The Swiss cheese plan for Syria

I’ve been remiss in not discussing the final statement for the Syrian opposition conference, issued in Cairo July 3.  This includes two documents:

• a “national compact” that attempts to lay out in very general terms the constitutional basis for a pluralistic, republican and democratic Syria;
• a “compatibility document” that addresses the challenges of the transition period.

The translation leaves a great deal to be desired, but some of the essentials are clear enough:

• the opposition is united in seeking a democratic transition;
• the Asad regime will have to step down, aside or wherever before the transition begins.

The 210 participants in the conference included but were not limited to the Syrian National Council, whose utility has come increasingly into doubt.  It simply does not appear to represent all the indigenous forces at work in Syria, where local coordinating committees, the Free Syria Army and various other political forces are driving the rebellion that has left Bashar al Asad hanging on by a thread.

There is not much to elicit comment in the national compact.  It is unimpeachable as far as it goes, including in dealing with sensitive issues.  All Syrians are created equal, including especially women.  The people are the source of legitimacy and sovereignty.  Kurdish nationality is recognized, “within the framework of the unity of the Syrian nation.”  Ditto Assyrians and Turkmen.  Syria is nevertheless part of the Arab world.  The state will be decentralized (not federalized), protect private property, safeguard public funds, provide many services at affordable prices….  As aspirational documents go, this is a good one, though it leaves to be settled in the future all the difficult issues of how power is to be distributed, rights guaranteed and abuses punished.

The document on the transition period offers a clearer idea of what the opposition has in mind for the next phase than has been available so far but leaves a lot still to be decided.

The “removal” phase envisages no negotiation.  Bashar al Asad is to be toppled by force and the regime (not clear exactly how deep this is to go) held accountable for its crimes.

In the transition phase that follows the decapitation of the regime, a caretaker government is to be formed, the ruling Ba’ath party is dissolved, the parliament dismissed.  A national conference of some sort then ratifies a new but temporary legislative body (not clear how selected), and a technocratic transitional government formed.  The temporary legislative body issues a constitutional declaration for the transitional period.  The transitional government and the temporary legislative body hold elections for a constituent (constitution-writing) assembly within one year.  It forms a new government, somehow writes a new constitution and gets it approved in a referendum within six months.

This Swiss cheese plan has a lot of holes.  Who attends the national conference that ratifies a temporary legislative body chosen by whom?  Who writes the constitutional declaration and the new constitution?  What sort of majority is needed to approve the constitutional referendum?  This is far less complete than the plan prepared by the Libyan Transitional National Council, a plan that has helped to stabilize a country many thought would have great difficulty transitioning towards democracy.  Some things–the rules governing the election, for example–can be left open for later decision.  But it is hard to see how this plan even begins if there are not clear ideas about who is to participate in the initial national conference.  And it is easy to see how it could falter, even degenerating into to internecine violence among different revolutionary factions competing for primacy.

Let’s hope I am wrong.  Clarity about the democratic objective is helpful, as is unity in the demand that the regime be decapitated before the transition begins, even if it ensures for the moment continuation of the regime’s horrendous effort to suppress the rebellion.  But I hope someone is using the time this provides to fill in all those holes.

I hope also someone is making sure that Syrians in Syria feel comfortable with this plan.  It won’t be worth the electrons it uses on the internet unless it is truly owned by those who are conducting this revolution.

PS:  One can hope that the nongovernmental “day after” project does better than the more “official” opposition plan in defining the how of the political transition, but we’ll only know when we see this hyped but not published document.