Month: May 2012
This week’s peace picks
Are things slowing down, or is it just me? Still some excellent events:
1. Is the Arab Awakening Marginalizing Women? WWC, 9 am-12:45 pm May 14
The Middle East Program and the Council of Women World Leaders
of the Woodrow Wilson Center
present
Is the Arab Awakening Marginalizing Women?
Monday, May 14, 2012
6th Floor Flom Auditorium
8:30 – 9:00am Coffee
9:00 – 9:20am Welcoming Remarks: Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
Opening Remarks: Jane Harman, President, Director and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
9:20 – 11:00am PANEL 1
Fatima Sbaity-Kassem, Former Director, UN-ESCWA Centre for Women
“A Cup Half Full or Half Empty: Is a ‘Women’s Spring’ Inevitable in Transitions to Democracy?”
Lilia Labidi, Visiting Research Professor, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore; Former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Tunisia; and Former Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center
“Tunisia: Policies and Programs for Women during a Democratic Transition”
Moushira Khattab, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center; Former Egyptian Ambassador to South Africa and to the Czech and Slovak Republics; and Former Minister of Family and Population, Egypt
“Lost in Translation: The Case of Egyptian Women”
Moderator: Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
11:00 – 11:15am Coffee Break
11:15 – 12:45pm PANEL 2
Rend Al-Rahim, Executive Director, Iraq Foundation; and Former Iraqi Ambassador to the United States
“Iraq: Frustrated Expectations”
Rola Dashti, Former member of Kuwaiti Parliament and Chairman, Kuwait Economic Society
“Arab Springs without Flowers”
Caryle Murphy, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
“Awakening Rains on Saudi Desert, Brings Green Shoots of Hope, Change”
Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Director, Women in Public Service Project Institute 2012, Wellesley College; and Director of International Human Rights Policy, Wellesley Centers for Women
“The Way Ahead: Some Lessons from Other Post-Conflict Communities”
Moderator: Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar
Read MEP’s latest publication on women in the Arab Spring: Reflections on Women in the Arab Spring
2. Solution or Stall? The Next Round of Talks with Iran, Bipartisan Policy Center, 10-11:30 May 14
Address:
1225 Eye St. NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC, 20005
On May 23, the United States and its international partners will sit down in Baghdad for another round of talks with Iran. While a diplomatic deal remains the best hope for a peaceful resolution to the international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, experts disagree over what terms the United States should accept and what can be expected from Iran. Join BPC and a distinguished panel for a discussion of what to expect from, and what is at stake in, the upcoming negotiations.
Featuring
Ambassador Dennis Ross
Counselor, The Washington Institute
Elliott Abrams
Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Undersecretary Nick Burns
Professor, Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of of Government
Steve Rademaker
Principal, Podesta Group
Member, BPC Iran Task Force
Moderated by
Mortimer Zuckerman
CEO and Chairman, Boston Properties
Member, BPC Iran Task Force
Introduction by
Michael Makovsky
Director, BPC Foreign Policy Project
REGISTER
3. Delivering Dignity in the Arab World through Political and Economic Reform, CIPE, noon-2 pm May 15
CIPE, 1155 15th Street, NW, 7th Floor
May 15, 2012
12:00 pm – 2:00 pm
Speakers: Larry Diamond, Director, Stanford University’s Center on Michele Dunne, Director, Atlantic Council’s John D. Sullivan, Executive Director, Moderated by Steve Clemons, Editor at Large, The Atlantic, Last year’s uprisings made clear that people were willing to make great sacrifices to build states and societies capable of delivering dignity to their citizens. This luncheon will offer an opportunity to explore the key linkages between political and economic reform in the Arab world and identify the opportunities and challenges to institutionalizing democratic values in economies throughout the region. |
Lunch will be provided.
RSVP by Friday, May 11, 2012
4. The U.S. National Security Budget, AEI, 1-2:30 May 15
On Tuesday, May 15, join the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for a New American Security and the New America Foundation to discuss an issue sure to face the next administration: U.S. defense spending in light of American grand strategy. With the “sequestration” mechanism set to cut at least $500 billion from the Department of Defense, on top of budget reductions in recent years, discussants will consider how these cuts could affect defense policy. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy will provide introductory remarks.
This event continues a unique collaboration among these institutions in the presidential campaign season, “Election 2012: The National Security Budget.” Past conversations covered the U.S. role in the world and policy in East Asia, and a later event will consider U.S. relations with the greater Middle East.
Schedule:
12:45 p.m. – Registration
1:00 p.m. – Remarks
Featured Speaker
Michèle Flournoy
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Panelists
David Barno
Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Thomas Donnelly
Resident Fellow and Co-Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Michael Waltz
Senior National Security Fellow, New America Foundation
Former Advisor on South Asia to Vice President Cheney
Moderator
Peter David
Washington Bureau Chief, The Economist
2:30 p.m. – Adjournment
Election 2012: Informing the National Security Agenda was launched on March 15 with a kickoff discussion on America’s role in the world and the strategies this might suggest for the elected commander-in-chief.
