Day: August 29, 2012
An important beginning
“The Day After” study, published this week, is intended to support a democratic transition in Syria. The study was prepared by a “diverse group” of Syrian activists, including “Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Alawites, and Druze; men and women; youth activists; and individuals with experience in the Free Syrian Army.” Some are identified; others are not for security reasons.
While claiming not to be a “blueprint,” this is by far the most in-depth effort I have seen to explicate what Syria would need to do to begin a transition to democracy. It breaks the issues down into six areas:
- Rule of law
- Transitional justice
- Security sector reform
- Electoral reform and forming a constituent assembly
- Constitutional design
- Economic restructuring and social policy
The approach is methodical: context, challenges, and detailed recommendations, broken down into what needs to be done prior to the start of transition, the immediate priorities once Bashar al Asad is gone, and the first few months. The underlying principles are unimpeachable: accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and consensus. Time lines and Gantt charts are included.
There are many good things about the approach. The emphasis on rule of law is appropriate. Establishing and maintaining order have been serious problems in most post-war situations. There is good reason to expect the same in Syria, where support for the Assad regime has been substantial and sectarian tensions high.
Plans to deal with regime abuses through transitional justice mechanisms and to re-organize and reform the security services will therefore also be key priorities. Some of the plans and organization suggested are obviously over-ambitious and too complex. It seems unlikely to me that the Syrians are going to be able to manage these tasks on their own, without an international force to keep the peace in the meanwhile, but that is what “The Day After” seems to envision.
The political piece is also important. The study foresees the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. It discusses options for the electoral system and recommends mixed system of proportional representation and some single-member districts. It also considers options for closed (party) or open (individual preference votes) lists as well as mechanisms for ensuring women’s representation and inclusion of minorities. While the time line is ambiguous, elections are not foreseen for 10-18 months following the fall of Asad.
The report is already so lengthy (133 pages) and comprehensive it seems churlish to complain about what is missing. But that is precisely what I must do. I would cite the following as the most important gaps: the Syrian voice, the relationship of religion and politics, in-depth treatment of economic and social issues, and a clear idea of who would do all the many things recommended.
The report is written in the good contemporary American prose, bureaucratic variant. It is clear, concise and sometimes eloquent, but it lacks any hint of a Syrian voice. No doubt the Syrians involved discussed the issues and made the fundamental choices reflected in the document, but the technocratic tone and Western-style content is far too prominent to convince me this is a truly indigenous product. I read Syrian activists every day. No philologist would conclude that they wrote this paper. I can only imagine what a Free Syrian Army soldier in Homs is going to think, once this fine example of bureaucratese is rendered into Arabic.
“The Day After” has no discussion of the relationship between religion and the state or religion and politics. It puts forward as “supra-constitutional principles” two relevant ones:
- Syria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-sectarian society that respects its diversity….
- The state is neutral toward religion, respects its values, and neither compels nor impedes religion among the people.
I’ll be delighted if it turns out that simple to deal with religion in Syria. I might even hope that, having seen how difficult and divisive the issue is everywhere else in the Arab uprisings, Syrians will resolve it in this eminently sensible and liberal fashion. But I suspect this facile veneer hides deep divisions, if not among the people writing this report then between them and the people carrying AKs in Aleppo.
Economic and social issues get short shrift, with recommendations that amount to “do the right thing”: establish macroeconomic stability, get displaced people and refugees back to their homes, create strong institutions. A lot more in-depth work will be needed on these issues. There is no serious treatment of the merchant class that was the backbone of the Assad regime and little sign of awareness of the desperate economic and financial situation in which Syria will likely find itself when Bashar al Assad falls. There is barely mention of civil society, which is simply assumed to exist in much of the rest of the report. Nor is there any mention of one of the most fundamental requirements of all post-war societies: getting people who have fought with each other talking and collaborating with each other. Transitional justice is just one aspect of reconciliation.
