An odd place to start

Milan Marinković continues his discussion of the first phase of the new Serbian government: 

“If the reports I am getting from the intelligence services are true, then I can immediately leave all of them to the opposition,” said Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić soon after assuming office at the end of May. Nikolić was expressing in an ironic way his distrust of security and intelligence agency directors appointed by his predecessor Boris Tadić. The irony was aimed in particular at Saša Vukadinović, the director of the state security agency (BIA), and signaled that he would soon be replaced.

Vukadinović by all accounts was loyal to Tadić. His dismissal took place once the new government, headed by Ivica Dačić, took office.

The new BIA chief is Nebojša Rodić. Rodić previously acted for a short time as one of President Nikolić’s advisers. The pattern continues: as Saša Vukadinović was Tadić’s man, so is Nebojša Rodić Nikolić’s man.

Rodić’s appointment immediately became a matter of controversy. Media close to Tadić’s Democratic Party (DS) claimed that in 1990s Rodić was the secretary of an election commission accused of electoral theft on behalf of then-president Slobodan Milošević. Nikolić’s Progressive Party (SNS) denied the allegation, admitting that Rodić was the secretary of an election commission in 1990s, but not of that one.

Concerns also arose over Rodić’s inexperience. Rodić had never before worked at any security or intelligence agency, but a former BIA deputy director, Zoran Mijatović, said that should not be problematic provided that Rodić’s deputy is an experienced official. That requirement has been satisfied. The man appointed as Rodić’s deputy, Dragan Marković, has two decades of experience working at both the state security agency and the interior ministry.

Prime Minister Ivica Dačić also distrusted former BIA director Saša Vukadinović. While on the surface Dačić seemed to have forged great political cooperation with his former coalition partner Tadić and his DS, the always sensitive battle for control over the security sector was fought out behind the scenes. The lack of mutual confidence came to the fore in the midst of the last election campaign, when hooligans who set the U.S. embassy ablaze during protests against Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 were finally arrested. According to Dačić, the police raid was planned and carried out without his knowledge, which he said was unacceptable given that he was the interior minister. BIA was rumored to have played a notable part in the preparation of the action.

Even though BIA, whose main responsibility is counterintelligence, belongs to the largely unreformed Serbian security sector, compared to other departments the agency has so far demonstrated significant professionalism. Vukadinović’s loyalty to Tadić aside, under his command BIA played a major role in significant achievements, such as the  relatively successful international police action executed in cooperation with the American Drug Enforcement Agency and several other foreign agencies against a powerful drug cartel. This action set the stage for a more dedicated, albeit selective, campaign against domestic organized crime.

Likewise, BIA’s contribution to the arrests of the last three Hague Tribunal fugitives – Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić and Goran Hadžić – was indispensable. Karadžić was captured only a day after Vukadinović’s appointment. Although officials of Serbian intelligence and security services are suspected of helping war criminals hide out, such accusations – especially in the case of Mladić – pertain much more to the military and its agencies than to BIA.

Serbian ombudsman Saša Janković has recently praised BIA for its constructive and professional conduct. While the other security sector departments have been obstructing Janković’s oversight activities, BIA has proved highly cooperative and law-abiding. This is particularly noteworthy since BIA evolved directly from Milošević’s notorious secret service, which served as a mainstay of his dictatorship.

Despite these positive steps, BIA still operates with too little transparency to be considered a truly democratic institution and for the most part remains resistant to civilian control due to the still strong influence of its recalcitrant old guard. In the military’s security and intelligence agencies remnants of the Milošević regime can be seen even more readily. Unlike Mr. Vukadinović, none of their directors, who were also appointed by Tadić, have been removed from office thus far.

If Nikolić and Dačić intend seriously to reform the security sector, they have picked an odd place to start.