Electoral reform in Lebanon

Yesterday’s event on electoral reform in Lebanon, hosted by the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation and the Aspen Institute, aimed to find a path away from political sectarianism. The necessary reforms are clear enough, but the challenge is how to implement them in a system where fear of change still trumps resentment of an undemocratic system.

Dr. Arda Ekmekji, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Beirut’s Haigazian University, began by stressing the question mark in the event’s subtitle (“What’s in Store for 2013?”). With elections scheduled for 2013, the Lebanese do not yet know what law will govern them, or even if they will take place as planned. Ekmekji addressed three different electoral laws: the 2009 electoral law, the Charbel proposal, and the defunct Boutros draft law.

The 2009 elections took place under essentially the same system (with minor adjustments) in use since the 1960s, based on majority vote for parliamentary seats allocated according to religious sect. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel has put forward an electoral reform proposal for proportional representation in place of the winner-takes-all system that sends the winning party’s entire list for a district to parliament. In 2006 the Boutros Commission proposal for a combined majority and proportional system was rejected. Both the Charbel and the Boutros proposals are in theory viable, if imperfect, but they lack support among the political elite with entrenched interests in the current system. Ekmekji proposed the creation of a bicameral legislature with an upper house elected by majority and a lower house elected proportionally as the first step in phasing out political confessionalism.

Hassan Mneinmneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, focused on the challenges to reform. Confessionalism is entrenched in the political system of Lebanon, which he described as a communitarian federation rather than a unitary state. This presents three levels of resistance to reform: existential, conceptual, and operational.

On the existential level, vertical segmentation of society is too powerful: people speak the language of reform in public but in private hold on to the confessional division of society. Conceptually, the main problems are defining the electorate and organizing a political system that can buck communitarian division. The current 50/50 division of seats in parliament between Christians and Muslims makes a mockery of what is more likely a 70/30 Muslim-Christian split in the population. A better organization would be a bicameral system with a symbolic communitarian upper house and a lower house elected on issues rather than sectarian loyalty. Municipal elections in Lebanon are already decided on concrete policy concerns, and Mneimneh suggested the possibility of transferring that system to a national lower house.

Operationally, the challenge of changing the system may be too great. Mneimneh argued there has never been a Lebanese election that was not determined by a small group of patrons under the influence of an international board of directors (principally the US, Syria, and Saudi Arabia). Elections are little more than en exercise in endorsing leaders selected by communal elites.

Leslie Campbell of the National Democratic Institute reported very little change in the Lebanese situation since he authored a report on electoral reform as part of an NDI mission in 2009. He counseled gradual progress guided by international standards for elections, among them fair districting, an independent election commission, expatriate voting, and pre-printed standardized ballots. He warned against the “inherently undemocratic” presence of nongovernmental security forces (read: Hizbullah) with the power to coerce people to vote their line.

The toughest question came from Elias Muhanna, author of the Lebanese politics blog Qifa Nabki, who has been researching electoral reform in Lebanon. He challenged the panelists to answer a recurring criticism of the bicameral system, namely that reforms won’t change voting habits and that a proportionally elected lower house would still be dominated by sectarian parties. Ekmekji answered that even a bicameral legislature would be transitional, but would represent a good start and provide an opening for political forces independent of sectarianism. Mneimneh argued that despite his own predilections, imposing secularism on the Lebanese would be elitist; it is up to the voting public to determine whether to retain the model of Lebanon as a federation of communities rather than a unitary state. The important thing is to make the process fair. A non-sectarian house would do not only that, but also provide a national forum for voting on issues rather than passions.

The panelists agreed on some vital elements for any electoral reform law. A bicameral system and proportional representation topped the list, but other suggestions included lowering the voting age to 18 and allowing expatriates to vote, along with procedural improvements like pre-printed ballots and an independent election commission.

This vision of a fair Lebanese electoral system free from the bonds of sectarianism has to confront a grim reality. Extensive civil society efforts have achieved little. International efforts have met with limited success.  Funding has run dry as attention shifts to countries caught up in the Arab Spring. The popular upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia have not appeared in Lebanon, and in any case mass street protests in Lebanon are extremely vulnerable to politicization and cooptation by elites. Ekmkekji declared that the solution must come from the top down, and yet political elites are unlikely to embrace changes challenging their traditional prerogatives.

2013 will likely witness no major changes to the system. The best path forward seems to be a gradual reform process, opening up new possibilities for political expression alongside the sectarian system, until they eventually become strong enough to replace it.