As for who is going to do all the hundreds of things recommended, the paper is vague. It talks about the need for a transitional regime, but it gives little hint where it would come from and how it might be constituted. French President Francois Hollande’s appeal for formation of a government-in-waiting even before Asad’s departs makes a good deal of sense, since much of what “The Day After” recommends needs to be started now.
But Syrians are so divided and distrustful of each other that it is hard to see how such a government could be formed and gain the confidence of most of the population. Bashar al Asad has lost legitimacy, but it is not yet clear where and when it will reappear. The notion that we are going to get through the Syrian transition without a major international effort, including peacekeepers, I find unconvincing, even though I know how difficult it would be to mount that effort. But the alternative is a level of chaos and violence that we should want to avoid.
The usefulness of a report of this sort can lie in several directions: its ideas may get picked up and incorporated into more official plans, the people who participated may take the wisdom they have gained into their other activities, it may help donor governments and other institutions understand better how they can help, it may stimulate other contributions. “The Day After” is an important step forward. But we are still at the beginning of planning for post-war Syria, not at the end.
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Exceptionally American
I might be tempted to do a full critique of the foreign policy portion of the Republican platform, which calls itself “American exceptionalism.” This is a phrase that has now become so all-encompassing, and so different in meaning to different people, that it is essentially meaningless.
But I won’t. Instead I’ll stick with the section on national security strategy, which manages to treat the subject as an exclusively military preserve. It starts well enough:
We will honor President Reagan’s legacy of peace through strength by advancing the most cost-effective programs and policies crucial to our national security, including our economic security and fiscal solvency. To do that, we must honestly assess the threats facing this country, and we must be able to articulate candidly to the American people our priorities for the use of taxpayer dollars to address those threats.
Let’s leave aside the question of whether President Reagan gave a hoot about cost-effectiveness. Let’s also leave aside the more recent presidency of George W. Bush, who used American strength mistakenly to go to war, weakening the nation in many ways. Let’s instead look forward. In the very next sentence the GOP abandons its focus on priorities and treats all threats as equal, and as military:
We must deter any adversary who would attack us or use terror as a tool of government. Every potential enemy must have no doubt that our capabilities, our commitment, and our will to defeat them are clear, unwavering, and unequivocal.
No hint here of risks arising from failed or failing states, epidemics, social unrest or economic failure. All adversaries are equal. There are no priorities, cost effectiveness is irrelevant, candid articulation is abandoned.
But then we turn to the section entitled “America’s Generosity: International Assistance that Makes a Difference.” Ambivalence reigns again. We are enormously generous, and for good reason:
Assistance should be seen as an alternative means of keeping the peace, far less costly in both dollars and human lives than military engagement.
Too bad that was forgotten in the national security section. But then the GOP says foreign assistance should be done through the private sector and the Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Never mind that the private sector relies heavily on the U.S. government to fund its efforts in a chaotic situation like Iraq in 2006/7. Or that the risks to American national security arise less frequently in countries eligible for MCC assistance, which is intended for those who already committed to reforms. Of course they aren’t completely immune: MCC has spent $460 million in Mali, which is struggling now with a military coup and extreme Islamist insurgency despite the relatively benign track it was on.
I’ll be amused to see if the next Republican administration cuts off assistance to Mali, Yemen, South Sudan, or Pakistan because “aid money should follow positive outcomes, not pleas for more cash in the same corrupt official pockets.” But don’t get me wrong: I’m not an enthusiast for aid in general, and I do believe it should be used, sparingly, to further U.S. interests. But that means it has to be used where we face national security risks, even under non-ideal conditions.
The problem with these bits of the Republican platform is not that they are entirely wrong but that they are inconsistent and self-contradictory. They state bold principles that, if applied, would lead to dramatically different conclusions from the ones stated. Reminds me a bit of some of the founding fathers, whose boldness on our being created equal did not translate into freeing the slaves. Maybe that is what is exceptionally American.
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