Month: July 2012

This week’s peace picks

1. Syria: What Lies Ahead, Woodrow Wilson Center, 12-1 pm July 16

July 16, 2012 // 12:00pm — 1:00pm

What if the Syrian opposition doesn’t unite? Are the Alawites preparing for a separate state? Are the Kurds? What is the likely impact of a Sunni dominated Syrian government on the region? How much U.S. intervention is the right amount? Joshua Landis discusses these questions and the future of Syria.

Location:
6th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center
Event Speakers List:
  • Associate Professor and Director, Center for Middle East Studies, University of Oklahoma and author of “Syria Comment,” daily newsletter on Syria
2. War and Protest in Sudan, Center for American Progress, 1-2:30 pm July 16
The one-year anniversary of South Sudan’s independence is fast approaching. South Sudan and Sudan have seemingly stepped back from the brink of all-out war, but they have yet to resolve many outstanding issues within the context of the ongoing North-South negotiation process. Meanwhile, conflict is deepening in a number of Sudan’s regions, while the pro-democracy movement – led by youth, civil society organizations, and opposition political parties – is protesting Sudan’s dictatorship. This violence and unrest poses significant implications for South Sudan and the region at large.Join us for a discussion that will address these multiple and interconnected challenges and explore ways to build peace and security within and between the two Sudans.The Enough Project will also debut a short video – shot in South Sudan – highlighting the reflections of South Sudanese and Sudanese on the occasion of South Sudan’s first anniversary of independence.Featured speakers:
Sarah Cleto Rial, Program Director, My Sister’s Keeper
Francis Deng, Former U.N. Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide
Omer Ismail, Senior Advisor, Enough Project
John Prendergast, Co-founder, Enough Project

Moderated by:
John C. Bradshaw, Executive Director, Enough Project

Refreshments will be served at 12:30 p.m.

RSVP

RSVP for this event
For more information, call 202-682-1611

Location

Center for American Progress
1333 H St. NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005

Map & Directions external link icon
Nearest Metro: Blue/Orange Line to McPherson Square or Red Line to Metro Center

3. The U.S. & the Greater Middle East, Center for a New American Security, 12-2 pm July 17

Event Time and Location

Tuesday, July 17, 2012 – 12:00pm – 2:00pm

Constitution Ballroom-Grand Hyatt Washington

1000 H Street NW Suite 400

Washington, DC 20001

See map: Google Maps

The U.S. and the Greater Middle East

Election 2012: The National Security Agenda

This event has been moved to the Constitution Ballroom Grand Hyatt Washington.  Event registration is now closed.  You can view the live event webcast on this page. 

On Tuesday, July 17, join the New America Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for a New American Security for an in-depth discussion of the opportunities and challenges posed to the United States by events in the Greater Middle East. Panelists will discuss electoral transitions following the Arab Spring, the changing role of Turkey, and Iran’s regional and international profile.  Ambassador Dennis Ross will provide introductory remarks.

This event continues a unique collaboration among these institutions in the presidential campaign season, “Election 2012: The National Security Agenda.” Past conversations covered the U.S. role in the world, policy in East Asia, and the national security budget.
Schedule:
12:00 p.m. — Registration and Lunch
12:30 p.m.-2:00 p.m. —Panel Discussion and Q&A
Featured Speaker
Ambassador Dennis Ross
Counselor, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Former Special Assistant to President Obama
Former National Security Council senior director for the Central Region
Former Special Advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Panelists
Dr. Marc Lynch
Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Danielle Pletka
Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
American Enterprise Institute
Douglas Ollivant
Former Director for Iraq on the National Security Council under Bush and Obama administrations
Senior National Security Studies Fellow, New America Foundation
Moderator
Peter Bergen
Director, National Security Studies Program
New America Foundation
CNN will livestream this event on the Opinion page. On Twitter? Follow #natsecurity2012 for updates throughout the series.
About the Series:
This fall’s presidential election comes at a critical moment for the United States and the world.  The demands for U.S. leadership are substantial–particularly in the dynamic Middle East and Asia-Pacific–yet fiscal challenges are forcing reductions in defense spending, sparking new thinking about American engagement with the world. In this important election season, many Americans will look to the next U.S. president to repair the economy, but he will nonetheless inherit complicated military and diplomatic engagements and govern as commander-in-chief of the globe’s most powerful nation. As a result, the discussion of national security issues must take a central role in the 2012 presidential election.
This event is the fourth in a series of campaign-season seminars on the critical issues of U.S. foreign and defense policy, sponsored by AEI, the Center for a New American Security and the New America Foundation.

