Day: July 18, 2012
Electoral reform in Lebanon
Yesterday’s event on electoral reform in Lebanon, hosted by the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation and the Aspen Institute, aimed to find a path away from political sectarianism. The necessary reforms are clear enough, but the challenge is how to implement them in a system where fear of change still trumps resentment of an undemocratic system.
Dr. Arda Ekmekji, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Beirut’s Haigazian University, began by stressing the question mark in the event’s subtitle (“What’s in Store for 2013?”). With elections scheduled for 2013, the Lebanese do not yet know what law will govern them, or even if they will take place as planned. Ekmekji addressed three different electoral laws: the 2009 electoral law, the Charbel proposal, and the defunct Boutros draft law.
The 2009 elections took place under essentially the same system (with minor adjustments) in use since the 1960s, based on majority vote for parliamentary seats allocated according to religious sect. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel has put forward an electoral reform proposal for proportional representation in place of the winner-takes-all system that sends the winning party’s entire list for a district to parliament. In 2006 the Boutros Commission proposal for a combined majority and proportional system was rejected. Both the Charbel and the Boutros proposals are in theory viable, if imperfect, but they lack support among the political elite with entrenched interests in the current system. Ekmekji proposed the creation of a bicameral legislature with an upper house elected by majority and a lower house elected proportionally as the first step in phasing out political confessionalism.
Hassan Mneinmneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, focused on the challenges to reform. Confessionalism is entrenched in the political system of Lebanon, which he described as a communitarian federation rather than a unitary state. This presents three levels of resistance to reform: existential, conceptual, and operational.
On the existential level, vertical segmentation of society is too powerful: people speak the language of reform in public but in private hold on to the confessional division of society. Conceptually, the main problems are defining the electorate and organizing a political system that can buck communitarian division. The current 50/50 division of seats in parliament between Christians and Muslims makes a mockery of what is more likely a 70/30 Muslim-Christian split in the population. A better organization would be a bicameral system with a symbolic communitarian upper house and a lower house elected on issues rather than sectarian loyalty. Municipal elections in Lebanon are already decided on concrete policy concerns, and Mneimneh suggested the possibility of transferring that system to a national lower house.
Operationally, the challenge of changing the system may be too great. Mneimneh argued there has never been a Lebanese election that was not determined by a small group of patrons under the influence of an international board of directors (principally the US, Syria, and Saudi Arabia). Elections are little more than en exercise in endorsing leaders selected by communal elites.
Leslie Campbell of the National Democratic Institute reported very little change in the Lebanese situation since he authored a report on electoral reform as part of an NDI mission in 2009. He counseled gradual progress guided by international standards for elections, among them fair districting, an independent election commission, expatriate voting, and pre-printed standardized ballots. He warned against the “inherently undemocratic” presence of nongovernmental security forces (read: Hizbullah) with the power to coerce people to vote their line.
The toughest question came from Elias Muhanna, author of the Lebanese politics blog Qifa Nabki, who has been researching electoral reform in Lebanon. He challenged the panelists to answer a recurring criticism of the bicameral system, namely that reforms won’t change voting habits and that a proportionally elected lower house would still be dominated by sectarian parties. Ekmekji answered that even a bicameral legislature would be transitional, but would represent a good start and provide an opening for political forces independent of sectarianism. Mneimneh argued that despite his own predilections, imposing secularism on the Lebanese would be elitist; it is up to the voting public to determine whether to retain the model of Lebanon as a federation of communities rather than a unitary state. The important thing is to make the process fair. A non-sectarian house would do not only that, but also provide a national forum for voting on issues rather than passions.
The panelists agreed on some vital elements for any electoral reform law. A bicameral system and proportional representation topped the list, but other suggestions included lowering the voting age to 18 and allowing expatriates to vote, along with procedural improvements like pre-printed ballots and an independent election commission.
This vision of a fair Lebanese electoral system free from the bonds of sectarianism has to confront a grim reality. Extensive civil society efforts have achieved little. International efforts have met with limited success. Funding has run dry as attention shifts to countries caught up in the Arab Spring. The popular upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia have not appeared in Lebanon, and in any case mass street protests in Lebanon are extremely vulnerable to politicization and cooptation by elites. Ekmkekji declared that the solution must come from the top down, and yet political elites are unlikely to embrace changes challenging their traditional prerogatives.
2013 will likely witness no major changes to the system. The best path forward seems to be a gradual reform process, opening up new possibilities for political expression alongside the sectarian system, until they eventually become strong enough to replace it.
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After the battle of Dimashq
In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there, @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:
We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.
Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring. Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.
The Syrian army today responded:
the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.
It added:
whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.
So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.
The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria. The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness. The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.
I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay. They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there. If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.
But I confess to another motive as well: if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace. The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force. Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea. Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion. Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task. Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so. I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.
If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers. Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds. Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. But some will be trapped and vulnerable. “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution. It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.
Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important. Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks. If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years. Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.
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Is Libya really headed for democracy?
