simultaneously as deputy regional coordinator for the CPA’s northern area. From 2001 until 2003, Ambassador Feltman served at the U.S. consulate-general in Jerusalem, first as deputy principal officer and then as acting principal officer. Other postings include Tunisia and Israel.
Ambassador Feisal Istrabadi served as deputy permanent representative for Iraq at the United Nations from 2004 to 2007. He is currently the founding director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East at Indiana University-Bloomington where he is also University Scholar in International Law and Diplomacy. Prior to his diplomatic appointment, Ambassador Istrabadi served as a legal adviser to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs during the negotiations for United Nations Security Council resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004, which recognized Iraq’s reassertion of its sovereignty. He was also principal legal drafter of Iraq’s interim constitution, the Law of Administration of the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, and principal author of its Bill of Fundamental Rights. Before contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq, Amb. Istrabadi was a practicing trial lawyer in the United States for 15 years.
Daniel Serwer is a scholar at the Middle East Institute as well as a senior research professor of conflict management and a senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Formerly vice president for Centers of Peacebuilding Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace (2009-10), he led teams there working on rule of law, religion, economics, media, technology, security sector governance, and gender. He was also vice president for peace and stability operations at USIP (1998-2009), where he led its peacebuilding work in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and the Balkans. Serwer has worked on preventing inter-ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq and has facilitated dialogue between Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans. In 2006, he served as executive director of the Hamilton/Baker Iraq Study Group.
Moderator: Charles Dunne is the director for Middle East and North Africa Programs at Freedom House and a scholar at the Middle East Institute. He spent 24 years as a diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service, serving overseas in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Madras, India. In addition, he was director for Iraq at the National Security Council from 2005-2007 and a foreign policy adviser to the director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff in the Pentagon (2007-2008).
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Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
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Believe what they do
While Eric Trager over at the Washington Institute continues to warn that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood seeks a monopoly on power, Carnegie Endowment yesterday hosted Islamist politicians–including an Egyptian adherent of the Muslim Brotherhood–swearing fealty to pluralism. The day-long event–of which I attended only the first session on “Building New Regimes After the Uprising”–started off with Islamists from Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan.
Tunisia
Sahbi Atig, a Tunisian National Constituent Assembly member representing Ennahda, said that Tunisians want is a “civil state” and protection of individual rights. The Tunisian revolution has been fortunate to have broken cleanly with the autocratic regime without much violence. The army stepped aside willingly and is now out of politics–soldiers cannot even vote. Tunisia has now conducted free and fair elections to a pluralist constituent assembly operating under a temporary constitution.
The constituent assembly seeks a broad consensus based on Islamic and Arab identity but also guaranteeing individual liberties through institutions like a constitutional court and independent electoral and media commissions. Women’s and minority rights will be respected. Sharia will be a basis for freedom and justice.
The current government is seized with economic issues: unemployment, foreign investment, the need for more development in the interior. Accountability and transitional justice will be important issues, but settled only by dialogue and consensus. Questioned about his 16 years in prison, Atig made it clear they had taught him to oppose torture and advocate for freedom.
Morocco
Mustafa Elkhalfi, now Minister of Communications, claimed that Morocco’s “third path” is working: meeting the demand for reform without instability. The King reacted promptly to the “February 20” movement, promising good governance, transparency, rule of law. There is now a new constitution, real elections have been held, there is an Islamist prime minister and a governing coalition that includes Amazighs (aka Berbers). The monarchy has provided unity, modern religious leadership, and preservation of pluralism. There is a dynamic and active civil society with more than 50,000 private organizations and a culture of integration that includes Amazighs as well as leftists, in addition to Islamists and other political forces.
There are four main challenges: implementation of the new constitution (especially its provisions for freedom press and expression, women’s equality and an independent judiciary); real decentralization of governance (including the Western Sahara); answers to economic and social challenges like poverty, electricity, health and education; and revived regional cooperation with Morocco’s neighbors.
Egypt
Abdul Maegoud Rageh Dardery of Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party (a Muslim Brotherhood outfit), suggested that Egypt had made mistakes in the past by either slavishly following European practices or trying to depart entirely from them. He would like to see Egypt respect its own traditions but learn from the Europeans.