4. Electoral Reform in Lebanon: What’s in Store for 2013, Aspen Institute, 12:30 pm July 17

The U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program will host “Electoral Reform in Lebanon: What’s in Store for 2013” to launch Dr. Ekmekji’s new policy paper exploring the complexities of Lebanon’s confessional society and avenues for reform in its electoral system. During this conversation, experts will discuss Dr. Ekmekji’s paper in light of the debate on democratic representation and the rights of minorities in Lebanon, Syria, and the region. The panelists will also offer actionable recommendations for lasting reform that reflects Lebanon’s democratic prospects, leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2013.

Dr. Arda Arsenian Ekmekji is the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Haigazian University in Beirut, Lebanon. She is professor of intercultural studies and a member of various non-governmental organization boards in Lebanon, such as World Vision and the Middle East Council of Churches. She was the only female member on the National Commission for a New Electoral Law (2006) and on the Supervisory Commission for the Electoral Campaign (2009).

We hope you will join us for what will be an interesting and informative discussion on:

July 17, 2012 at 12:30PM

The Aspen Institute

One Dupont Circle

Suite 700

Washington, D.C.

Please contact Sarah Harlan at sarah.harlan@aspeninst.org or 202-736-2526 to RSVP. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Featuring
Dr. Arda Ekmekji, Dean of Arts and Sciences, Haigazian University – Beirut, Lebanon; Author, “Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon”
Mr. Hassan Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
In a moderated discussion with
Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
National Democratic Institute

5. Democratization in the Arab World, Carnegie, 12:15-1:45 pm July 18

Wednesday, July 18, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 1:45 PM EST

Based on the democratization experiences of other countries, what are the chances that the Arab Spring will lead to a flowering of democracy? In a new book, RAND Corporation experts extensively analyze past democratization examples over nearly four decades and analyze the Arab revolutions that up-ended longstanding authoritarian regimes.

Laurel Miller and Jeffrey Martini of the RAND Corporation will discuss what the successes and setbacks of other transitions from authoritarianism suggest about the problems ahead for Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, and how they might be overcome. Carnegie’s Thomas Carothers will discuss and Marina Ottaway will moderate.

6.  Can Pakistan Grow Again? Atlantic Council, 3:30-5 pm July 18

Karachi stock exchange trader

Please join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center on July 18 for a public discussion entitled, “Can Pakistan Grow Again?” with deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan Nadeem Ul Haque.

In the face of major domestic, regional, and international political and economic difficulties, Pakistan’s growth rate has suffered in recent years, falling well behind the growth of its population. Unemployment is rampant, especially among the burgeoning youth population. Rising urbanization is creating new challenges for policymakers. A low tax-to-GDP ratio is often cited as a major hindrance to growth. Yet, there are many other underlying economic issues behind Pakistan’s problem. Dr. Haque will offer his views on how growth may be regenerated in Pakistan and the potential pitfalls that lie ahead.

A discussion with

Nadeem Ul Haque
Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission
Government of Pakistan

Moderated by

Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

DATE: Wednesday, July 18, 2012
TIME: 3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.
LOCATION: Atlantic Council
1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor,
Washington, DC 20005

To attend, RSVP with your name and affiliation (acceptances only) to southasia@acus.org.

Nadeem Ul Haque

Dr. Nadeem Ul Haque is the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, the agency responsible for managing growth and development policies in the country. As a key member of the economic management team of Pakistan, he has led the country-wide research and consultative effort for the development of the “framework for economic growth,” which emphasizes economic reform for sustained long-term productivity.  The framework has been approved by all levels of the government of Pakistan and has been implemented into policy.

Dr. Haque has over twenty-four years of wide-ranging operational and research experience from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including leading technical assistance missions, and policy and research teams. With a strong background in economic analysis and policy development, Dr. Haque has published numerous publications including books and papers in academic and policy journals. Dr. Haque holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago.

