peacefare.net

Serbia squeezed

Milan Marinković writes again from Nis:

The period of economic hardship Serbia is entering will afford the country’s new government, named last week, little room for maneuver. The social consequences of budget stringency will likely generate protests.  Lay-offs of public-sector employees, whose unions whose unions are stronger and better organized than those in the private sector, could generate massive street demonstrations and even riots leading to broad popular unrest, as in Greece.  The ability of Serbian security forces to maintain public safety could be put to a serious test.

The test will be particularly demanding if criminal clans and extremist groups – which already share many members and often collaborate –  attempt to take advantage of the situation.  Public safety might come to rely entirely on security forces due to chronic inefficacy of the Serbian court system.

Under pressure from Brussels, the previous government started a rather selective battle against organized crime, resulting in arrests and trials of several mob bosses and their close accomplices.  But that was far from sufficient.  Crime gangs in Serbia are organized like the military. If only the gang’s top leadership are removed, it is just a matter of time before infighting erupts among members of the middle and lower ranks over who will seize the helm. This leads to the division of large gangs into dozens of smaller clans that continue to fight for control of the formerly common territory.

During the clashes, which can last for years, younger members of criminal groups are especially violent. They are eager to do whatever it takes to advance to higher positions within the new hierarchy. The young thugs often belong to football (soccer) hooligan groups. Using football as a screen, these groups actually serve as recruitment centers for future drug dealers. Their capability to wreak havoc must not be underestimated. Not accidentally, football hooligans and far-right political extremists from Serbia also have been spotted in northern Kosovo, where they reputedly operate under the auspices of power structures closely associated with parts of Serbian intelligence services.

No less important, a lack of regulation has enabled private security companies to hire individuals with criminal backgrounds, which makes potential security concerns even bigger. Easy availability of weapons through the black market compounds the threat.

Serbia’s looming troubles will likely require a centralized model of coordination between various departments of the security and intelligence apparatus, as well as tighter control in general. That will not be easy to achieve. Animosity already exists between the state (counter)intelligence agency (BIA) headquarters and the interior ministry. Even inside a single institution tensions occasionally arise, due principally to long-established politicization of the security sector.

Necessary as it might be under the current circumstances, a strong political grip on the security and intelligence apparatus could further cripple an already fragile democracy in Serbia unless proper parliamentary supervision is in place. The instruments of control which the parliamentary committee for defense and security has at its disposal have so far proved to be insufficient. Just as worrisome is that a legislator from a ruling party will preside over it.  Rather than carrying out genuine reform of the security sector, the new political leadership will, like their predecessors, likely seek to adapt it for their own interests.

The challenges Serbia is likely to encounter could be of critical importance in the shaping of the relationship between major players in the government, prime minister Ivica Dačić and his deputy Aleksandar Vučić, since the two will be practically in charge of the entire security sector.  The “Socialist” Dačić is minister of the interior.  The “Progressive” Vučić is defense minister, and also the future secretary of the National Security Council.

Control over security and especially intelligence services is traditionally seen by Serbian politicians as a most effective way to secure and fortify political dominance.  Multiple factors will determine how the balance of power shared between Dačić and Vučić is going to work in practice. While in the early stages of the government’s term they should be expected to develop good cooperation out of necessity, a rivalry may emerge later in the process, when their powers begin increasingly to overlap. The possible power struggle could have a significant impact on dynamics within the security sector.

The Gendarmerie is of particular importance. While nominally part of the Interior Ministry, the Gendarmerie has its own separate headquarters. Its robust equipment, training procedures and organizational structure make it look more like a military unit than a police one. It is no secret that the Gendarmerie is the strongest individual force within the entire defense and security system.  Some even claim that in terms of combat capability the Gendarmerie alone is stronger than the army, even though the army’s manpower is about ten times larger.

But apart from its high professional competence, the Gendarmerie is not free of ideological leanings. If intra-governmental political strife takes place, the Gendarmerie could prove crucial for gaining the upper hand.

Serbia faces a paradox.  While overall public expenditure will have to be sharply reduced if the government is to avoid financial disaster, the costs of financing security forces may well increase.  This will put a dramatic squeeze on budgetary resources, lead to social instability, or both.