Month: August 2012
America should not play Asad’s game
David Rohde asks “Is Syria America’s Responsibility?” But he never really answers that question, which is a good one. Instead he answers another one:
We must embrace Syrian moderates and openly declare them our allies. Whether or not we should provide them with military aid is a separate debate. But if we are going to provide non-lethal aid we should do so wholeheartedly. We cannot say America is behind you — secretly.
Of course we can and have often said America is behind you secretly. The fundamental problem is not secrecy, it is whom to assist and how. There is a military opposition and a civilian one. I’d rather we pumped non-lethal support into the civilians, Islamist or not. They are organizing upwards of 100 peaceful demonstrations (often more than 150) each day in Syria. The military effort is scaring Allawites, Christians and others into supporting the regime. The day they go out into the streets to demonstrate–which they will not do so long as the Free Syria Army is attacking–is the day Bashar will be forced from power.
But let’s be clear: Syria is not America’s responsibility. What is happening there is Bashar al Asad’s responsibility. The “responsibility to protect” is in the first instance Syria’s. Russia and Iran, as Syria’s prime military allies, are also responsible for what is becoming an effort to frighten Syrians into submission through random, but sectarian, killing. This technique was used in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to establish the “republic of fear.”
I doubt it will work in Syria, because too many people have already lost their fear. But let’s be clear: there is a lot to be afraid of, as events in the past couple of days at Daraya, a community near Damascus, testify. Upwards of 200 people appear to have been murdered by regime forces. Don’t click on this video if you are even remotely squeamish:
It is of course difficult to suggest that people subjected to this treatment should not respond by defending themselves. They certainly have every right to do so. But it is not clear that revolutionary violence will win the day over a regime that is armed to the teeth and ready to kill. It is for Syrians to decide what the best strategy is. But those of us concerned to see the revolution come out on top and Syria eventually evolve into a democracy are rightly concerned when we see priority given to military assistance.
Revolution and war are political struggles. Empowering those who will take Syria in a democratic direction is what America should worry about. Those are the civilian activists, who risk being pushed aside because Bashar al Asad prefers a military fight he thinks he can win. We should not be trapped into playing his game.
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A good idea
It is difficult to imagine a good reason for the persistence of the Nonaligned Movement, which will hold a summit meeting beginning tomorrow in Tehran. Its website does not appear to have been updated since the early years of the century, so it is hard to understand what it thinks it is doing. Hosted by Supreme Leader Khamenei, the week’s meeting will include distinguished representatives like Sudanese war crimes indictee President Bashir, Zimbabwean President Mugabe, Venezuelan President Chavez and North Korean President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong Nam. It’s a wonder Bashar al Assad is not planning to attend.
Of course there are also other, far more reputable attendees: the Tunisian, Libyan and South African Foreign Ministers, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Australian UN ambassador (hard for me to understand what is non-aligned about Australia). And, most notably, newly elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.
If anything good might come out of such a meeting, I imagine it would come from the interaction of these democratic and would-be democratic states with the startling array of autocrats. I can hope that there is at least a bit of private criticism, as in “Robert, do you think it is in the interest of Zimbabwe that you continue to hold on to power?” Or “Hugo, tell me how you are doing in the polls.” But there is a real risk that such a conclave will be seen in some parts of the world as validating the legitimacy of the autocrats and undermining the citizens who oppose them.
That’s where National Iranian American President Trita Parsi’s idea comes in. He tweeted today that Morsi should meet with Green Movement leaders in Tehran, those brave souls who contested the 2009 presidential election as not free and unfair only to find themselves outgunned, outmaneuvered, beaten and defeated in the streets. A call on Mir-Hossein Mousavi, just returned to house arrest from a stay in the hospital, is one possibility. Or a visit with younger activists. Morsi, the product of successful street protests and a serious (if not perfect) election, should want to hear from Iranian protesters, unless he has already switched to his predecessor’s mentality, as the New York Times suggests.
But why only Morsi? He will be reluctant to do it alone, as he will not want to offend the hosts and put at risk whatever improvement in relations with Tehran he hopes to initiate. Better if the whole lot of more serious democratic leaders announce their willingness to meet with the Green Movement and others who are not on good terms with the Iranian regime, which claims it is not repressive.
I am not at all sure whether any Iranians would dare accept the invitation, as the consequences for them could be dramatic (and some Green Movement leaders are under house arrest). But that doesn’t mean the idea is a bad one. It would at least signal to the host that its more democratic “non-aligned” friends know what is going on. And it would signal to the Green Movement that the democratic world knows their plight and sympathizes with it.
