Month: May 2012
This week’s peace picks
A light week in DC. The big events are elsewhere: NATO Summit continuing today in Chicago, nuclear talks with Iran in Baghdad Wednesday, and Egyptian presidential election Wednesday and Thursday.
1. Egypt’s Presidential Election and Public Opinion: What Do Egyptians Want? Brookings, May 21, 3-4:30 pm
Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
Summary
The elections of 2012 could prove to be even more consequential for Egypt than the turbulence of 2011. Various Egyptian factions have spent the last year trying to find their place in the new post-Mubarak order, and for the first time Egyptians have an opportunity to choose their president. It is a critical time to take the pulse of the population.
On May 21, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will unveil the results of a new University of Maryland poll. Conducted in the weeks leading up to Egypt’s historic presidential election, the poll gauges which candidate is most favored by the public, what issues are driving public preferences, what Egyptians want their leader and their country to look like, and what role they want religion to play in politics. In addition, the poll explores Egyptian public attitudes toward the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the Iran nuclear issue, the Syria crisis, and the American presidential election. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami, principal investigator of the poll and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, will present his latest research and key findings. Steven Cook, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations will provide commentary and offer his insights from his own research. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, director of research for the Saban Center, will moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
2. The Dynamics of Iran’s Domestic Policy, WWC, 9-10:30 am May 22
Bernard Hourcade
Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Senior Research Fellow (emeritus) CNRS
Bijan Khajehpour
Managing Partner, Atieh International
On the eve of the Baghdad meeting between Iran and the P5+1, two Iran experts will discuss the role of domestic dynamics—recent parliamentary elections, divisions among the ruling elite, economic difficulties—in Iran’s decision to return to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue.
- post-war political agreements, especially the effects of excluding or including parties to the conflict both in governance and in security institutions, such as the military and police;
- the role of international diplomats and mediators;
- economic arrangements in peace agreements;
- the role of peacekeeping missions.
An array of cases will be discussed.
Speakers
- Charles “Chuck” Call, Presenter
Associate Professor, American University, and former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow (2008-2009) - Caroline Hartzell, Presenter
Professor of Political Science, Gettysburg College and former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow (2010-2011) - Lise Howard, Presenter
Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University, and current Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow - Ambassador Robert Loftis
former Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at U.S. Department of State, current USIP Interagency Professional in Residence; - Pamela Aall, Moderator
Provost, USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
4. The Day After Baghdad: Assessing the Iran Nuclear Talks, National Iranian American Council, 2-3:30 pm May 24
A panel discussion featuring:
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| PJ Crowley Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs |
George Perkovich |
Bijan Khajehpour |
Aaron David Miller |
Trita Parsi |
Thursday, May 24, 2012
2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
101 Constitution Ave, NW
Capitol View Conference Room, 7th Floor
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Greece is defeating its own purposes
Nikos commented on my previous post urging Athens to export stability:
An article from 2.150 A.D.: “Northern Mexico wants to join NATO with the name Virginia. We must hear those peoples voice because they have the right for self-determination. Recognizing them by this name means also that every Virginian that lived there the last thousand years is only Virginian and they never have been Americans there. Including the eight Presidents that born there and any other historical figure that Americans demand as their own. Virginians are no Americans and the opposite. And ancient Virginians were no Americans also. The history of Virginia is the history of the Former Mexican Republic of Virginia. And some day Virginians (Mexicans) will have the historical right to take Virginia state into their territory because it is their right.”
This is a little example which can make Americans see the problem with the Greek view. I chose this example because this page is American. With the use of our imagination we can think other examples with other American states or other countries. But still it will be a minor example because Macedonia (Greek, Ancient) is many more for the Greeks of what is any American state for Americans. I’ve tried to be brief here. Dozens of books have been written which they cannot fit in a comment.
Let me assure you, Nikos, that your example rings hollow to American ears: we would take it more as a risible compliment than anything else. Only those terribly insecure in their own identity and uncertain of their capacity to defend their own territory would object. If this Virginia were ready to contribute seriously to NATO defense capabilities, it would be welcomed with open arms.
