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On course for war with Iran

Ilona Gerbakher reports from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:

Yesterday’s Middle East Institute panel at SAIS presented a report on “Prospects for US-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead.” The predominant mood was tempered pessimism. War is a real possibility, so it behooves us to redouble diplomatic efforts.

Alan Keiswetter (a scholar at the Middle East Institute, senior consultant at C&O Resources and an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland) thought the nuclear negotiations stalemated and likely to remain that way until after the U.S. election. The parameters of a possible agreement are clear:  enrichment allowed up to a low level (3.5-5%) combined with strict safeguards and shipment out of Iran of its more highly enriched uranium.

But it is unclear whether Iran wants a negotiated solution or is just stringing along the negotiations to gain more time.  Sanctions alone are unlikely to force agreement, as Iran is ready to hunker down as necessary.  Some kind of meatier inducement is going to be needed.

Calls in the Israeli government for military action are growing louder and more strident. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat.  The debate among Israelis is no longer “will we strike” but “will the strike be effective enough.” It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack. Some Israel watchers say Prime Minister Netyanyahu thinks he can do what he wants without U.S. concurrence; others feel he is bluffing, to force the U.S. to take a hard line and scare Iran into concessions.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is more united in fear of Iranian pretensions in the Gulf than the Iranians imagine.

Next year will be a real turning point in US-Iran relations over the nuclear issue. Without significant diplomatic progress, the trajectory we are on will lead to military confrontation.

Geneive Abdo, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, contrasted the current tense diplomatic situation with Iran-US relations in 2003, when Tehran cooperated on Afghanistan and was more open to negotiation but Washington was not.  Supreme Leader Khamenei sent a letter to then-President Bush proposing a diplomatic breakthrough.  Today even a minimal goal of building trust with Iran seems hard to reach. Iranian leaders are convinced that the ultimate U.S. goal is regime change. Khamenei’s hardline conspiratorial beliefs about the U.S. are self-fulfilling prophecies.

The Revolutionary Guard, which has grown powerful under Khamenei, no longer bothers to hide its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Although arguably they stand the most to lose from sanctions, a military attack on Iran would serve their interests by reaffirming their ideological position.

Also troubling is the decline of Iran’s educated middle class. Those who once called for reform and might have questioned the nuclear program are marginalized. They were our best hope for breaking three decades of hostility but their voices have been silenced.  An attack led by the U.S. or Israel would stifle prospects for democratic reform even further.

Israel is not helping matters with its increasingly hardline rhetoric. The way is being paved for it to appear that all options except an Israel-led attack have been eliminated. Don’t expect President Obama to take action until after the election. The best diplomatic option for the moment seems to be to buy more time.

Roby Barrett, the president of a consulting firm specializing in defense and security technology applications, was dismissive of the possibility of a diplomatic solution because “Iran is not really interested in negotiation.” For Iranian leaders and citizens the nuclear program has become a point of national pride.  Iran sees nuclear capability as a part of its destiny as a regional power in the Gulf.

The GCC has resigned itself to the fact that Iran will not give up nuclear weapons capability and that the  U.S. will need to do something about it. The alternatives are either a nuclear Iran or war.  Despite the consequent global economic disturbance, the GCC wants the Iranian nuclear program stopped by hook or by crook. The idea of a nuclear Iran is a redline issue for most Arab states.

We should “never say never,” but diplomatic efforts will probably not stop the march towards war. Given the calcifying hardline between the Israeli and Iranian positions and the distance between America and Israel on this issue, there is a high probability an Israeli attack will go forward. It is unlikely that the U.S. will initiate a strike or engage cooperatively with Israel.

Israel knows they don’t have the military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program.  If they strike, it will be in desperation, with the objective of bringing the U.S. into the conflict.  That is possible if Iranian retaliation makes the mistake of striking back at the U.S.

In closing, Genieve Abdo raised a vital point: what will happen the morning after? What will be the economic and military fallout of  an attack?  Will an attack have to be repeated to prevent an intensified Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons?  What are the implications of repeated attacks on Iran?

Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, acted as moderator.  He noted that some countries have stood back from nuclear programs, including Brazil and Argentina.  Iran is a more difficult case, because Israel will not give up its nuclear weapons and there are several other potential nuclear powers in the region.  But if Iran thinks hard about what nuclear weapons might mean for its own security as well as long-term regional and economic stability, it may conclude they are not a good idea.

PS:  The video of the event can be downloaded from C-Span.

PPS:  Bennett Ramberg comes to similar conclusions.