After the battle of Dimashq

In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there,  @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:

We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.

Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring.  Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.

The Syrian army today responded:

the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.

It added:

whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.

So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.

The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria.  The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness.  The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.

I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay.  They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas.  I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there.  If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.

But I confess to another motive as well:  if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace.  The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force.  Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea.  Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion.  Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task.  Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so.  I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.

If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers.  Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds.  Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.  But some will be trapped and vulnerable.  “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution.  It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.

Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important.  Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks.  If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years.  Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.