7. Oslo: Twenty Years Later, IIACF, 9 am-12 pm July 19

Oslo – Twenty Years Later

Oslo – Twenty Years LaterCapitol Hill – Washington, D.C.
July 19th, 2012
9:00am – 12:00pm

No meaningful negotiations have taken place in almost two years, yet the death of the peace process remains a taboo topic in Washington.  Recently, both Palestinian and Israeli voices have bemoaned the lack of progress.  Mahmoud Abbas is rumored to be, once again, flirting with the idea of dissolving the Palestinian Authority.  Yossi Beilin, considered one of the architects of the Oslo Peace Accords, has said it is time to move on.

After 20 years and little positive progress, the time has come to reevaluate our thinking and try a new approach – it is the only hope of moving towards a lasting peace.

Join the IIACF on Thursday, July 19th from 9:00am to noon as we bring together journalists, policy experts and government officials who are shaping the future of peace in the Middle East.

Download event flyer here.

Event Details

  • Date: 07/19/12
  • Location: Longworth House Office Building, Room 1539
  • Address: 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington D.C.

8. Diplomacy in Syria: U.S.-Russia Relations and International Intervention, Center for National Policy, 12-1 pm July 19

Please join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel for a discussion on the current state of the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russia’s evolving foreign policy posture, and the corresponding implications for the crisis in Syria.

Featuring:

Jeff Mankoff
Adjunct Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mark Adomanis
Contributor, The Russia Hand, Forbes Magazine

*A light lunch will be served*

Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333

Washington, DC  20001
202-682-1800

Map
Click here

When
Jul 19   12:00 pm – 1:00 pm

9. Can Libya Really Become a Democracy?, SAIS, 2-3:30 pm July 19

“Can Libya Really Become a Democracy?”
Hosted By: Conflict Management Program and the Middle East Institute
Time: 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM
Location: Room 417, The Nitze Building (main building)
Summary: Christopher Blanchard, research manager at the Congressional Research Service, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact itlong@jhu.edu.

10. Assad’s Coming Downfall?, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 9:30 am July 20

Event
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Middle East & North Africa
Date / Time
Friday, July 20 / 9:30am Register with host
Location
1726 M Street NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers David Enders, Ammar Abdulhamid, John Hannah, Reuel Marc Gerecht

Unbeknownst to most Americans, reports suggest that the rebels fighting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad may have taken control of a growing portion of the country, and may now be closer to wresting it away from him altogether. While some Syrian soldiers have defected to Turkey, many more are deserting, or simply refusing to fight. Is Assad’s central authority breaking down? Are new power brokers emerging? If so, how can the United States and its allies prevent further humanitarian catastrophe?

To assess these questions and others, FDD is pleased to host a breakfast conversation with:

David Enders, a Pulitzer Center grantee on Crisis Reporting, recently returned from a month of reporting alongside the rebels fighting Bashar Assad’s government in Syria. Author of Baghdad Bulletin, a firsthand account of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, he has reported from the Middle East for news outlets ranging from The Nation to The National, Al-Jazeera, Vice, and the Virginia Quarterly Review.

Ammar Abdulhamid, a fellow at FDD, is a leading Syrian human rights and democracy activist, and also director of the Tharwa Foundation, a grassroots organization that works to break the Assad government’s information blockade by enlisting local activists and citizen issues to report on developments inside Syria. Before founding Tharwa, Mr. Abdulhamid served as a fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He has briefed the President of the United States and testified before the U.S. Congress, and has appeared in many media outlets, including the New York Times.

John Hannah is a senior fellow at FDD, before which he served as national security advisor to Vice President Richard B. Cheney. Mr. Hannah has served in a range of senior policy positions in both Democratic and Republican administrations, as a senior member of Secretary of State James A. Baker’s Policy Planning staff during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, and later as a senior advisor to Secretary of State Warren Christopher under President William J. Clinton. Mr. Hannah’s articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal, and he blogs regularly at ForeignPolicy.com and National Review Online.

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a Senior Fellow at FDD and a former Iran analyst at the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. He focuses on the Arab Revolt, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, and intelligence. Mr. Gerecht is the author of The Wave: Man, God, and the Ballot Box in the Middle East, Know Thine Enemy: A Spy’s Journey into Revolutionary Iran, and The Islamic Paradox: Shiite Clerics, Sunni Fundamentalists, and the Coming of Arab Democracy. He is a contributing editor for The Weekly Standard and a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, as well as a frequent contributor to The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and other publications.