As for the supposed territorial ambitions of your neighbors, I’ve yet to find a FYROMer who thinks one inch of Greece will ever become part of their territory. There are surely more Mexicans who would like to recover parts of Texas, New Mexico and California than FYROMers who want a piece of Greece. Moreover, the best guarantee that it will never happen is of course NATO membership, which requires that all such problems be resolved.
Greece has nevertheless done what its political leadership thought best at the NATO Summit and blocked any consideration of The FYROM’s membership. This is not only a clear violation of the International Court of Justice decision but it also increases ethnic tension in Macedonia and puts at risk of partition Kosovo and Bosnia as well as Cyprus. Should I mention that everyone in the world except Greece calls the country whose capital is Skopje “Macedonia”? It’s a habit that neither its inhabitants nor the rest of the world will give up easily, especially if the practice continues for another decade or two.
Some day there will no doubt be a political leader in Greece who recognizes how counter-productive Athens’ resistance to The FYROM becoming a member of NATO is, but it is not clear that either Skopje or anyone else will see any reason to accommodate. The sooner Greece comes to recognize that it is defeating its own purposes, the less damaged those purposes will be.
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Do the right thing
I wrote last October:
There has to be strict accountability for crimes against Serbs if Kosovo is to gain high ground in its international tug of war with Belgrade. The murders in recent weeks have to be made the object of serious investigations leading to arrests and prosecutions. And those who perpetrate these crimes, or who intimidate witnesses, should be viewed as what they are: enemies of a Kosovo state seeking to gain international recognition as a willing and capable defender of the rights of all its citizens.
I confess I do not know if there have been arrests and prosecutions for the murders I was referring to 7 months ago. I’ll be grateful if someone who knows leaves a comment on this post. But in any event what I wrote bears repeating, because it is happening again: threats against Serbs south of the Ibar and an attack on a police checkpoint in the majority Albanian portion of southern Serbia.
I don’t believe in collective guilt or punishment, but I do believe in collective responsibility. People who know better need to restrain the people who commit such crimes and speak out when the restraint fails. There is nothing that can hurt Kosovo’s campaign for international recognition and its effort to be accepted in international organizations more than crimes against Serbs. The perpetrators need to be discouraged, apprehended, tried and convicted. That is what the international community expects of a country that wants to be treated as independent and sovereign.
I met last week with Kosovo’s new crop of ambassadors going abroad. They are a well-educated, talented group, several of whom I’ve known for a long time. But the resources they command are minimal. Kosovo’s moral standing is vital to them. They cannot do their jobs if people in Kosovo are doing things that disgrace the homeland.
Ah, some will say, but you forget the crimes against Albanians! No, I don’t. I remember well hearing Nekibe Kelmendi talk about the murder of her husband and sons. How could anyone forget? And there are thousands of other cases, still unsolved, unprosecuted, unpunished. I don’t excuse Serbia’s failure to pursue these cases, but I have to admit that their failure to do so will have less impact, because Serbia is already a member of the United Nations. Kosovo isn’t.
That’s not fair. Life is not fair. You still have to try to do the right thing.
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Algeria: is stability stable?
Thursday’s discussion at SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations of Algeria After the Elections: Now What? left the audience wondering whether the country’s apparent stability really is stable, in particular as the 2014 presidential elections draw closer.
Algeria pulled off an election no one will say was free or fair for a parliament that controls nothing, as SAIS professor Bill Zartman put it. The junta remains firmly in power. The election results reflect the voting population’s reluctance to rock the boat or entrust its future to Islamists, who did poorly. Algeria had its intifada in the 1990s. Having suffered a civil war as a result, with horrific violence both by the Islamists and the security forces, there are good reasons for those Algerians who remember it not to want a repeat performance. It also had mini-intifadat every month or so in the 2000s and a larger one in January 2010; labor and other protests are common in Algeria, but they have little political impact. It wouldn’t matter if President Bouteflika were removed; the junta remains. However, the time of the presidential elections in 2014 may bring a moment when, whoever runs, the people will have had enough.
Even without revolutionary fervor, Algeria faces big problems. Barrie Freeman of NDI noted that its youth bulge is finding little employment (youth unemployment stands at 40%). Few young people voted. While the government is claiming over 40% of the electorate went to the polls, the real number may be significantly lower. Civic participation is generally low, in part due to a restrictive law on associations. The junta has promised constitutional reform, but it is unclear what that means. There is no reason to expect any serious moves to democratize.
