Nikolic starts well, now let’s have fun
Tomislav Nikolic’s inauguration as President of Serbia went well: he pledged Serbia to a European future, committed himself to resolving regional problems through dialogue and promised future prosperity in return for hard work. He did not of course repeat his controversial remarks of recent days seeming to justify the Serb assault in the early 1990s on the Croatian town of Vukovar and his denial of genocide at the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.
He did however necessarily commit himself to
protect the Constitution, respect and safeguard the territorial integrity of Serbia and try to unite all political forces in the country in order to identify and implement a common policy on the issue of Kosovo-Metohija.
This means that he maintains Serbia’s claim to all of Kosovo, despite loss of control over 89% of its territory and more or less the same percentage of its population. As required by the constitution, he denies the validity of the 2008 declaration of independence and recognition by 90 sovereign states.
The key question for today’s Serbia is whether and how Nikolic resolves the contradiction between his commitment to a European future for his country and his commitment to holding on to Kosovo. No Serb politician wants to admit that this contradiction exists, but it does and they all know it. Twenty-two European Union members have recognized Kosovo’s independence. They will be unwilling to accept Serbia into their club unless it accepts Kosovo’s sovereignty and establishes “good neighborly relations” with the democratically validated authorities in Pristina.
Belgrade has been inclined to put off any resolution of this contradiction for as long as possible. That is understandable. It involves a trade-off that is unappetizing: either give up Kosovo, or give up the EU.
But the failure to make a clear choice distorts judgment on other issues important to Serbia’s future: relationships with Russia, the United States and NATO as well as Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo’s Albanian citizens (Kosovo’s Serb citizens will presumably choose to remain Serbian citizens, though some have also accepted Kosovo citizenship).
The United States and the EU have been reluctant to press Serbia hard on its choice between the EU and Kosovo, for fear of undermining former President Boris Tadic and strengthening Nikolic’s more nationalist forces. It might appear that there is no longer need for that reluctance with Nikolic in the presidency. But there is a real possibility that Tadic will become prime minister and lead the first government of Nikolic’s mandate. That would enable Serbia to renew its diplomatic manipulation of the West on the Kosovo vs. EU issue.
Nikolic in the past has been more inclined to advocate partition of Kosovo than to give up all claim to it. This proposition won’t go anywhere. The Americans and the Europeans are solidly against it, because it would precipitate a domino-effect of partitions in Macedonia, Bosnia, Cyprus and perhaps farther afield. The Kosovars would ask for the Albanian-majority area of southern Serbia in trade, something Belgrade would not want to offer. More importantly: it is not in the interest of most Serbs who live in Kosovo (outside the northern area Serbia would hope to claim). The Serbian church, whose important sites are all in the south, is solidly opposed.
I’ll hope that Nikolic defies the odds and gets courageous about Kosovo: it is lost to Serbian sovereignty. All politicians in Belgrade, including Nikolic, understand that, but no one wants to accept responsibility for it. Some of my Serb Twitter followers and email correspondents assure me there is not a chance in hell Nikolic will: that’s why they voted for him. They want him to choose Kosovo over the tarnished EU.
They may well be correct, but I’ll wait to see what Nikolic does. His first test will be implementation of the agreements already reached with Pristina. Tadic did precious little to make them operational. If Nikolic wants to stick his predecessor with responsibility for them, he’ll demand that they be implemented by a newly named prime minister, whether it be Tadic or someone else from his Democratic Party.
Nikolic could also change Serbia’s policy on United Nations membership for Kosovo, thus forcing Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic to preside in his new position as General Assembly president over Pristina’s acceptance into the UN. Watching that would be worth almost any admission price.
I’m not holding my breath for any of this to happen. Just saying it would be fun.
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6 thoughts on “Nikolic starts well, now let’s have fun”
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Belgrade knows it doesn’t have to rush into making the final choice between Kosovo and EU because its (increasingly unlikely) EU membership cannot take place before 2020 (if ever) even under the best of circumstances. Rhetoric aside, Serbian national policy orientation in the coming years will be predominantly determined by its growing economic troubles, and that’s something Russia could easily take advantage of now that the Europeans, as well as the West as a whole, are preoccupied with their own crises and likely to remain so for the long haul.