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Where diplomats earn their pinstripes

Hillary Clinton’s visit today to Egypt this weekend is one of those awkward diplomatic moments:  she has to convey to all concerned that the United States backs a democratic transition whose fate is contested between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and President Morsy, who spent a lifetime as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  That would be the SCAF’s arch enemy for many decades.

For now, the SCAF seems to have won its tug-of-war with Morsy over the future of the parliament Egypt elected last winter.  The President has accepted the court decision to dissolve it.  This leaves the democratically elected Morsy with little power, as the self-appointed SCAF has arrogated to itself legislative authority and fenced off the military and its budget from presidential decisions.

But it is the SCAF that is vital to America’s most important interest in Egypt:  maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel, which Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood have criticized for a long time.  They are likely to seek changes in its provisions and have threatened to subject it to a referendum, which it could well lose.  Morsy can also be expected to be friendlier to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate that now controls Gaza, than the Americans or the SCAF will like.

No wonder the Secretary of State waxed eloquent on the need for dialogue as she made it clear that the United States expects the SCAF to give up its governing authority and return to a security role, presumably one subordinated to a democratically elected president.  She meets with Field Marshall Tantawi, the SCAF’s chair, tomorrow.  Rarely have American values and interests been more obviously in conflict.  This is where diplomats earn their pinstripes.

The transition in Egypt is a mess.  It is no longer clear how and when the new constitution will be written, or how and when the SCAF will surrender its legislative powers.  Morsy is so far president in name only, though he has a good deal of popular legitimacy.  It is no doubt awkward for the Americans to be helping a Muslim Brotherhood president to pry the powers of his office from a military establishment they have long supported and funded.  But that is the only route to a decent outcome in Egypt.

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Milestone on a bumpy road

Ilona Gerbakher reports:

Wednesday’s Atlantic Council discussion on the results of the Libyan election veered between exuberance and caution.

Gregory Kehalia, from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) opened on a hopeful note.  Libyans are full of pride, motivation and joy.  The media has called July 7 “exceptional.” Not every Libyan has turned into a democrat, as attacks on polling places in Ajdabiya demonstrate, but the elections did not turn into the kind of bloodbath that some were expecting. Security was good.  By Tuesday 100% of polling places had opened. A 63% turnout is excellent for a first election and a relatively uneducated population. From the point of view of an electoral technician, the elections themselves are–against all odds–an unquestionable success. It is still too early to know the official election results, and we cannot yet know if Libya will be an exception to the recent string of Islamist victories in the region. But the election is a major new milestone for Arab democracies in the Middle East, even if the road is “still littered with problems.”

Fadel Laman of the American Libyan Council illuminated some of these problems.  He was critical of the pre-election campaign. Despite very high turnout, particularly for women, most Libyans were not well educated about their candidates. Until the day before the election, Libyans were unsure of whom to vote for, or did not understand that receiving a registration card was not the same as casting a vote. A thirteen-day campaigning period was too brief for people to understand much about the political parties or their agendas. Most Libyans voted for people they knew, or felt they knew, or felt they trusted, such as Mahmoud Jibril.

The big bump in the road is governance. Regardless of who wins the popular vote, it is unlikely that any one person or party will have an absolute majority. Assuming a Jibril victory, which early polls seem to indicate, will he be able to create and maintain a ruling coalition? What will be done about the militias? How will the place of Shari’a law be decided?  The “morning after,” when the election winners come to power, Libya will still be facing the same problems and challenges.  Whether 200 newly minted representatives can unite to overcome these is uncertain.

Dr. Esam Omeigh, director of the Libyan Emergency Taskforce, was also more concerned with the aftermath of the elections than with the elections themselves. Yes, they were historic, but now the question is whether the new National Assembly can tackle Libya’s to-do list? Can the new representatives remain coherent and create a coalition around which bigger alliances can be constructed? It’s a difficult question, which leaves room for worry. Neither the Justice and Development Party nor the National Forces Alliance will have a real majority.  It is the large block of independents who will be the real movers and shakers in the parliament. Regional power brokers, tribal alliances and some holdovers from the Gaddafi regime will plague the government with problems and divisions. How this will all play out, and how this will affect US interests in the region is impossible to control.

