Day: July 12, 2012
Iraq and its Arab neighbors: no port in the storm
Speakers painted a bleak picture of a lebanized Iraq, weakened by internal divisions and unable to craft coherent regional policies, at a Middle East Institute event today.
Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie, former Iraqi ambassador to the United States, likened contemporary Iraq to a leaking ship, barely floating on the regional political waters as storms rage all around. The Ambassador bemoaned the lack of support for secularists after the American invasion and lambasted American support to Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Islamists. This policy worsened sectarianism. The United States left Iraq with a constitution that forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, but with an unwritten political pact that “lebanizes” the executive branch, with the presidency Kurdish, the prime ministry Shi’a and the speaker of parliament Sunni. This built-in sectarianism weakens the Iraqi state.
These internal divisions are at the heart of Iraq’s tepid relations with its Arab neighbors, who are standoffish, especially towards the Shi’a and Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional government conducts its own foreign policy, including a representative in Washington. The Ambassador is pessimistic about Iraq’s immediate future in the region: “it is in a crisis, but the horizon seems to be more of the same.” Only if Iraq improves its internal cohesion and mends fences with Kuwait and Turkey can it avoid being engulfed by the ongoing political firestorms raging in Syria.
Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, focused on the “brightly burning” Syrian flame. Like Ambassador Sumaida’ie, he bemoans Iraq’s internal lebanization, especially with regard to policies towards Syria. There is no coherent Iraqi policy, but rather multiple Iraqi policies toward Syria. The complex interplay of internal factionalization within Iraq’s weak state muddles its external relations, as each faction approaches the region in general, and Syria in particular, with an eye towards its own interests. The Kurds see events in Syria as an opportunity, not a threat; Masoud Barzani is strengthening ties to Turkey, trying to reassure the Turks that Kurdish interests are aligned with their own in the case of Syria. Sunni tribal leaders also see Syria as more of an opportunity than a threat: Syrian Sunnis in their view are throwing off the yoke of an Iranian-backed Shi’a minority. If it can happen in Syria, the thinking goes, why not in Baghdad? Despite some sympathy for the Syrian opposition, Iraqi Shi’a associated with Moqtada al Sadr are still wary of developments there, which threaten a regime aligned with Tehran. Prime Minister Maliki fears spillover from Syria that may damage Iraqi stability and security. This multiplicity of Iraqi approaches to Syria is driven by internal Iraqi political divisions, and is emblematic of the larger foreign and domestic policy problems facing Iraq.
Gregory Gause, professor of political science at the University of Vermont characterized Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iraq as passive. The Saudi view of Iraq and the Maliki government is negative, because they view the prime minister as an agent of Iran. The Saudis have done little or no outreach to Kurds or Iraqi Shi’a, and even with the Sunnis they have made no real appeal to Arabism. Saudi policy toward Iraq is a policy of complaint, not outreach. Saudi elites are focused on what appears to them a losing struggle for influence in the Middle East against Iran. This struggle for influence in the region plays out not through armies, but through contests for influence in the domestic politics of weak Arab states. The Saudis find Sunni allies, and Iran finds Shi’a allies. This sectarian alignment is counterproductive for the Saudis, because it gives Arab Shi’a in the region no choice but to ally with Iran. Ultimately, this will cause long-term problems for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and America, as it creates an atmosphere where al Qaeda type ideas can flourish. Other GCC states have largely followed Saudi Arabia’s lead.
John Desrocher, Director of the Office or Iraq Affairs at the Department of State focused on the positive, in terms of Iraq’s relations to its regional neighbors: Iraq and Kuwait have made “considerable progress in terms of resolving disputes,” relations with Jordan have improved, Saudi Arabia named an ambassador to Iraq for the first time since 1990, and Qatar airways now flies to Iraq. However, internal political divisions in Iraq have led to “real political gridlock” both in terms of domestic policy and regional relations.
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At last
The defections in the last few days of a senior Syrian republican guard commander and Damascus’ ambassador to Iraq could be a tipping point. It has taken a remarkably long time for cracks in the regime to show. But these two defections could be the beginning of an avalanche, one that would sweep away Bashar al Asad’s murderous regime.
If so, we need to begin considering seriously whether the international community and the Syrian opposition are ready for the difficult days ahead. Syria, unlike Libya, has limited oil resources and frozen assets abroad. It is a more diverse society than Tunisia, with significant Alawite, Christian, Druze and Kurdish minorities. It has seen a great deal of violence.
So what should we be expecting? The country will be broke at the end of this year and a half of contestation. It will have several armed forces on its territory: the Syrian army and intelligence forces (including non-uniformed thugs), the Free Syria Army and various neighborhood watch and other militias. Sectarian resentment against Alawites, who form the mainstay of the regime even if some have joined the revolution, will be ferocious. Some Christians and Druze will also be afraid of retaliation. Large numbers of regime supporters may flood into neighboring countries (there are still hundreds of thousands of Qaddafi-supporting Libyans in Tunisia and Egypt). Refugees now in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon will flow back into Syria to reclaim and defend their homes. Weapons will be circulating freely, with some risk that the regime’s heavier armament and chemical weapons will fall into the hands of malefactors. Sunni extremists (whether Al Qaeda or other varieties) will see a chaotic situation and try to take advantage of it.
I see no sign that the international community is ready for post-Asad Syria. I know why: we are tired of doing post-war reconstruction, which has posed expensive and seemingly insurmountable difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’d like Syria to be like Libya and Tunisia, which are taking reasonably good care of themselves. Or like Yemen, which is bumbling along under the former autocrat’s vice president with help from the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Or at worst like Egypt, where the military is clumsily trying to steer a revolution that has managed so far to avoid massive violence.
I doubt that is possible in Syria. Too much blood has been spilled for the revolution to entrust the army with steering anything, even itself. The army is unlikely to evaporate, as Qaddafi’s did in Libya. While many of its draftees will happily go over to a revolutionary regime, the elite units of the republican guard are unlikely to do that. Nor will the Alawite paramilitaries known as shabiha.
I’ve seen little sign of serious thinking or preparation for the big challenges ahead: creating a safe and secure environment, separating combatants, minimizing sectarian violence, providing for returnees and refugees, re-establishing law and order, beginning a political transition and somehow funding the effort. Nothing about the Syrian National Council’s performance in recent months suggests that it is capable of handling the situation with the modicum of legitimacy and skill that the Libyan National Transitional Council managed. Nothing about the Syrian army’s performance suggests that it could do even as well as the shambolic performance of the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Nothing about the UN’s performance in trying to implement the Annan peace plan suggests it can take on Syria and be effective.
We are in for a rough ride in Syria. Post-war transitions are difficult in all situations. This one will be among the toughest.
PS: Nothing in Steve Heydemann’s The End Game in Syria convinces me the situation is better than the doubtful one I describe above.
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