Future Events Include:
The U.S. and the Greater Middle East, keynote to be announced
July 17, 2012
New America Foundation, 1899 L St. NW #400 Washington, DC
This fall’s presidential election comes at a critical moment for the United States and the world. The demands for U.S. leadership are substantial–particularly in the dynamic Middle East and Asia-Pacific–yet fiscal challenges are forcing reductions in American military power and defense spending, sparking new thinking about American engagement with the world. In this important election season, many Americans will look to the next U.S. president to repair the economy, but he will nonetheless inherit complicated military and diplomatic engagements and govern as commander-in-chief of the globe’s most powerful nation. As a result, the discussion of national security issues must take a central role in the 2012 presidential election.
This event is the third in a series of four campaign-season seminars on the critical issues of U.S. foreign and defense policy, sponsored by AEI, the Center for a New American Security and the New America Foundation.
5. A Blueprint for Engagement Amid Austerity: A Bipartisan Approach to Reorienting the International Affairs Budget, 10:30-noon, May 16
Featuring report co-authors:
John Norris, Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, Center for American Progress
Connie Veillette, Director of the Rethinking U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Center for Global Development
And distinguished panelists:
Gordon Adams, Professor, School of International Service, American University, and Distinguished Fellow, the Stimson Center
Andrew Preston, Counsellor for Development, Foreign and Security Policy Group, British Embassy
Moderated by:
George Ingram, MFAN Co-Chair
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
10:30am–12:00pm
The Glover Park Group
1025 F St NW, 9th Floor
Washington, DC
Please RSVP by Monday, May 14th to event@modernizeaid.net. Space is limited.
Please join MFAN for a discussion on a new report from the Center for American Progress and the Center for Global Development. The report, A Blueprint for Better Engagement Amid Austerity: A Bipartisan Approach to Reorienting the International Affairs Budget, calls for a more focused approach to how the U.S. delivers economic and security assistance.
We will be joined by the report’s authors to share their findings and recommendations followed by a reactions from a distinguished panel and Q and A.
Colbert fetes Simonyi
I found this gem on the Johns Hopkins/SAIS website. Former Hungarian Ambassador to the United States András Simonyi has become the managing director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations, with which I am proud to be associated as a senior fellow. Or at least I used to be proud. Now I’m prouder. A Jon Stewart upload will make be proudest:
Talking Turkey
There were Turks in town this week. Well-informed ones who spoke off the record at a meeting that included other luminaries. Here are some of the conclusions from the discussion.
Zero problems with neighbors, Turkey’s avowed foreign policy based on realpolitik, blew away in the gusts of idealism associated with the Arab spring. Turkey now has growing problems with neighbors, especially Syria and Iran but also Iraq.
Syria. Turkey misread Bashar al Assad. Ankara thought he would step aside, but that reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of the Ba’ath regime and an underestimation of the difficulty of getting Bashar out. In fact, Turkey generally lacks people who understand the Middle East well, and even experts who speak Arabic.
With the U.S. reluctant to intervene, Turkey is paralyzed, fearing that anything it does will worsen its own problems with the Kurds and increase refugee flows. Prime Minister Erdogan’s voice is much stronger than his policies. He lacks domestic political support for any further move against Bashar al Assad. There is little popular sympathy for the Syrian revolution in Turkey. Ankara says it supports an inclusive Syrian National Council (SNC), but in practice Turkish support goes mainly to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the dominant influence within the Syrian National Council, not to secularists.
Turkey wants the Syrian Kurds to support the revolution, but it isn’t willing to support their desire for decentralization. Ankara pressured the SNC to deny the Kurds what they want, causing them to withdraw from the SNC entirely.
Iran. Turkish relations with Iran have deteriorated sharply. The traditional highly competitive but non-hostile relationship is turning ugly, despite rapidly growing bilateral trade. The balance is sharply in Iran’s favor. Iran will not back down on Syria. Nor will Turkey. Tensions are bound to escalate. It is not clear where the breaking point lies, but there is no sign that it can be avoided.
Iraq. Turkey has improved its relations with the Iraqi Kurds (particularly Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani) in an effort to influence the Syrian Kurds. But Ankara’s relationship with Baghdad has taken a turn for the worse. Turkey is competing for influence in Iraq with Iran.
Bottom lines: A few years ago, Ankara had hopes for zero problems with neighbors and was knocking on the door to the Europe. If Assad survives, Turkey will now face increasing Middle East turmoil that it has little capacity to manage and no European prospect. Ankara has bitten off more than it can chew in Syria and has little idea what to do about it.
Who is Ivica Dačić?
Milan Marinkovic writes from Niš:
Perhaps Serbia still does not know who is going to be its next president, but I think it knows very well who will be the prime minister
said Serbian incumbent interior minister and the leader of the Socialist party (SPS) Ivica Dačić at his first press conference after preliminary results of Serbian parliamentary elections were announced. He has even hinted he might also keep the powerful interior ministry portfolio while also taking the prime ministry.