Libya represents a good vantage point for looking forward to what will become of the region. Observers of the Middle East (and US policy makers) should take a step back and give the fledgling democracy space to develop–it might allow us to project what a post-Arab Spring world will look like.

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Benghazi needs a hug

Foreignpolicy.com has published this piece, based on my personal experience observing the July 7 Libyan elections in Benghazi:

Shouts of “Allahu akbar” rang out Friday night in Benghazi, as Libya lost to Morocco on penalty kicks. Saturday brought a loud night of celebratory honking and gunfire as the polls for the first national election in 60 years closed.

I was in Benghazi observing the election for the Carter Center, which mounted a limited mission due to security concerns. It has issued its preliminary assessment. These are my own views, and not those of the Carter Center.

The Libyans are electing what they call a General National Congress (GNC), which will form the country’s first elected government and — according to a last-minute decision — preside over regional elections for members of a constitution-drafting committee. Eighty seats in the GNC will be assigned proportionally from closed party lists, with men and women alternating on the ballot. One hundred twenty seats will go to individual candidates. This election will end Libya’s self-appointed revolutionary regime, the National Transitional Council (NTC), which led the political side of the February 2011 revolt against Muammar al-Qaddafi.

The July 7 election wasn’t perfect. Several people were killed in the eastern part of Libya, which saw tension and violence. But the elections came off smoothly in the west and much of the south, and better than feared in the east. This was good reason to celebrate. We will not know complete final results for several days, perhaps even a week, but the tallying is proceeding rapidly in an effort I visited at an army base on the way to Tripoli airport.

Who would resist elections in a country so hungry for self-governance and freedom of expression? Extremist Islamist groups with limited resonance in the broader population opposed this spring’s municipal elections in several communities, including Benghazi. In the weeks since, what Libyans call the “Federalist” opposition has grown both more vocal and more violent. They want to see Cyrenaica (or Barqa, as the Federalists prefer to call it) become autonomous, along with Fezzan in the south and Tripolitania in the west. They sought more seats in the GNC for Cyrenaica, as well as a constitution-drafting committee chosen regionally. Tribal and ethnic divisions are also at work. While proof is scarce, it is widely believed Qaddafi remnants in Cairo and elsewhere funded youthful protests and violence against the GNC elections, in an effort to undermine a democratic revolution.

Voting stations in Benghazi were generally well organized, well staffed, and orderly. Voters’ names were usually posted outside polling stations, queuing was well-managed, the check-in process comparing voter cards with registration lists was meticulous, the ballots were stamped and distributed properly, provision was made for secret voting, fingers were inked, and the ballot boxes were clearly visible. There were observers present more often than not, many serving for individual candidates as well as political parties but most (more than 2,000 in Benghazi) from nongovernmental organizations, including the Libyan Women’s Association, the Association for International Law, the Libyan Association for Election Observers and others. There was little sign of campaigning, intimidation or other attempts to influence voters inside (or immediately outside) polling centers. Staff was well acquainted with their responsibilities and properly identified with badges as well as white plastic smocks. Many polling stations posted their instructions on how they were to be set up and choreographed.

The second polling center I visited was in Gimeenis, on the periphery of Benghazi. Battles were fought nearby during the seesaw war with Qaddafi’s forces. An attack on one of the polling centers there the previous day prompted the High National Election Commission to consolidate three polling centers into one. This had been accomplished by 10:30 a.m.. Voting was proceeding without a hitch. Sufficient materials had somehow been made available. A grenade attack on the new, consolidated polling center caused no hesitation. The polling center courtyard was crowded with men milling about, proudly defiant of the violence. Women were ululating upstairs.

Voters in Benghazi were well aware of the anti-election Federalist demonstrations and violence in the city and areas surrounding. They voted with determination and commitment in significant numbers. At the end of the day, the men’s polling stations I visited were recording 75 to 85 percent of registered voters voting, before the police came in to vote after the centers closed. Revolutionary brigades who fought Qaddafi’s forces, now at least in part organized under the “Supreme Security Council,” participated in providing security in Benghazi, but they were part of the security problem in Ajdabiya, where some tribally-based militias opposed the voting.

