Month: June 2012
Shaping a security community
István Gyarmati (Professor and President of the Center for Democracy Public Foundation in Budapest) opens the first panel session of the OSCE Security Days conference noting the increasing division between East and West but also underlines that there is less substance in trans-Atlantic relations. OSCE has been important in putting forward a broad concept of security, now including transnational threats. There are increasing challenges to democracy even in Europe. Francis Fukuyama notes that the crisis of democracy is due in part to shrinkage of the middle class.
Heather Conley of CSIS asks how the OSCE can be effective. The OSCE needs to be on the side of the global political awakening. She offers a SLOT analysis:
- Strengths: The OSCE has institutions concerned with conflict prevention and resolution, press freedom and minorities that are well-adapted to the current situation.
- Limitations: The OSCE is too widely spread. Needs to focus to excel. The economic dimension is not strong. Is the political military dimension strong, or should it yield to other organization?
- Opportunities: OSCE can help with democratization, especially in free and tolerant media. Combating discrimination and promoting tolerance will be important even within Europe.
- Threats: There is a sense of drift, lack of political will, dispersion of effort, need for consensus.
Here are things the OSCE can do:
- Promoting tolerance and non-discrimination in an era of social media and economic crisis.
- Exploring freedom of the media. OSCE may not be the best vehicle for cybersecurity.
- Strengthening civil society, with a focus on European youth, who are alienated.
- Resolving conflict. OSCE needs to make sure it is not part of the problem, and distinct from the UN and EU.
- Monitoring mission. But how does it differentiate itself?
- Strengthening linkage to Mediterranean partners. But beware of distraction from primary goals.
Igor Yurgens, Director of the Institut Sovremenogo Razvitiya, opens underlining that we are living in an unusally safe world. OSCE is not much of a player on security or economy. It should beef up on economic issues. It is already important to democracy and human rights, which is where it should concentrate its efforts. Frozen conflicts are a major issue, because that is where trust is lost (trans-Dniester, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia). There is no substitute for civil society engagement. He worked for 15 years on reconciliation with Latvia, engaging civil society and business. This is the kind of effort that is needed: nongovernmental organizations, experts and business can do more than diplomats. OSCE should create a “network of the willing.”
Professor Alyson Bailes of the University of Iceland focuses on transnational non-military threats. Common exposure to these threats does not necessarily mean common experience. Economic instability, terrorists, cyberthreats, natural disasters vary a good deal across the OSCE. Not everyone has security forces that they trust, or security forces from neighbor countries that they would trust. Nor is political will necessarily there to respond to other countries’ problems. The legal basis may be lacking, even within the European Union. The OSCE cannot fix all this. It has limits to its funding, limits to its expertise, and limits to its legal authority. The problems often extend beyond the OSCE area or strike only a part of the OSCE area. Other organizations may be more appropriate.
What can OSCE do? Analysis, development of norms, a clearing house for expertise. OSCE is a relatively privileged area that can set a good model.
A Georgia representative underlines OSCE’s weakness in the security dimension. Inviolability of borders and respect for human rights were the pillars of the Helsinki agreement. The former is obviously a problem for Georgia, 20% of whose territory is occupied by another power. OSCE as an organization is still strong on human rights, but not all member states welcome that focus. Are transnational threats attracting attention because they are easier to deal with than the human rights issues that remain important in some OSCE member states?
A Ukrainian representative from an institute for research puts emphasis on OSCE values and civil society engagement. The Polish ambassador to the OSCE notes there is pressure on all multilateral institutions, which are having difficulty meeting challenges like youth unemployment. Core contributions of the OSCE have been conceptual innovations in response to new challenges, including engagement of civil society. Gyarmati notes a tweet that identifies OSCE’s search for easy transational issues as a mistake. The U.S. amabassdor underlines the OSCE role in promoting security transparency and confidence, including confidence building measures in the cybersecurity area.
The Canadian ambassador says three quarters of the OSCE iceberg is in the field, Warsaw and The Hague. Vienna is a hub for expertise on convential arms control. Shouldn’t we underline the early warning and mediation functions outside Vienna? The French ambassador underlines that OSCE does not exist in isolation and needs to coordinate with other organizations. Shaping the security environment is a goal that extends beyond the OSCE. A German foreign ministry official, noting the safer security environment, asks how OSCE can preserve and improve it. OSCE has competitive advantage in arms control and disarmament. In cybersecurity, OSCE can develop confidence building measures. The Turkish ambassador underlines the value added of a comprehensive security approach that unites East and West.