While it came in third, the number of seats SPS has won in Parliament makes Dačić the kingmaker in postelection negotiations over the formation of the next government. Unless the two bigger parties – Democrats (DS) of President Boris Tadić and Progressives (SNS) of Tomislav Nikolić – decide to join forces despite their bitter rivalry, SPS cannot be avoided in any combination that reaches a majority in Parliament. That’s why Dačić is so confident.
According to the latest news, the puzzle seems to be already solved. Officials from Tadić’s DS and Dačić’s SPS told the media that they have reached agreement. Tadić, who faces a presidential runoff May 20, enigmatically confirmed that he knew who would be the next prime minister, refusing to reveal the name.
Increasing Dačić’s prospects of assuming the post is the fact that Boris Tadić needs his support if he is to defeat Tomislav Nikolić in the second round of the presidential race. What remains unknown is which party will be the third coalition partner. The potential candidates are the United Regions of Serbia (URS), which participated in the outgoing government, and the opposition Liberal democratic party (LDP). If Dačić is going to have the final word, he will probably opt for URS.
Even if Dačić fails in his aspiration to the premiership, he has every reason to celebrate. Since the previous election four years ago he has managed to become the second most influential politician in the country, having doubled both his own and the party’s popularity. The two stronger parties – DS and SNS – won higher percentages of votes than SPS but came in well below their own – and most analysts’ – expectations. Ivica Dačić thus appears to be the one who best understands what the average voter wants to hear.
What could the policy of a government he heads look like?
In a recent statement, Dačić said he would remain committed to the process of European integration but stressed that he was not going to accept any foreign ultimatums, no matter if they come from Brussels, Washington or Moscow. “I only listen to Serbian people,” Dačić concluded.
When it comes to Kosovo, Dačić will prove assertive, as he continues to insist that partition would be the best solution, disregarding potentially adverse consequences of such an idea and international opposition to it. But Dačić is a prudent pragmatist who knows his (and his country’s) limits, so it is unlikely he would dare to cross the line and seize the northern part of Kosovo. He is just as unlikely to agree to put it under Pristina’s sovereignty.
Probably the same pragmatism will moderate his behavior towards Bosnia. Dačić often makes provocative remarks suggesting independence for its Serb-controlled half, Republika Srpska. The situation in Bosnia is troublesome enough even without sniping from Belgrade.
Altogether, the way Serbia has so far dealt with the these issues should not be expected to undergo any notable shifts, at least in the short term. Apart from Dačić’s contentious rheoric, the country’s foreign policy will basically remain as ambigous as it already is.
Currently more challenging for Serbian government is the question of what it intends to do in the coming months to solve the problems it is facing at home. Prominent economists are warning that Serbia, among other things, must urgently undertake a stringent fiscal reform with emphasis on budget cuts if it wants to escape the Greek scenario. The incumbent government has been delaying reform for fear of popular unrest. The likely composition of the incoming government suggests that procrastination will persist. But there is a catch-22: the existing state of the economy is such that popular unrest could prove inevitable anyway
The failure to reform the security sector has contributed to the failure of reforms in other areas, since many factions within the apparatus that served as the backbone of Slobodan Milošević’s regime have never been disbanded. Once an important figure of Milošević’s inner circle, Ivica Dačić could be an ideal person to carry out security sector reform, but his electoral constituency is rooted partly in the security services. It might well be in his interest that the old guard in security services remains intact. His inclination as interior minister has been more in the direction of centralization than serious reform.
Reports are now emerging from a Hungarian party in Vojvodina (an autonomous province in northern Serbia) and from Nikolic about election irregularities. This is the first time since the fall of Milošević that serious accusations of election theft have been lodged. It will be interesting to see how they are resolved.
Rebalancing should be the order of the day
Having spent some time earlier this week listening to people who think war is becoming obsolete, it is hard not to write about today’s publication of a survey suggesting Americans want substantial cuts in the defense budget. This is true across the board: Republicans as well as Democrats, with the average cut desired far larger than anything Congress is contemplating.
The war in Afghanistan is one target of the cutting, but the sentiment extends also to nuclear weapons, ground forces, air power and missile defense. As the authors put it
By far the most durable finding — even after hearing strong arguments to the contrary — was that existing spending levels are simply too high. Respondents were asked twice, in highly different ways, to say what they thought the budget should be, and a majority supported roughly the same answer each time: a cut of at least 11 to 13 percent (they cut on average 18 to 22 percent).
Far be it from me to suggest that public opinion should determine the defense budget. But combined with previous survey data showing that Americans think we spend far more on foreign aid than is in fact the case (and would support spending far more than we do), this new poll suggests that rebalancing is not only in order but politically viable. It would take only a small slice of a defense cut of $100 billion or more, which is what this survey suggests the American people on average would support, to significantly increase civilian capabilities and thereby compensate for at least in part for any loss of overall capability to protect the national security.
Rebalancing should be the order of the day.
Ineffective solutions to the wrong problem
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.