Carnegie Endowment’s Marina Ottaway noted that a remarkably high 18% of voters spoiled their ballots, which likely reflects widespread dissatisfaction. It is harder to interpret the low turnout, which might just reflect indifference. While the Islamist parties did not see the surge evident in Tunisia and Egypt, Algeria suffers as they do from lack of secular opposition parties offering a serious alternative. President Bouteflika represents the last of his generation. Once he and his cohort are gone, within the next few years, the dissatisfaction many feel may emerge in political form, but there is little sign of it yet. The ruling parties have so far hung together fairly well, fearing that otherwise they will hang separately.
Pointing to southern Algeria and northern Mali, Daniele Moro of the Center for Transatlantic Relations raised the specter of terrorism, equipped in part by arms from Libya. We need to keep our eye on this obscure part of the Sahel, which could become a free for all region where Nigerian, Somali and Algerian (Al Qaeda in the Maghreb) terrorists may create a “mini-Afghanistan.” Algeria and Morocco, whose border is closed due to differences over Algerian support to the Western Sahara, are joining with NATO soon in a naval exercise. This is a positive development of a sort Europe and the U.S. should continue to encourage.
No one should be under any illusions. Reform in Algeria has not yet begun in earnest. But the apparent stability of an aging regime may not last.
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Syria: what now?
This is a piece of mine Reuters published this afternoon under the headline “Here’s how to handle Syria”:
Bashar al-Assad continues his war on the Syrian opposition, despite the presence of United Nations observers. His efforts have generated extremist reactions, including major bombings. The Syrian opposition continues to fragment, even as protesters manage to mount peaceful demonstrations in many parts of the country. The conflict is increasingly sectarian in character and has overflowed to Lebanon’s Tripoli.
There is no alternative in sight to the existing Security Council resolutions. Syria is not on the NATO summit agenda this weekend in Chicago. The Americans continue to need the Russians “on side” for nuclear talks with Iran that resume next week in Baghdad. Unilateral American action on Syria is not in the cards. Europe is preoccupied with its own financial crisis and is unable to act without American help. Qatari and Saudi weapons entering Syria are likely to increase violence and worsen sectarian tensions.
So what is to be done? Here are some ideas for the Obama administration:
- Lend wholehearted support to the Annan plan, which the United States has been badmouthing ever since the Security Council passed Resolution 2043 on Apr. 21.
- Talk with Moscow about ensuring that Russian vital interests in Syria, port access and arms sales, are protected once Bashar al-Assad is gone. The United States no longer needs to block Moscow’s access to a Mediterranean port, as it did during the Cold War. Russian arms sales to Syria are a small price to pay to bring down a regime that links Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
- Deploy civilian observers – including Americans – to Syria. The Security Council has already authorized a civilian component to the U.N. Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). It would be too much to expect Syria to accept U.S. military observers, and the U.S. does not send its soldiers and Marines into harm’s way unarmed, as the UNSMIS observers are. But we have had good results with unarmed civilian observers in the Kosovo Verification Mission before the NATO-Yugoslavia war, when the lead observer spoke truth to power about a civilian massacre.
- Stop talk about arming the opposition. It isn’t what we should be doing or encouraging because of the likelihood it will prolong sectarian conflict; we can’t control where the weapons end up; and there is no hope that an insurgency will defeat Assad anytime soon.
- Redouble encouragement for peaceful demonstrations, which are occurring every day in Syria, and try to ensure that the U.N. observers are present for them.
- Increase the flow of non-weapons aid to the opposition inside Syria, which claims to have received precious little so far, and provide intelligence on threatening movements of Syrian security forces.
- Present overhead video of heavy weapons in use against Syrian cities at the Security Council, along with other hard evidence of Annan plan violations. Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a U.N. website that would post video and photographs uploaded by Syrians.
- Tighten the application of sanctions, including implementing the draconian financial sanctions already adopted for Iran against Syria as well.
When the Security Council approved the Annan plan, the United States called for “swift and meaningful consequences … should the regime continue to flout its obligations.” The best way of getting those consequences approved in the Security Council is to support full implementation of the Annan plan. Then the United States can go to the Council in mid-July, when the observer mission has to be renewed, arguing that despite its sincere efforts, Bashar al-Assad has defied the international community and needs to be taught a lesson.