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What they don’t want anyone to hear
War in northern Mali has displaced hundreds of thousands. The Islamist rebels there have now prohibited secular music on the radio (only chanting of Koranic verses will be allowed). Isn’t it high time we all got back to listening to what they don’t want anyone to hear?
From the Tuareg group Tinariwen (deserts):
And this:
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No easy call
Having written Tuesday that President Obama should be considering a no-fly zone in Syria, I was surprised but pleased to read this tactical level account confirming my view that this is preferable to safe zones or humanitarian corridors. They wouldn’t make much difference at this point because the opposition already control wide swaths of territory. But of course a no-fly zone over all of Syria would need to be strategically as well as tactically good in order to convince a president.
Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane of the New York Times summed up the argument against any Western military intervention this way:
American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.
The risk is not only greater Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, but also losing Russia’s cooperation on Afghanistan and on trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. These are serious risks involving important American interests.
But Iran and Russia are already heavily involved in Syria, and it is also an important American interest to prevent the war in Syria from “grinding on,” as Andrew Tabler puts it. That would increase the likelihood of Al Qaeda and other jihadi involvement. It will also increase the risk to Syria’s neighbors. Lebanon and Jordan are already in difficulty, the former from sectarian fighting provoked in part by the Syrian conflict and the latter from the burden of tens of thousands of refugees. Iraq could also be threatened. Kurdish extremists are increasing operations in Turkey, presumably egged on by the Syrian regime, but the Turks can counter that effort both diplomatically (by getting the Iraqi Kurds to restrain their Syrian brethren) and militarily.
A no-fly zone could significantly shorten the conflict in Syria, but of course a great deal depends on how it is authorized and who engages in it. There seems no possibility of UN Security Council authorization. Moscow won’t allow it. The Arab League would need to ask for it. That seems within the realm of possibility. The Americans would have to undertake the major military operation needed to defeat Syria’s Russian air defense system, giving the Iranians a pretty good picture of how we would go about a similar attack on them. A continuing effort to patrol the skies and strike occasionally afterwards might rely on Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The alternative, or possibly a supplement, to a no-fly zone is to supply the Syrian revolutionaries with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs). The risk is that these would fall into the wrong hands, as they did in Afghanistan and Libya. Few however have been used effectively against Western targets. I imagine that our geniuses have managed to create MANPADs that don’t last long and are therefore useless after a few months, but I don’t actually know it (and Al Qaeda might be able to defeat any technological wizardry).
I don’t think a no-fly zone or giving the revolutionaries anti-aircraft capability is an easy call. But refusing to somehow redress the imbalance that Bashar’s air force is exploiting to kill civilians also has consequences. President Obama appears to have already made his decision not to intervene (I am less sure that we aren’t giving the revolutionaries some anti-aircraft capability), but the mounting toll, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, means that the issue will have to be revisited.
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Serbia needs to accept Kosovo’s borders
A recent interview I gave to Marko Matic of e-Novine has attracted a good deal of attention in the Balkans. This was a followup to my prior comments on a proposal for Serbia to accept Kosovo’s independence but not recognize its sovereignty. As I’ve seen inaccurate reproductions of what I said, and the headline in the e-Novine piece may have misled some, for the record I am reproducing below the text , as transmitted to Marko:
MM: Although you have expressed doubt that Belgrade’s readiness to accept Kosovo’s independence, but not sovereignty, could give satisfactory results in the normalization of relations, what do you think about idea that this formula, perhaps as a temporary solution, could trepresented a significant step forward of official Belgrade towards the gradual full acceptance of Kosovo statehood?
DPS: Any step Belgrade takes towards acknowledging Kosovo statehood is a step in the right direction. That the Albanians of Kosovo are independent and will not in the future be governed from Belgrade is something everyone understands. Acknowledging that publicly would be a useful step, even if it is not adequate for resolving issues like the north of Kosovo.
MM: Could contractual acceptance of the principle peaceful coexistence of different views on the status of Kosovo, allow normalization of wide areas of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, with no formal mutual recognition?
DPS: I don’t think peaceful coexistence can be established on a firm basis if Serbia harbors territorial ambitions in Kosovo. Belgrade needs to accept that Kosovo is a single political entity within well-recognized borders. Normalization can only happen if this territorial aspect–an essential part of sovereignty–is recognized.