Conley emphasizes networks in civil society and business. Yurgens welcomes the idea of OSCE accrediting civil society and thinktanks so that they can be heard by their governments. OSCE should also welcome the professional peacekeeping capacity of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Bailes recognizes the importance of resolving the basic security issues but also thinks it is possible to sometimes focus on “easier” issues. CSTO should be heard at OSCE.
What good is the OSCE?
I’m at the Organization for Security and Cooperation’s “Security Days” conference in Vienna (Austria, not Virginia) today. This is an effort to open up discussion of OSCE’s future to broader than the usual governmental participation. OSCE’s origins are in the Helsinki agreement of 1975, which at the time represented an important breach in what we termed then the Iron Curtain. I’ll speak later in the day on reconciliation as a possible new vision for the organization, which is feeling a bit lacking in this department 24 years after the fall of the Berlin wall.
Ambassador Eoin O’Leary, representing the current chair of the OSCE, opens with emphasis on unresolved security problems and new challenges like terrorism and organized crime, which have to be resolved in an atmosphere of financial stringency. He is doubtful an overall vision is what is needed. OSCE needs to solve concrete problems, as it did in Kosovo recently by arranging voting by Serbs in the presidential elections. Consensus is not always the right way to go–it leads to the lowest common denominator.
Former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, now president of the Foreign Policy and United Nations Association of Austria, underlines the financial crisis, which has relegated security concerns to secondary priority. There is a need to understand the added value of our security organizations. The big problem is lack of trust. There is the re-emergence of separate security communities in the West and the East. The need is to focus on what unites, not divides. There are both traditional and new, trans-national challenges. He emphasizes the role of robots, which make it easier to start conflicts and harder to end them.
We need a bridge to future world governance, built on regional structures. The OSCE is a natural for building trust in the Euro-atlantic space. It needs a roadmap to 2015, when OSCE will celebrate its 40th anniversary in Helsinki. He suggests in particular a code of conduct for state behavior in cyberspace. He also emphasizes the importance of adapting conventional arms control to 21st century requirements. Frozen conflicts are a big obstacle to progress in the OSCE area: trans-Dniester is on the way to resolution, but Nagorno-Karabakh remains a problem, as does Georgia, where the OSCE mission should be deployed in the whole territory.
OSCE has done well to appoint three women as heads of mission this year. It needs to keep its focus on pluralism and conflict resolution. Religion is exploited in many situations where the underlying issues are really not religious. Religion can also have a positive influence. OSCE can play a positive role in North Africa and Afghanistan. Mongolia is interested in joining. Should there be an Asian Pacific version of Helsinki?
The 150 million euros that the OSCE costs represent a minimal expense. It has lost one third of its budget during the last decade. There is no good reason to continue in this direction: OSCE can and should add far more value than its expenses.
That’s the end of the opening session. Next up: Shaping a Security Community: Thematic and Geographic Issues Within a Comprehensive Security Agenda (where do they get so many words?).
This week’s peace picks
Lots of good events in DC this week, several of them big all-day events. I’ll be away part of the week in Vienna–that’s my excuse for not going to everything. Write-ups for peacefare.net are, as always, welcome.
1. Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, Stimson, noon June 25
Event Details
On June 13, 2012, The Centre for International Governance Innovation released its long-awaited report, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA.”
The report will be presented at an event on June 25 in Washington, DC, co-hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute North America (SIPRI North America). CIGI Senior Fellow Trevor Findlay, author of the report, will present the report’s findings. He will be introduced by Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, executive director, SIPRI North America.
The release of “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA” marks the culmination of a two-year research project that examined all aspects of the Agency’s mandate and operations ― from major programs on safeguards, safety, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to governance, management and finance. The report makes multiple recommendations, both strategic and programmatic, for strengthening and reform of the Agency. The project was a joint undertaking of CIGI’s global security program and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.
Professor Findlay holds a joint fellowship with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at NPSIA and is director of the CCTC.