Egyptians yearn to live free under the rule of law. They want a civil state with reference to Islamic principles (not rulings in the FJP view) as the main source of law. The new constitution will be written by committee chosen half from outside parliament, which includes 20 parties. The FJP refused to claim the chair of all the parliamentary committees, preferring to distribute responsibilities more widely. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is trying to hold on to its privileges but the FJP wants to avoid a military-industrial complex.
Dardery was at pains to underline that sharia simply means rule of law and jihad means exerting an effort. The FJP will take a pragmatic approach to alliances, making common cause with whoever supports its program.
Jordan
The tone got darker with Nabil Alkofahi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan, which has undergone very limited reform. Elections in 2007 were fraudulent, he said, leading the Brotherhood to boycott them in 2010. The King is still stalling on reform, preferring to keep in place a constitution that gives him, his government and the military too much power. He uses the Israel/Palestine conflict, and the division between West Bankers and Jordanians, to distract attention and delay reform.
The King should be part of the solution, not part of the problem. The MB wants a constitutional, pluralist and civil state to conduct free and fair elections. There is no history of religious oppression in Jordan. But there is a need to eliminate military tribunals and the excessive role of the intelligence services. The MB itself is internally democratic, he claimed. Women participate.
Alkofahi was blunter than the others about Israel. While at pains to say that individual Jews and Christians should be treated correctly in Muslim countries, he underlined that Israel is occupying Palestine. Israel, he said, needs to end its aggression and respect Palestinian rights, including the right of return. But he promised a clear MB policy on the issues only when they gain power.
The bottom line: It was good to hear these rising political figures deal forthrightly with the issues Americans have on their minds, well-posed by Carnegie’s Marwan Muasher. But ultimately we’ll need to assess what they do, not just what they say. Trager’s warnings should not be ignored.
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Empty threat?
Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani in a soft-spoken but hard-hitting performance today at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy touted Iraqi Kurdistan’s political, economic, commercial and social success, underlining its safe and secure environment as well as its tolerance, relative prosperity, literacy and attractiveness to foreign investors, including American oil companies.
But he lambasted Iraq, describing its central government as headed towards dictatorship, unwilling to implement its constitution (by proceeding with the Article 140 referenda in disputed territories) or abide by the November 2010 Erbil agreement that was supposed to institute serious power-sharing among Kurdish, Shia and Sunni dominated political forces. Prime Minister Maliki is accumulating all sorts of power: over the security forces, the intelligence services, the judiciary and even over the central bank. If a constitutional solution to the current political impasse cannot be found, Barzani threatened to “go back to the people,” by calling as a last resort a referendum on a question to be posed by Kurdistan’s parliament at a time unspecified.
The threat was clearly stated, but left a lot of open questions. In addition to the timing and content, it was not clear how Kurdistan would handle the disputed territories in a referendum scenario or whether it was prepared to defend itself by military means from strengthening Iraqi security forces. Barzani foreswore the use of force, but indicated that an eventual clash might be inevitable. He did not comment on how he thought Ankara and Washington would react to an independence referendum.
On other issues, Barzani made it clear Kurdistan is trying to mend fences with Turkey, which has changed its tune on Kurdish issues. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would cooperate “without limit” he said with non-military, non-violent efforts against the PKK (Kurdish insurgents who use Kurdistan as a safe haven but attack inside Turkey).
Barzani promised moral, political and financial assistance to the Syria’s Kurds, but said the decision whether to join the revolution would be left to them. The KRG would not provide weapons, he said.
Barzani noted the KRG’s common interest with the United States on Iran issues. Presumably Kurdish assistance in this respect was discussed in some detail in official meetings. Kurdistan supports UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, including those regarding sanctions in particular. U.S. influence in Iraq, Barzani said, depends not on the presence of American troops but on the degree of commitment in Washington. He clearly hoped to see more commitment to diverting Maliki from his current course.
Barzani declined to criticize Iraqi Parliament Speaker Nujayfi, noting that he has not accumulated or abused power the way Prime Minister Maliki has. On Iraqi Vice President Hashemi, who fled to Kurdistan to avoid arrest in Baghdad, Barzani said the Iraqi judicial system is inadequate to the task because the Prime Minister controls it.
Barzani sounded determined, but a referendum threat is only as credible as the likelihood that an independent Kurdistan will gain significant recognition. He may be buttering up Turkey and the U.S. in hopes of neutralizing their opposition to such a move, but he has a long way to go before they will contenance it.
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