Ah, yes – the Russia card. Now just what is it Russia wants from Serbia in return for its supposedly promised investments? Besides the ability to engage in general mischief in the Balkans, of course? Now, if Serbia still had a port … Jeremic as President of the GA might offer opportunities, but that’s only for one year. (It was satisfying, I suppose, to see Lithuania stymied, although if it gets the seat on the Security Council in exchange, it might actually get to vote on something, and neither Russia nor Serbia can necessarily count on its being in their favor. While Jeremic will probably not have to welcome Kosovo has a full member of the UN during his term, observer status is within reach, but you’ll probably have to go to a scalper to get the tickets for the show.)
Too bad that most of the neighbors missed the inauguration and didn’t hear Nikolic’s fine new speech – they were still irritated over his recent comments on Srebrenica and Vukovar, it seems. Was it just coincidence that the dinar, that had been recovering slightly from its pre-election swoon, turned down again? A Serbia at odds with its nearest neighbors is not a potentially strong economy. In any case, having to consider the behavior of markets may do more to teach Nikolic to mind his tongue than any amount of reminding from Fuele.
Well, I’m not quite sure that the “Russia card” is a proper term for what I meant. The Russian card Serbia has been playing so far is intented to portray Serbia in the eyes of the West as stronger a player in the international arena than it actually is. But this time dependence on Russia for economic survival might prove unavoidable should the new Serbian government fail to carry out profound structrural reform of the country’s entire economic – but also political and justice – system. Moreover, it perfectly fits Russia’s long-term goal of securing access to maritime trade lines via the Mediterranean, which would help the Russians finally eliminate one of their biggest strategic weaknesses – i.e. their essential isolation from the global market. Add to this that Greece could at some point also come to have no other choice than turning to Moscow, and you’ll see that such a scenario is not so distant, much less unrealistic, as it may seem to be on the surface.
By the “Russia card” I merely meant using the threat of turning to Russia for support rather than the EU. How access to Serbia (overland or by air) helps Russia with its desire for an outlet to the Mediterranean is unclear – it’s not as though Serbia has any ports of its own. (Some new form of association with Montenegro would make Serbia a much more attractive proposition, of course.) Since Russia’s main exports are delivered via pipeline, I’d assume they’re more interested in access to the Med and the world ocean for warships than for container ships. But with the rise in global temperatures and the opening up of the Arctic Ocean, Mediterranean ports may become less interesting to them in any case. At long last, Russia’s geography, with its major rives running north, will become an advantage.
There’s the matter of South Stream, of course, but with alternative sources of gas becoming available (imports of LNG, the shale gas reserves within Europe) it’s not going to offer Russia the potential stranglehold on the European economy it once did. The “base” in Nis would leave them in the same situation they were in at the Prishtina airport – no ingress or egress except with the permission of presumably unfriendly forces. It’s clear why Serbia wants Russia’s backing, but unclear what Russia expects from the deal. Is preventing NATO from solidifying its position in the Balkans and dividing its member states politically really enough? Since there’s no cost to it, perhaps.
“How access to Serbia (overland or by air) helps Russia with its desire for an outlet to the Mediterranean is unclear – it’s not as though Serbia has any ports of its own. (Some new form of association with Montenegro would make Serbia a much more attractive proposition, of course.)”.
Good that you mentioned Montenegro, as that’s exactly what I have in mind (among other things). If the EU crumbles, economically devastated Serbia will have to seek for help somewhere else. Russia would be the first, so to speak, natural choice. The Russians are proven masters of converting short-term financial investment into long-term political profit. Montenegro, for its part, is currently on its path toward EU and NATO, but pro-Serbian forces there are still strong enough – especially in the country’s northern area – to undermine the process if they get an opportunity. In fact, Montenegrin pro-Western elite is so eager to join NATO and make the biggest possible advancement in Eurointegration precisely because they want to prevent Serbia from further exerting its influence in Montenegro. And there is also RS with its secessionist intentions that would also vastly benefit from the contingent EU collapse.
To summarize: the scenario of Russia taking effective control over Serbia, Montenegro, RS and Greece – i.e. incorporating these into Moscow’s exclusive sphere of interest – would be possible only in case the EU breaks apart; and even then, it would not be bound to happen for sure (for one thing, we don’t know in which way the collapse of EU would affect NATO, particularly its eastern and southern European members), but there certainly is such a possibility among many others. Therefore, let’s hope the EU will survive.
And this is why I cannot understand NATO’s spurning – again – Montenegro’s advances. Declare they’ve achieved whatever it is that needs to be achieved and get on with it. At least the EU talks are supposed to begin this month, aren’t they? Even if the EU is feeling pressed, Montenegro couldn’t cost them all that much, and would be worth having as insurance, to keep an unpredictable Russia from the (other) doorstep.