No, Yemen won’t work in Syria

Tonight at the International Peace Institute in New York, Jamal Benomar, special representative of the UN Secretary General for Yemen, discussed whether the “Yemen model,” a negotiated transfer of power from Bashar al Assad to one of his two vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa, might work in Syria (the female vice president, Najah Al-Attar, was not mentioned–no surprise that).  I attended all but the last few minutes by webcast.

Jamal was appropriately circumspect.  Yemen, he emphasized, was a unique and complicated situation.  The state started to collapse and lose control over parts of the country.  The President refused the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal initially and only accepted when offered complete immunity not only for himself but also for others in his regime.  The solution was a Yemeni one, based on face-to-face negotiations among Yemenis and codified eventually in UN Security Council resolution 2014 with support from the GCC and participation by other actors in Yemeni society.  Women’s rights, rule of law and democracy are explicit parts of the agreement.  The vice president, now President Hadi, had the trust of the opposition.  A military committee is responsible for disengagement and security sector reform.  There is also provision for a national dialogue, constitution-making, national reconciliation and traditional justice.  It is a clear and detailed road map culminating in elections in February 2014.

There is no way to transplant the Yemeni model.  Yemen has a history of political parties, active politics and powersharing.  There is a sophisticated civil society.  Parliament functions, elections are held.  There is democratic space that does not exist in Syria.  The peace deal is a power sharing arrangement between parties that believed there was no viable military solution (a “mutually hurting stalemate” in the parlance of conflict management).  All wanted a peaceful and orderly transition.

Yemen suffered nothing like the level of violence we have seen in Syria.  The total number of protesters killed in Yemen was 270 or so, far fewer than the more than 10,000 in Syria.  The Security Council, the region and the international community more generally spoke with one voice.  That voice was in favor of transition and backed the UN as facilitator. The agreement was signed in Riyadh because the presence of the Saudi King was useful.  The Yemenis in the end all cooperated because they concluded there was no other way than a peaceful solution.  Implementation of the agreement is on track.

So there may be lessons from Yemen, but Ambassador Abdullah M. Alsaidi (former Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations) summarized the differences between Yemen and Syria:

• the Syrian regime is stronger and controls the territory
• Yemen had a coherent opposition that is lacking in Syria
• Yemen had more democratic space than Syria, because its reunification in 1990 made it necessary
• the region and the UN Security Council are united in Yemen, divided in Syria
• rebel forces in Yemen were relatively larger
• the Yemeni military resisted a military solution and insisted on a political course, which is not yet the case in Syria
• in Syria the vice president has disappeared from sight and doesn’t have the confidence of the opposition (or perhaps even of Bashar al Assad)

The government in Syria still believes it can win militarily.  It faces a divided Security Council and a divided Arab world.  No, the Yemen model won’t work in Syria, not at least under current conditions.

But the UN has certainly demonstrated that in the more permissive Yemeni conditions it can, given time, add value in facilitating negotiations among local actors and prevent the worsening of a conflict that would have had devastating humanitarian and political effects.  UN agencies have also been able to provide a good deal of humanitarian relief.  Yemen is a success story, so far.   Success in Syria will require that both sides realize that further military action will not produce results.