We visited one polling center in a Tuarga displaced persons’ camp and one in a facility for disabled people. The Tuarga, black people whom the revolutionaries of neighboring Misrata blame for alleged human rights violations, are unable to return to their homes hundreds of miles to the west, but they had the option of voting on ballots for their home constituency. Turnout was light. The facilities and staffing were on a par with elsewhere, even if the atmosphere was more somber. The facility for disabled people was uplifting: Qaddafi built it as a showcase, but more important than the relatively good physical facility was the spirit of those voting and managing the polling. Many (but not all) had physical limitations of one sort or another. Quiet but unmistakable pride was on display.

The political atmosphere in which the voting took place in Benghazi was one of anticipation and determination. While some Libyans did not vote because they were afraid, feel the NTC betrayed the revolution or support the Federalists, most relished the opportunity. Political leaders of all the major coalitions and parties — my colleagues and I were able to talk with all the major ones in Benghazi — were looking forward to the electoral contest, which included 3,700 candidates.

Early indications are that a coalition led by former NTC prime minister Mahmoud Jibril will do well in the closed-list contest, with over 50 percent of the party list seats in the General Public Conference. Justice and Construction, a creature of the Muslim Brotherhood even if it would prefer to deny the association, is hoping for at least 15 percent but no more than 35 percent, well aware of the unhappiness a bigger share would cause in some quarters. This would be significantly less than in Egypt and Tunisia. Many Libyans regard the Brotherhood as a foreign import that is trying to divide people who generally regard themselves as conservative Muslims. A “patriotic” party, the National Salvation Front, looks like a possible second or third. The experts may say Libya is an invented country — its three pieces were cobbled together for independence in 1951 — but if nothing else the Qaddafi regime has left everyone here literally waving the flag: not his green one, but the red, green, and black monarchical one the revolution prefers and demonstrators drape over your windshield as you pass through the chanting crowd in downtown Benghazi.

Benghazis may be patriotic, but they also feel they have gotten the short end of the stick for far too long. They are looking for respect and constitutional guarantees that it won’t continue. The raw material for an insurgency — charismatic leadership, youthful discontent, and funding — is not lacking in Libya’s east. Benghazi needs a hug. And maybe a few oil service companies, which in recent decades Qaddafi required to locate in Tripoli.

This was not only an inspiring but also a technically impressive election day, despite the scattered violence. Only a handful of communities were unable to vote. The results will be interesting, but the process was the main message. Libya wants democracy.

PS:  Here I am, in a photo by Sidney Kwiram, who says I was asking lots of questions on election day:

That really is a Roman arch, not a plastic one
photo by Sidney Kwiram
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Hope does not erase scepticism

I was enjoying the pleasures of Benghazi ten days ago when the conference on Afghanistan adopted the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.   This is an admirable effort to lay out specific goals and mutual commitments for the Afghan government and the international community for the next three to five years or so, and in some cases longer.  In exchange for the commitments therein, the international community pledged $16 billion.

The framework is a step in the right direction.  Unlike most assistance programs, it explicitly combines governance and economic development objectives.  It emphasizes Afghan priorities and indigenous mechanisms.  It includes explicit milestones (“indicators”).  It tries to be quantitative, a virtue in principle but often difficult in practice.

The New York Times claims

…foreign governments will assure Afghanistan a steady stream of financing in exchange for stronger anticorruption measures and the establishment of the rule of law. Up to 20 percent of the money would depend on the government meeting governance standards…

They may know better than I do, but I see no such clear commitment in the framework.  Nor do I see the kind of measurable governance standards that would be meaningful in determining whether the government has really met the standards:  for example, a commitment to move Afghanistan out of the basement of Transparency International’s corruption perception index (180 out of 182, just above Somalia and North Korea).

There is provision for monitoring and followup, but ensconced in an existing bureaucratic mechanism well under the control of donors.  This is self-monitoring, not independent evaluation.  Donors find it exceedingly difficult to withhold funds–once projects begin, there is a substantial donor interest in seeing them completed.  Even if they haven’t begun, donors are rightly loathe to undermine their perhaps incorruptible interlocutors because of malfeasance in some other part of the Afghan government.  This kind of conditionality is exceedingly difficult to administer.

The big problem with the framework is not within but outside.  Everything depends on the economic, political and security context.  Money is fleeing Afghanistan.  Its politics are corrupt and venomous.  Even if enemy initiated attacks are down, Taliban insurgents still dominate key areas and operate from safe havens inside Pakistan.  The question is whether any plan for foreign assistance can be effective in this context, much less one undertaken in the midst of a drawdown of American and other forces.

