What is a counter autocoup?

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi Sunday abrogated the constitutional declaration that protected military privileges, arrogated to himself full executive and legislative powers and replaced the country’s upper echelon military chiefs, including former Supreme Council of the Armed Forces chief Field Marshall Tantawi.  This is an autocoup (that’s a coup conducted by people already in power against another part of the governing establishment).  Or, to be more precise, this is a counter autocoup, since the Egyptian military conducted an autocoup against Morsi in June when they arrogated to themselves broad powers.

I wrote then:

The American press describes the army as “cementing” power.  That’s unquestionably what they are trying to do.  But it is unlikely to work….It is yet to be seen whether the military has cemented power, or has deluded itself so thoroughly that its moves will be seen one day as demented.

One could of course say something similar about Morsi now.  It is unclear whether the army will put up with this seizure of power.

My guess is that it will, not least because Morsi is showing real political skill in choosing people to man (it is almost entirely men) his government.  While not as broadly based as some might have hoped, the cabinet he named last week was more technocratic than some expected and included a sprinkling of political rivals as well as holdovers from the last military government.  He has also chosen experienced military figures to replace the Minister of Defense (for the last few days Field Marshall Tantawi) and the chief of the army staff.

Morsi’s great advantage over his military rivals is one he seems to understand well:  legitimacy, backed domestically by the organizational capabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood and supported internationally by the United States and Saudi Arabia.  So long as he shows a modicum of respect for what Yezid Sayigh describes well as the officers’ republic, he may well pull off this latest lurch in Egypt’s dubka between military dictatorship and popular democracy. He has to be careful about paring back the officers’ economic perks and military privileges.

Let’s hope Morsi’s gamble works.  Egypt faces growing security problems in the Sinai and serious economic challenges.  It needs an effective government and a new constitution.  Morsi had appeared to yield to the Supreme Constitutional Court’s decision to dissolve the elected parliament, leaving the constitutional process a shambles.  He now has to decide how to reconstitute a legislature and create a committee to write a new constitution.*    He would be wise to reach out farther than he did in naming the government towards political forces beyond the Muslim Brotherhood:  women, Christians and secularists should have a role that they have so far been denied.

The Egyptian revolution is proving by far the most fraught of those Arab awakenings that have brought down dictators so far.  Tunisia, Libya and Yemen all have their problems, but all three seem to be progressing, with fits and starts.  Egypt still seems uncertain of its direction, not least because it allowed the military an out-sized role in the post-autocratic transition.  But it is also important to recognize that Egypt is much more populous, poorer and diverse than the other Arab awakening countries.  This latest turn may not be its last.  But Morsi is correct to try to establish civilian control.

*Michelle Dunne points out that there is already a “constituent assembly,” created by the now-dissolved parliament and the object of on-going litigation, working on a new constitution.  Morsi presumably has the option of going along with that parlous process.