Pristina, again

I’m in Pristina, again.  The big question on my mind is about the end of “supervised independence.”  Kosovo, according to the International Steering Group that has overseen its progress since independence in February of 2008, has substantially implemented the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (Ahtisaari Plan).  This will enable the Steering Group to end the supervision conducted by the International Civilian Office, which will go out of business in September.

That is a milestone worth noting.  Few international operations of this sort reach a clear end to their responsibilities.  The High Representative in Bosnia–the closest equivalent to the International Civilian Office in Kosovo–is still overseeing implementation of the Dayton agreements more than 17 years after they were signed. Kosovo, in order to reach this point, has had to meet a lot of requirements.  It has decentralized governance, strengthened legal protection for Serbs and other minorities, improved its legislation and amended its constitution.

Supervised independence is ending, but not the complex regime of limited sovereignty that dates from the end of the war in 1999, well before independence.   Kosovo will not be entitled to a proper defense force until next year, and even then NATO will remain essential to the defense of Kosovo’s territory for an undetermined period.  An EU rule of law mission will still provide prosecutors and judges, especially in cases of inter-ethnic and organized crime.  The UN continues to maintain a mission in Kosovo that plays a limited (I hope diminishing) role in the northern area still under Belgrade’s control.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has helped Kosovo to improve its governance and enabled Serbs there to vote in Serbian elections.  Kosovo uses the euro as its currency, thus eliminating the difficult issues that arise from having a sovereign currency of its own.

Some of this chafes, but not all of it.  Kosovo is happier to be part of the eurozone than many European Union members.  The international prosecutors and judges relieve their Kosovar counterparts of burdensome and dangerous responsibilities.  Having the OSCE around is useful if you want Serbs to be able to vote in an election neither Pristina nor Belgrade would feel comfortable arranging.

The more troubling issues concern the north and Kosovo’s defense force.  No state can tolerate forever not having control over its entire territory.  That is the heart of sovereignty.  This applies to both Serbia, which continues to avow (even in its constitution) that all of Kosovo is part of its territory, and to Kosovo, which believes that the north is an integral part of its territory.

This is the kind of conflict that leads to war.  It needs to be settled, definitively and peacefully.  I can think of no better basis than the Ahtisaari plan, which would provide the Serbs of the north with ample autonomy and self-governance.  It is true of course that that is precisely what Belgrade would like to offer the Kosovars, but they were at least 20 years late doing it.  It might have been accepted in 1991.  Independence, now recognized by 91 other countries, is a film that won’t run backwards.

Establishing Kosovo’s governing authority in the north, even in the weak form envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan, is going to be challenging.  Many of the Serbs who live there don’t want it, and Belgrade encourages them to resist.  Ivica Dacic, the Serbian prime minister-designate, hopes to hive off the north as compensation for the loss of the rest of Kosovo.  No one in the international community wants to see that happen de jure, but no one has been ready to exert the effort to reverse it de facto.

This is related to the question of Kosovo’s future defense forces.  A NATO-led force has protected Kosovo since the end of the 1999 war.  But what was designed as protection against a Belgrade effort to retake Kosovo is now functioning also as protection against a Pristina effort to retake the north. This is comfortable for Belgrade, but it cannot be expected to last forever.  It ties down about 5600 troops, including about 780 Americans.

Supervision is ending.  That is to be celebrated.  Time to get busy resolving the remaining questions.