PHOTO: Anti-government protesters attend the funeral of Mahmoud Al Moustafa, whom protesters said was killed by forces loyal to Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, in Deir Al Zour, May 15, 2012. REUTERS/Handout
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Block that kick!
A correspondent sent me this English translation of the transcript of Greek political leaders meeting on May 16, published on the Greek presidency website. Any corrections to the translation will of course be welcome:
Kamenos (Independent Greeks): Mr. President, we would like to have clear guidance from this Council of political leaders under your presidency on how to handle the issue that might arise with Skopje joining NATO at the Chicago Summit under the name “Macedonia”. I would like that we express our opinion that in this process we have even the option to veto the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join NATO under the name “Macedonia”.
Kamenos: I would like to reopen the issue, whether there is a a possibility to give a direct order even for a veto to stop the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from joining NATO under “Macedonia”. So far I don’t have an answer. I ask again mr. President.
Venizelos (PASOK): There will be, there will be.
Kamenos: All right then.
Venizelos: Regarding the important questions that were raised, as you know, the agenda of the NATO Summit does not include the question of admitting Skopje. So, there is no question of enlargement. And if there are any questions raised at the sidelines of the Summit, they will be dealt with according to our national strategy and the arguments that also include (our response to the) verdict of the International Court of Justice to the Hague. So, our arguments need to be more intelligent then the ones we gave in 2008 (Bucharest NATO Summit).
Samaras (New Democracy): Of course. We mustn’t back down from Bucharest.
Venizelos: Obviously. All we need to do is reinforce our arguments in a way that is, shall I say, more skillful and intelligent.
Kamenos: But is using the veto to last possible weapon? This is what I’m asking?
Venizelos: Yes, yes.
President Papoulias: I think that Kamenos speaks of the possibility that the Skopje issue is added to the Summit agenda…
Venizelos: Yes, all right.
Papoulias: …Because right now it is not.
Venizelos: On the other hand, the reaction after the Hague verdict was very friendly toward Greece and our positions. I say this because I dealt with the issue as defense and finance minister.
Tsipras (SYRIZA): Regarding NATO, if Ms. Papariga will let me speak so I don’t have to take the floor again, I would like to make the same point as Mr. Venizelos. To the best of my knowledge, the Summit Agenda is determined unanimously by the NATO members, and it doesn’t include the issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. So, unless there is some surprise, which is not common practice in such occasions, there is no serious problem. I believe that our position, that should be followed by the interim Government, is the position that we also held so far regarding this important issue, that we, as a country, want the name issue to be dealt with a mutually acceptable solution with a geographic qualifier. There is no need to go into this any longer. Regarding the NATO summit, I think we are covered by the fact that this issue is not on the agenda.
Papariga (Greek Communist Party): Because this issue is not on the agenda, there is no need for discussion. If it does suddenly appear on the agenda, the one who is going (to Chicago) will put a veto so it will not be discussed, because there is no official Greek Government. Our position is known, let’s not discuss it now, before the elections.
Kouvelis (Democratic Left): There is no need to open non-existing questions. It is not on the agenda. We have a specific strategy as a country. In any case it needs to be stopped. And it is possible to be stopped. We will be there to resist, if someone wants to put it on the agenda. But, today we have two facts: primarily, the national strategy and also the fact that the issue is not on the agenda.
Samaras: We are discussing this in case there is a surprise.
Kouvelis: That’s what I said.
Samaras: In case of a surprise there should definitely be a veto. We are not even discussing that.Venizelos: Agreed. These things are understood without saying.
Kouvelis: These things are understood Mr. Samaras.
It is rare that one gets a transcript of political leaders planning to violate a decision of the International Court of Justice. But it is also curious that they are discussing the admission of “Macedonia” to NATO. Everyone I’ve discussed the issue with, including those who call themselves “Macedonians,” agrees that Skopje can only enter NATO at this point as The FYROM, in accordance with the 1995 interim agreement.
At least Greece’s representatives in Chicago on Sunday and Monday will have something to do that the country’s political leadership, busily preparing for financial apocalypse, thinks worthwhile. Even though there is no ball in play, they are ready to block that kick!
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