Al-Monitor yesterday published this piece, which they titled “Libya Hurtles Toward Democracy.” That’s not quite my message, but have a read for yourself:
Returning from observing the July 7 Libyan elections last week, it was hard for me to believe that Libya — a pariah state for most of my adult life — might be on the path to democracy. Why, I wondered, did the elections go so well? Why were the results so “good” from a US as well as Libyan perspective? What are the implications of the results for the US and the region?
Based on my experience in Benghazi, the answers so far are encouraging, although significant challenges remain.
The elections went well because that is what the Libyans wanted. Without exception, the politicians I spoke with rejected last-minute appeals to vote for Islamists, as well as even more extreme Islamist and “Federalist” views opposed to voting at all. At least some of the Federalists, who want a commitment to a Libya formed from its three historic regions, have acknowledged defeat and proclaimed that the Libyan people have spoken in an election that drew 62% participation. Most Libyans wanted to vote and felt invested in the electoral process, which was organized and paid for by the Libyans themselves.
The assistance the Libyans got from the United Nations and US-backed organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems was wide-ranging, but did not deprive Libyans of ownership. Relatively quick sanctions relief ensured that the National Transitional Council’s coffers were full. When I asked the manager of the tallying center in Tripoli how he managed to get the ballots and tally sheets to the capital so fast from far-away Tobruk, near the border with Egypt, he responded, “I sent the plane.” Elections conducted in many municipalities during the spring were in some ways a practice run and whetted the electoral appetite.
Libyans won’t be happy to hear me say it, but I suspect that there were elements of Muammar Gadhafi’s legacy involved in the success of the elections. Hatred for Gadhafi gave Libyans a stronger sense of collective identity than many experts had anticipated. One Libyan election observer, asked at the end of her 12-hour vigil at the polling place whether she had ever imagined a free election in Libya, said, with vehemence, “never!” Her determination was a reaction to decades of oppression.
The Gadhafi regime also gave Libyans a lot of discipline. Entrusted with setting up the polling places, the nation’s school teachers posted instructions on classroom walls and arranged furniture and cardboard voting booths as shown in the posters provided by the Libyan High National Election Commission.
Last but not least, the Gadhafi regime had always promised Libyans self-government even if they were never allowed to exercise that right. No one in Libya has anything good to say about the Green Book or the Jamahiriya (Gadhafi’s “republic of the masses”), but Libyans have a clearer concept of self-governance than many people I know who have also lived under autocracy for decades.
As an election observer, my role was to watch and report. Mostly I found myself checking the “yes” boxes: the polling centers were accessible and free from adverse influence; the polling center staff was present; polling procedures were implemented correctly; voting was secret and free of apparent fraud or disruption. More often than not, Libyan observers were also present at the polling stations I visited. They also thought the process was conducted properly. There were separate polling stations for men and women, with relatively few women observing in the male polling stations. The polling stations in a camp for displaced people and in a disability center were set up and operating in the same way.
Not only the process, but also the election results were good. The leader of the winning coalition is Mahmoud Jibril, whose doctoral thesis and portrayal in a Wikileaks cable, show him to be a certifiable wonk and technocrat. He also proved to be a good politician. Eschewing secularism, he managed to get dozens of smallish, liberal parties to unite, then campaigned vigorously all over Libya. His Islamist opposition was more divided and less rooted than Jibril’s coalition.
It would be unwise to suggest that the results necessarily have broad implications for Libya’s western neighbor Tunisia, where the transition is already going reasonably well, or Egypt, where the transition is confused and messy. Nor will Libya echo strongly in Yemen, already embarked on a Gulf Cooperation Council-designed transition, or in benighted Syria. But Syrians and Libya’s western Maghreb neighbors, Morocco and Algeria, would do well to study carefully the way Libya is managing its transition. If the pro-revolution Syrian National Council could muster even a fraction of the cohesion the Libyans have shown, there might be some hope for a peaceful transition once Syrian President Bashar al-Assad falls.
The age of Algeria’s leaders will compel some sort of transition there as well, likely beginning with presidential elections in 2014. If the Moroccan king wants to avoid cataclysm, his tentative steps in the direction of constitutional monarchy should be bolder than they have been so far.
Perhaps the most important lesson of Libya is that the polarization of Islamists and secularists can be avoided. When everyone is Islamic, it hardly matters who is an Islamist. Islam, like Christianity in most of the West, should be a religion, not a source of political division. Europe and America will find it far easier to improve relations with a moderate, Islamic Libya than a sharply divided Egypt.
Libya still runs serious risks. Everyone points towards the militias, which provided good security for the voting in many areas but also clashed in a few, disrupting the polls in Kufra and Ajdabiya (south of Benghazi). While still vital to security in some places, the militias gradually have to be reined in and absorbed into state security forces and civilian society. These young militants have enjoyed a heady time. It will not be easy for them to accept a less exciting life. There are also tribal conflicts, often over smuggling routes, that continue to threaten the transition, especially in the south. And there are regional tensions between east and west that will have to find solutions in the constitution to be written and approved in a referendum next year.
The biggest challenge will be handling oil and gas revenue. If that is not done equitably, accountably and transparently, all bets are off. Only two countries on earth with hydrocarbon-dominated economies have managed their wealth reasonably well: Norway and East Timor. If Libya becomes a third, it might really be on the path to democracy.
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