When & Where
SIPRI North America, Stimson Center
1111 19th Street NW
Twelfth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
3. Iran and the West: Oil, Sanctions, and Future Scenarios, SAIS room 500 BOB, 9-12:45 June 26
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
9:00 – 9:15 | Light Breakfast |
9:15 – 9:30 | Welcoming RemarksAmbassador Andras Simonyi (Managing Director, SAIS CTR) |
9:30 – 11:00 | PANEL I Energy and Politics: Myths and Reality of a Complex InteractionSpeakers:
Claudia Castiglioni (Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, SAIS CTR) Sara Vakhoshouri (President of SVB Energy International and former Advisor to Director of the National Iranian Oil Company International) Guy Caruso (Senior adviser in the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, former administrator of the Energy Information Administration) Moderator: Robert J. Lieber (Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) |
11:00 – 11:15 | Coffee |
11:15 – 12:45 | PANEL II The Future of Iran-West Relations: A Transatlantic PerspectiveSpeakers:
Michael Makovsky (Foreign Policy Director at the Bipartisan Policy Center) Abbas Maleki (Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at Center for International Studies, MIT) Moderator: Suzanne Maloney (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution) |
4. Crisis Yemen: Going Where? City Club, 555 13th St NW, 10-noon June 26
June 26, 2012
Crisis Yemen: Going Where?
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Lecturer and Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Princeton University; and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
Mr. Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton University; author, Waq al-waq blog and The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemeni Studies Fellow in Yemen
Dr. Charles Schmitz, Associate Professor of Geography, Towson University; President, American Institute for Yemeni Studies; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemen Studies Fellow in Yemen
Mr. Robert Sharp, Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of Defense/National Defense University
Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; former Fulbright Fellow in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; and official observer for four of Yemen’s presidential and parliamentary elections
5. Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: International Norms, Unintended Consequences, and the Challenge of Non-Traditional Conflict, German Marshall Fund, 12:15- 2 pm June 26
Date / Time |
Tuesday, June 26 / 12:15pm – 2:00pm Register with host
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Location |
German Marshall Fund 1744 R Street NW, Washington DC, 20009
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Speakers | Mark R. Jacobson, Sarah Holewinski, Mark V. Vlasic |
Description | A discussion of the dilemmas posed by the use of RPVs, or “drones to include the implications for alliances, international norms, and their use outside of traditional armed conflict. The panel will also address the unique capability this new technology presents as well as the potential for unintended consequences and “blowback.”Speakers include Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of CIVIC (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict) who is preparing a report on drones with the Colombia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Mark Vlasic from Georgetown University and Madison Law & Strategy Group PLLC who has served at the World Bank and the Pentagon and has authored a legal analysis of Targeted Killing in the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The event will be moderated by Dr. Mark Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy NATO Representative in Afghanistan. |
6. Third Annual Conference on Turkey: Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey, National Press Club, 9-5 June 27
The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies
in collaboration with the Institute of Turkish Studies present:
“Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey”
June 27th, 2012
9:00am-5:00pm
National Press Club
529 14th Street, NW 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
Conference Schedule:
8:45am – 9:00am: Registration
9:00am – 9:15am: Welcome
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin, Middle East Institute
Gönül Tol, MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies
Ross Wilson, Institute of Turkish Studies
9:15am – 10:00am: Opening Keynote
Senator John McCain
United States Senate
10:00am – 10:30am: Keynote
Ömer Çelik
Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party
10:30am – 10:45am: Coffee Break
10:45am – 12:15pm
Panel 1: Turkey’s Domestic Calculus: The Kurds, the Constitution, and the Presidential System Debate
Yalçın Akdoğan, Member of Parliament, Justice and Development Party
Ruşen Çakır, Turkish Daily Vatan
Michael Gunter, Tennessee Technological University
Levent Köker, Atilim University
Moderator: Michael Werz, Center for American Progress
12:15pm – 1:00pm: Lunch*
1:00pm – 1:45pm: Keynote
Ibrahim Kalın
Chief Adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
1:45pm – 3:15pm
Panel 2: Turkey, the EU, and the U.S.: Evolving Partnerships Post-Arab Spring
Brice de Schietere, Delegation of the European Union to the U.S.
Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, IREX
Ambassador Ross Wilson, Atlantic Council
Yaşar Yakış, Center for Strategic Communication, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moderator: Sharon Wiener, Koç University
3:15pm – 3:30pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm – 5:00pm
Panel 3: Turkey’s Leadership Role in an Uncertain Middle East
Amr Darrag, Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
Joost Hiltermann, International Crisis Group
Yigal Schleifer, Freelance Journalist
Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Moderator: Abderrahim Foukara, al-Jazeera
*Complimentary lunch will be available on a first come first served basis
Follow @CSIS for live updates
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program will host its second annual conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea June 27-28, 2012.
The conference is a timely policy level discussion of the complex and important issues around the South China Sea. The program will take place a week before Secretary of State Clinton departs for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell will deliver the keynote speech on Wednesday, June 27 and Senator Jim Webb (D-VA), chairman of the Senate’s Asia Pacific subcommittee, will present a keynote address on Thursday, June 28.
In addition, CSIS is pleased to have recruited a world-class group of experts from Asia and the United States to initiate the dialogue around five key themes:
- Recent developments in the South China Sea
- South China Sea in ASEAN-U.S.-China relations
- Assessment of the South China Sea in a changing regional landscape
- Role of international law in resolving and managing territorial disputes
- Policy recommendations to boost security and cooperation in the South China Sea
Continuing disputes suggest there is a great need and interest to explore security in the South China Sea. We have invited approximately 20 experts to make presentations and will invite senior officials, executives, academics, and members of the media to participate in the dialogue. The full conference agenda is available here.
Please click here to RSVP by Monday, June 25, 2012. When you RSVP you MUST include the panels you wish to attend.You must log on to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, please contact imisadmin@csis.org.
8. Libya, One Year Later, CATO, noon June 27
Noon (Luncheon to Follow)
Featuring Diederik Vandewalle, Adjunct Associate Professor of Business Administration and Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College; Jonathan Hutson, Director of Communications, Enough Project to End Genocide and Crimes against Humanity; Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and join the conversation on Twitter with the hashtag #CatoEvents. Also follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Some political commentators have called the Obama administration’s intervention last year in the Libyan civil war an “undeniable success” and one of “the greatest triumphs and signature moments in Barack Obama’s presidency.” One year later, however, Libya remains in crisis. Reports suggest that operatives linked to al Qaeda are active in Libya. Militias are detaining thousands of former regime loyalists and engaging in widespread torture. Instability remains rampant and has spilled into neighboring states. Moreover, President Obama’s unilateral decision to intervene contravened congressional war powers.
What do these troubling developments mean for the future of the UN’s “responsibility to protect”? Did the death of Muammar Qaddafi vindicate the intervention? Will Qaddafi’s example make other so-called rogue states less willing to relinquish their nuclear programs? Were political commentators premature in declaring NATO’s intervention a success? Please join us as leading scholars examine this under-appreciated and almost forgotten topic.
Cato events, unless otherwise noted, are free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
9. Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security, Brookings, 9-12:30 June 29
Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.
On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and consider the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
After each panel, participants will take audience questions.
Details
June 29, 2012
9:00 AM – 12:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
For More Information
Brookings Office of Communications
events@brookings.edu
202.797.6105
Event Agenda
- 9:00Welcoming Remarks
- 9:15Panel One: Strategic and Energy Implications of Iran Sanctions
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Moderator
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- 10:45Break
- 11:00Panel Two: International Approaches to Iran Sanctions
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Moderator
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Tanvi Madan
Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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Albania’s role in the neighborhood
I spoke this morning at CSIS on this topic. Here are the notes I prepared for myself:
- In an important sense, Albania is the new guy on the Balkans block. It was thoroughly isolated from 1945 through the Cold War.
- The collapse of the Communist regime was cataclysmic for Albanians. I was in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Rome in August 1991 when the Vlora, a ship carrying 10,000 refugees, reached the port of Bari.
- Twice in the 1990s Italian troops were sent to Albania on what we would now call stabilization missions.
- When I went to observe the 1997 elections, I found myself in the midst of far more gunfire at night than in Sarajevo during the war.
- Less than 15 years later, Albania is a NATO member and sends peacekeepers abroad. It is an exporter of stability rather than an importer.
- Still the poorest country in Europe, Albania has suffered a slowdown in growth since the 2008 but weathered the financial crisis relatively well. Severe poverty is down sharply.
