peacefare.net

An important beginning

“The Day After” study, published this week, is intended to support a democratic transition in Syria.  The study was prepared by a “diverse group” of Syrian activists, including “Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Alawites, and Druze; men and women; youth activists; and individuals with experience in the Free Syrian Army.”  Some are identified; others are not for security reasons.

While claiming not to be a “blueprint,” this is by far the most in-depth effort I have seen to explicate what Syria would need to do to begin a transition to democracy.  It breaks the issues down into six areas:

• Rule of law
• Transitional justice
• Security sector reform
• Electoral reform and forming a constituent assembly
• Constitutional design
• Economic restructuring and social policy

The approach is methodical:  context, challenges, and detailed recommendations, broken down into what needs to be done prior to the start of transition, the immediate priorities once Bashar al Asad is gone, and the first few months.  The underlying principles are unimpeachable:  accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and consensus.  Time lines and Gantt charts are included.

There are many good things about the approach.  The emphasis on rule of law is appropriate.  Establishing and maintaining order have been serious problems in most post-war situations.  There is good reason to expect the same in Syria, where support for the Assad regime has been substantial and sectarian tensions high.

Plans to deal with regime abuses through transitional justice mechanisms and to re-organize and reform the security services will therefore also be key priorities.  Some of the plans and organization suggested are obviously over-ambitious and too complex.  It seems unlikely to me that the Syrians are going to be able to manage these tasks on their own, without an international force to keep the peace in the meanwhile, but that is what “The Day After” seems to envision.

The political piece is also important.  The study foresees the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution.  It discusses options for the electoral system and recommends mixed system of proportional representation and some single-member districts.  It also considers options for closed (party) or open (individual preference votes) lists as well as mechanisms for ensuring women’s representation and inclusion of minorities.  While the time line is ambiguous, elections are not foreseen for 10-18 months following the fall of Asad.

The report is already so lengthy (133 pages) and comprehensive it seems churlish to complain about what is missing.  But that is precisely what I must do.  I would cite the following as the most important gaps:  the Syrian voice, the relationship of religion and politics, in-depth treatment of economic and social issues, and a clear idea of who would do all the many things recommended.

The report is written in the good contemporary American prose, bureaucratic variant.  It is clear, concise and sometimes eloquent, but it lacks any hint of a Syrian voice.   No doubt the Syrians involved discussed the issues and made the fundamental choices reflected in the document, but the technocratic tone and Western-style content is far too prominent to convince me this is a truly indigenous product.  I read Syrian activists every day.  No philologist would conclude that they wrote this paper.  I can only imagine what a Free Syrian Army soldier in Homs is going to think, once this fine example of bureaucratese is rendered into Arabic.

“The Day After” has no discussion of the relationship between religion and the state or religion and politics.  It puts forward as “supra-constitutional principles” two relevant ones:

• Syria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-sectarian society that respects its diversity….
• The state is neutral toward religion, respects its values, and neither compels nor impedes religion among the people.

I’ll be delighted if it turns out that simple to deal with religion in Syria.  I might even hope that, having seen how difficult and divisive the issue is everywhere else in the Arab uprisings, Syrians will resolve it in this eminently sensible and liberal fashion.   But I suspect this facile veneer hides deep divisions, if not among the people writing this report then between them and the people carrying AKs in Aleppo.

Economic and social issues get short shrift, with recommendations that amount to “do the right thing”:  establish macroeconomic stability, get displaced people and refugees back to their homes, create strong institutions.  A lot more in-depth work will be needed on these issues.  There is no serious treatment of the merchant class that was the backbone of the Assad regime and little sign of awareness of the desperate economic and financial situation in which Syria will likely find itself when Bashar al Assad falls.  There is barely mention of civil society, which is simply assumed to exist in much of the rest of the report.  Nor is there any mention of one of the most fundamental requirements of all post-war societies:  getting people who have fought with each other talking and collaborating with each other.  Transitional justice is just one aspect of reconciliation.

As for who is going to do all the hundreds of things recommended, the paper is vague.  It talks about the need for a transitional regime, but it gives little hint where it would come from and how it might be constituted.  French President Francois Hollande’s appeal for formation of a government-in-waiting even before Asad’s departs makes a good deal of sense, since much of what “The Day After” recommends needs to be started now.

But Syrians are so divided and distrustful of each other that it is hard to see how such a government could be formed and gain the confidence of most of the population.  Bashar al Asad has lost legitimacy, but it is not yet clear where and when it will reappear.  The notion that we are going to get through the Syrian transition without a major international effort, including peacekeepers, I find unconvincing, even though I know how difficult it would be to mount that effort.  But the alternative is a level of chaos and violence that we should want to avoid.

The usefulness of a report of this sort can lie in several directions:  its ideas may get picked up and incorporated into more official plans, the people who participated may take the wisdom they have gained into their other activities, it may help donor governments and other institutions understand better how they can help, it may stimulate other contributions.  “The Day After” is an important step forward.  But we are still at the beginning of planning for post-war Syria, not at the end.