MM: As one of the good ideas of the plan, in your commentary you’ve mentioned the proposal on the implementation mechanism of the parallel status in regulating of minorities issues. What would be the advantages of this model compared to previous proposals for the Kosovo division and the distinction between Serbs and Albanians, and whether it could resolve the tensions that exist over the issue of the position of minorities?
DPS: I think it is important to understand that whatever Serbs get in a political solution within Kosovo will set a precedent for what Albanians want inside Serbia. Otherwise, Belgrade insists on maximum proposals without any restraint. You could argue of course that Serbs in north Kosovo want what Albanians got: an independent state. But no one is going to recognize a north Kosovo independent state, and absorption of north Kosovo into Serbia proper will end Belgrade’s hopes for EU membership.
MM: You are welcomed and the proposal for opening offices for cooperation. Why are they important, which would be their role, and if their work could contribute to the improvement and normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina in the future?
DPS: I would never want to negotiate with a partner in whose capital I am not represented, because I need to understand the internal political dynamics there and because I need to be able to voice my own views directly. Moreover, there are legitimate services that such offices can provide: providing information, services and documents to dual citizens and helping to implement agreements reached.
MM: In recent months, there is an announcement about the raising of the existing dialogue on the political level. What could be the topics of the new format of dialogue if it is clear that there are diametrically opposing views on the status of Kosovo that Belgrade and Pristina represent?
DPS: The main topic for political dialogue is how Belgrade intends to bring northern Kosovo into compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1244, which the official presence of the government of Serbia there violates every day. Beyond that, I envision a discussion of how the Ahtisaari plan will be implemented in the north, including any additional agreements needed for implementation. Once that is concluded, it is hard for me to picture obstacles to Serbian acceptance of Kosovo as a member of the United Nations, though formal diplomatic recognition may take more time.
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Anything but
President Obama yesterday told the world–and Bashar al Asad–all too clearly what he plans to do about Syria: nothing, so long as Asad makes no move to use his chemical weapons. “At this point the likelihood of a soft landing seems pretty distant,” he said.
The contrast with the Barack Obama of May 2011 is stark:
The President still wants all those nice things: democratic transition, an end to shooting demonstrators, peaceful demonstrations, access for human rights monitors. But he signaled yesterday what most of us have already concluded from a year of inaction: he isn’t going to use American military power to get it done.
Why not? Russian opposition is one reason. He isn’t prepared to buck Moscow when he needs Russian support both for the northern supply network into Afghanistan (which may also be necessary for American withdrawal) and for the nuclear talks with Iran. President Putin is hard over about Syria. The smart money says that is more about domestic policy than international affairs.
Arab hesitation is another. The Arab League is not asking for military intervention, as it did in Libya. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are preferring to arm the Syrian opposition.
They likely know all too well that Europe, which in the end carried much of the military burden in Libya, is unwilling to repeat the experiment. Euro problems and the consequent financial burdens are weighing too heavily as the European Union heads into its double-dip recession.
The Administration is vaunting its cooperation with Turkey against Asad. Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones is headed for Ankara to intensify the effort, though precisely what that means is unclear to me. The Turks, while providing safe haven for both refugees and the Free Syrian Army, have hesitated to intervene militarily. Some say the Americans have held them back, but I suspect they hesitate also because Asad can respond by encouraging Kurdish guerillas to attack inside Turkey.
Some in the Administration also think we are already doing a good job of bleeding Iran, which is more and more engaged on the ground in Syria. We can keep our powder dry for possible military action against Iran’s nuclear program but at the same time cost them a bundle in money and men fighting an insurgency in Syria. That may well be cost effective.
This approach leaves poor Syria out in the cold. The death toll is approaching 200 per day.* The regime has retaken Damascus but has not entirely succeeded in Aleppo. Large swaths of the country are out of Asad’s control but still far from peaceful. Someone at the UN has a keen sense of irony: the Secretary General’s report on “responsibility to protect” issued yesterday is entitled “timely and decisive response.” The response in Syria so far is anything but.
I have not favored in the past military action. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would become target-rich environments. Large military operations would be needed to enforce them. They are bad ideas.
But Asad’s increasing use of aircraft (helicopters as well as fixed wing) merits some kind of international response. If it is too dangerous to give the opposition the shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) it wants, the President needs to consider a no-fly zone over all of Syria. Unless Asad responds by immediately grounding his air force, that would also require a major military operation to suppress the air defense system.
*PS, August 22: out of date already. The opposition reports 250 killed yesterday.
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