- Its role in the neighborhood is a positive one: Albania’s relations with neighbors Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece are generally very good.
- This is a remarkable achievement, one that merits a gold star no matter what I say farther on.
- There are problems. Albania’s problems are above all internal: its politics are contentious and sometimes violent, its public administration is weak, its economy is burdened with corruption and organized crime, rule of law is unreliable.
- These are all well-known and longstanding problems that will need to be addressed in the EU accession process, which has begun in recent years with the application for membership, the visa waiver and the Stabilization and Association Agreement, even if Brussels has not given Tirana candidate status or a date for negotiations to begin.
- I really see only one thing that could derail Albania’s progress towards European Union membership, if not in this decade then in the next one.
- That is its relationship with other Albanian populations in the Balkans. Fundamentally, it boils down to this: will the Albanians of the Balkans accept living in six different countries, or will they challenge the existing territorial arrangements?
- If I were in their shoes, I would not for a moment put at risk my hopes to be inside the European Union by unsettling borders in the Balkans or fooling with irredentist ambitions.
- Washington and Brussels will be unequivocal in rejecting Greater Albania ambitions, which could lead to catastrophic population movements and widespread instability.
- The wise course for Albania is to cure its internal ills, maintain good relations with all its neighbors, including Italy as well as those in the Balkans, and maintain close cultural ties with Albanians who live in other countries, including the United States.
- That Albania will continue to export stability, enjoy improving prosperity and enter the European Union with its double-headed eagle held high.
PS: A lot of people in the room, including the Albanian ambassador, thought Greater Albania was getting too much attention in the discussion. I trust they are right. The attention clearly reflects how strongly Americans feel the idea is a bad one, not how strongly Albanians are attached to it.
No, Yemen won’t work in Syria
Tonight at the International Peace Institute in New York, Jamal Benomar, special representative of the UN Secretary General for Yemen, discussed whether the “Yemen model,” a negotiated transfer of power from Bashar al Assad to one of his two vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa, might work in Syria (the female vice president, Najah Al-Attar, was not mentioned–no surprise that). I attended all but the last few minutes by webcast.
Jamal was appropriately circumspect. Yemen, he emphasized, was a unique and complicated situation. The state started to collapse and lose control over parts of the country. The President refused the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal initially and only accepted when offered complete immunity not only for himself but also for others in his regime. The solution was a Yemeni one, based on face-to-face negotiations among Yemenis and codified eventually in UN Security Council resolution 2014 with support from the GCC and participation by other actors in Yemeni society. Women’s rights, rule of law and democracy are explicit parts of the agreement. The vice president, now President Hadi, had the trust of the opposition. A military committee is responsible for disengagement and security sector reform. There is also provision for a national dialogue, constitution-making, national reconciliation and traditional justice. It is a clear and detailed road map culminating in elections in February 2014.
There is no way to transplant the Yemeni model. Yemen has a history of political parties, active politics and powersharing. There is a sophisticated civil society. Parliament functions, elections are held. There is democratic space that does not exist in Syria. The peace deal is a power sharing arrangement between parties that believed there was no viable military solution (a “mutually hurting stalemate” in the parlance of conflict management). All wanted a peaceful and orderly transition.
Yemen suffered nothing like the level of violence we have seen in Syria. The total number of protesters killed in Yemen was 270 or so, far fewer than the more than 10,000 in Syria. The Security Council, the region and the international community more generally spoke with one voice. That voice was in favor of transition and backed the UN as facilitator. The agreement was signed in Riyadh because the presence of the Saudi King was useful. The Yemenis in the end all cooperated because they concluded there was no other way than a peaceful solution. Implementation of the agreement is on track.
So there may be lessons from Yemen, but Ambassador Abdullah M. Alsaidi (former Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations) summarized the differences between Yemen and Syria:
- the Syrian regime is stronger and controls the territory
- Yemen had a coherent opposition that is lacking in Syria
- Yemen had more democratic space than Syria, because its reunification in 1990 made it necessary
- the region and the UN Security Council are united in Yemen, divided in Syria
- rebel forces in Yemen were relatively larger
- the Yemeni military resisted a military solution and insisted on a political course, which is not yet the case in Syria
- in Syria the vice president has disappeared from sight and doesn’t have the confidence of the opposition (or perhaps even of Bashar al Assad)
The government in Syria still believes it can win militarily. It faces a divided Security Council and a divided Arab world. No, the Yemen model won’t work in Syria, not at least under current conditions.