President Obama has chosen a stately pace for the American drawdown of combat forces, which will extend to the end of 2014.  Even then, substantial numbers of American troops will remain in Afghanistan for support and training purposes.  For the past 10 years, the State Department and USAID have failed to mount the kind of effort that would provide a modicum of confidence that the Afghan state and society will reach 2015 in decent shape.  I hope the new framework will turn things around, but I have to remain sceptical.

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Iraq and its Arab neighbors: no port in the storm

Speakers painted a bleak picture of a lebanized Iraq, weakened by internal divisions and unable to craft coherent regional policies, at a Middle East Institute event today.

Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie, former Iraqi ambassador to the United States, likened contemporary Iraq to a leaking ship, barely floating on the regional political waters as storms rage all around. The Ambassador bemoaned the lack of support for secularists after the American invasion and lambasted American support to Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Islamists. This policy worsened sectarianism. The United States left Iraq with a constitution that forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, but with an unwritten political pact that “lebanizes” the executive branch, with the presidency Kurdish, the prime ministry Shi’a and the speaker of parliament Sunni. This built-in sectarianism weakens the Iraqi state.

These internal divisions are at the heart of Iraq’s tepid relations with its Arab neighbors, who are standoffish, especially towards the Shi’a and Kurds.  The Kurdistan Regional government conducts its own foreign policy, including a representative in Washington.  The Ambassador is pessimistic about Iraq’s immediate future in the region: “it is in a crisis, but the horizon seems to be more of the same.” Only if Iraq improves its internal cohesion and mends fences with Kuwait and Turkey can it avoid being engulfed by the ongoing political firestorms raging in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, focused on the “brightly burning” Syrian flame. Like Ambassador Sumaida’ie, he bemoans Iraq’s internal lebanization, especially with regard to policies towards Syria. There is no coherent Iraqi policy, but rather multiple Iraqi policies toward Syria. The complex interplay of internal factionalization within Iraq’s weak state muddles its external relations, as each faction approaches the region in general, and Syria in particular, with an eye towards its own interests. The Kurds see events in Syria as an opportunity, not a threat; Masoud Barzani is strengthening ties to Turkey, trying to reassure the Turks that Kurdish interests are aligned with their own in the case of SyriaSunni tribal leaders also see Syria as more of an opportunity than a threat: Syrian Sunnis in their view are throwing off the yoke of an Iranian-backed Shi’a minority. If it can happen in Syria, the thinking goes, why not in Baghdad? Despite some sympathy for the Syrian opposition, Iraqi Shi’a associated with Moqtada al Sadr are still wary of developments there, which threaten a regime aligned with Tehran.  Prime Minister Maliki fears spillover from Syria that may damage Iraqi stability and security. This multiplicity of Iraqi approaches to Syria is driven by internal Iraqi political divisions, and is emblematic of the larger foreign and domestic policy problems facing Iraq.

Gregory Gause, professor of political science at the University of Vermont characterized Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iraq as passive.  The Saudi view of Iraq and the Maliki government is negative, because they view the prime minister as an agent of Iran. The Saudis have done little or no outreach to Kurds or Iraqi Shi’a, and even with the Sunnis they have made no real appeal to Arabism. Saudi policy toward Iraq is a policy of complaint, not outreach. Saudi elites are focused on what appears to them a losing struggle for influence in the Middle East against Iran. This struggle for influence in the region plays out not through armies, but through contests for influence in the domestic politics of weak Arab states.  The Saudis find Sunni allies, and Iran finds Shi’a allies. This sectarian alignment is counterproductive for the Saudis, because it gives Arab Shi’a in the region no choice but to ally with Iran. Ultimately, this will cause long-term problems for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and America, as it creates an atmosphere where al Qaeda type ideas can flourish. Other GCC states have largely followed Saudi Arabia’s lead.

John Desrocher, Director of the Office or Iraq Affairs at the Department of State focused on the positive, in terms of Iraq’s relations to its regional neighbors: Iraq and Kuwait have made “considerable progress in terms of resolving disputes,” relations with Jordan have improved, Saudi Arabia named an ambassador to Iraq for the first time since 1990, and Qatar airways now flies to Iraq. However, internal political divisions in Iraq have led to “real political gridlock” both in terms of domestic policy and regional relations.

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