But the UN has certainly demonstrated that in the more permissive Yemeni conditions it can, given time, add value in facilitating negotiations among local actors and prevent the worsening of a conflict that would have had devastating humanitarian and political effects. UN agencies have also been able to provide a good deal of humanitarian relief. Yemen is a success story, so far. Success in Syria will require that both sides realize that further military action will not produce results.
No earth shaker
Israeli Vice Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz spoke Tuesday at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy during his first appearance in Washington since taking over leadership of the Kadima Party and joining Prime Minister Netanyahu’s governing coalition. His remarks encompassed the most pressing issues in Israeli foreign policy and touched also on domestic policy priorities.
Mofaz began by saying that Israel has a historic opportunity in light of the formation of its largest ever coalition. The 16-month window until the next required elections will allow Israel to make historic changes with its neighbors, even as the region undergoes “tectonic” change.
The Palestinian issue was first on the list and Mofaz’s number 1 priority. Unlike Iran, the Palestinian issue directly affects Israel but not the West. The onus is on Israel, then, to address it. Now is the time to “break the ice” with the Palestinians and immediately resume direct negotiations. According to Mofaz, the two sides are close enough on the issues of borders and security arrangements that negotiations can lead to an interim agreement. Such an agreement would change the atmosphere, build trust, and lead eventually to negotiations toward a permanent agreement for a two-state solution covering the most contentious issues like refugees and the status of the holy places.
Mofaz’s subsequent clarifications undermined his opening burst of optimism. He insisted that there be no preconditions for negotiations, referring to Palestinian demands that Israel cease illegal settlement building, but then sketched out Israel’s red lines. A Palestinian state could have security forces but not an army that could threaten Israeli security. No Palestinian refugees will be allowed to return to Israel, only to Palestine. Israel will not deal with Hamas, because it is a terrorist organization. Nor will Israel deal with Palestinian Authority President Abbas until Hamas leaves the Palestinian government. Israel’s eastern border will be at the far edge of its large settlements, and settlement building should continue in all such territory, including East Jerusalem. The message seemed to be that the Palestinians need to drop all preconditions to enter into negotiations leading to a solution dictated by the Israelis. Mofaz expressed the hope of talking with the Palestinians as soon as tomorrow, but he offered little incentive for them to come to the table.
Mofaz echoed Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position that a nuclear Iran constitutes an existential threat for Israel, but his tone was more cautious and less urgent. Time is left for diplomacy, including the oil embargo and tougher sanctions expected next month. The goal is for Iran to end all enrichment activity, remove all enriched material, and dismantle all underground facilities. While every option must be prepared, military action should be the last resort. We will have to ask ourselves how much it can accomplish in setting back the Iranian program, and what the impact will be on the region. In any event he would prefer that the West handle Tehran, as a nuclear Iran would threaten the West and moderate Arab states along with Israel.
The bloody uprising in Syria will end with the fall of Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Mofaz expected that the West would provide humanitarian aid to Syrians and warn Asad of the consequences of continued slaughter. The decision of how to handle the regime belongs to the Syrians, however. Mofaz hesitated to make predictions about the Egyptian elections but stressed that Israel would continue its relationship with Egypt no matter the results. The new regime will undoubtedly be less friendly, but Israel’s priority will be maintenance of the peace treaty and prevention of Sinai terrorism.
Mofaz proposed a number of reforms to the Israeli political system: raising the threshold for parliamentary representation to 4% of the vote, allowing the party with the most seats to form the government (which would have made Tzipi Livni, Kadima leader before Mofaz, prime minister), and requiring the full four-year term between elections. Other domestic priorities include service for all citizens (ultra-Orthodox and Arabs included) and a 2013 budget based on a social agenda responsive to last year’s protests
Mofaz’s approach to Iran and the Palestinians suggests he is more flexible than Netanyahu, but his weight in the governing coalition might not allow him to deliver much. There may be “tectonic change” in the region, but Mofaz is a junior coalition partner and has less than a year and a half to make something substantial happen with the Palestinians. He doesn’t have the look or sound of an earth shaker.