Month: August 2012
Why Bosnia can’t be divided
Some of my Twitter colleagues (antagonists?) are interested in my answering this question:
#Serbia can join the#EU without#Kosovo, so why can’t#RepublikaSrpska join without the Federation? Double standard?
The answer to this one is easy: The EU only accepts for membership sovereign states. Serbia can join the EU without Kosovo because Serbia is a sovereign state. I have no doubt that many of the EU’s 28 members (the 27 current ones plus Croatia, which will join next year) will insist that Serbia be clear about where its sovereign borders lie. Germany appears to be insisting on that before the EU gives Serbia a date for negotiations to begin. None of Kosovo (not even the Serb-controlled north) will enter the EU with Serbia.
Republika Srpska (RS) is not sovereign and will not be. But that begs the question, why can’t the RS be sovereign? So this is a better formulation of the question:
Speaking of reintegration/independence…why can’t the Republika Srpska divide from B-H & stand alone—or rejoin
#Serbia?
I have addressed this question on peacefare.net many times, but I suppose there is no harm in revisiting it. After all, you can skip this post if you feel I’m repeating myself.
My colleague here at SAIS, Michael Haltzel, offers a moral argument: Republika Srpska, which occupies the 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the product of an ethnic cleansing campaign conducted during the Bosnian war (1992-95). Few non-Serbs have been able to return. He argues that the international community will not and should not recognize as sovereign a political entity whose origin lies in war crimes and gross human rights violations.
This is not what I argue, even if I agree with Mike on the merits of the case. After all, Kosovo Albanians chased Serbs from the area south of the Ibar river and relatively few of them have returned. Yet the United States and 90 or so other countries have recognized Kosovo as sovereign. There are many differences of both degree and principle between the two cases, but I don’t expect my Twitter colleagues to appreciate them.
I incline towards the realist arguments. RS independence would inevitably lead to a three-way division of Bosnia. The Croat-dominated southern portions would also secede from Bosnia, leaving what my State Department colleagues and I during the Bosnian war called “a nonviable rump Islamic state that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism.” We imagined the terrorism would be aimed at Europe, not the U.S., but the prospect was still to be avoided. It is even less appetizing today than it was in 1995.
In fact, the prospect is worse than our quoted phrase portrayed. While some may imagine that the inter-entity boundary line drawn at Dayton divides the RS from any future Islamic state in central Bosnia, there is no comparable line defining the Croat state. Nor is there any reason why the Bosniaks (that’s the non-religious term many Bosnian Muslims prefer) should accept the inter-entity boundary line as defining the limits of their state, especially as the eastern portion of RS before the 1990s was largely Bosniak, not Serb, majority. In short: an RS claim of independence would reignite the Bosnian war, as each of the ethnic groups seeks to lay claim to territory it regards as its own.
In the meanwhile, no one in the international community would be interested in recognizing RS independence. Even Serbia would refrain, because of the implications not only for EU membership but also because there is nothing attractive to Serbia about having a nonviable rump Islamic state on its border. Croatia’s President Tudjman understood how unattractive that prospect was, which is why he shifted from supporting Croat secession from Bosnia to support of the Croat-Muslim Federation. Slobodan Milosevic did not understand this, but many in Belgrade today do. They also understand that RS secession would cause unrest in Sandjak and trouble in Kosovo as well.
In short, division of Bosnia would cause a whole lot more trouble than Serbia, Croatia, the EU, the United States and most of the rest of the world think wise. That’s a good enough reason for me to think it should remain a single state, albeit one in which there is a large measure of self-governance not only in Republika Srspka but also in the Federation. But that is a different subject.
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This week’s peace picks
Another quiet week in DC as the summer nears its end
1. U.S. Drones Policy: Strategic Frameworks and Measuring Effects, American Security Project, Monday August 20, 12:00pm-1:30 pm
Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 710w, Washington, DC
Join us for a fact-based discussion with leading experts on counterterrorism about how we can better understand the effects and effectiveness of America’s drone campaign.
Are drones effective at containing al-Qaeda? Can we measure the social and political effects of a drone campaign? Is there a way to empirically determine what effects lethal drone strikes have on a country, on a terrorist movement, and on the broader global war on terrorism?
Speakers:
Aaron Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow at The Washington Institute and the editor of Jihadology.net.
Will McCants is a research analyst at CNA, adjunct faculty at the John’s Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the editor of Jihadica.com.
Christine Fair is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is a renowned expert on South Asia and Islamist groups.
Moderated by:
Joshua Foust
Fellow for Asymmetric Operations at ASP who researches the strategic uses of drones, terrorism, insurgencies, and national security strategy – focused on Central and South Asia. He is also a columnist for PBS and The Atlantic Monthly.
This discussion will be on the record
The discussion will begin promptly at 12:30 p.m. Please arrive by 12:15 p.m. for registration.
2. Three Elections that Might Change the World, Center for National Policy, Tuesday August 21, 12:00pm-1:00pm
Venue: Russel Senate Office Building, Room SR-485, Washington, DC 20510
In 2012, elections in the United States and Taiwan, along with the leadership transition in the PRC will all take place in less than a year’s time. What are the prospects for continuity and change in the complex triangle that is the US-PRC-Taiwan relationship?
Featuring:
Richard Bush
Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution
Wei (Victoria) Hongxia
Visiting Scholar
Carnegie Endowment’s Asia Program
Anil Mammen
Fellow for American Government and Politics
Center for National Policy
*A light lunch will be served*
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An odd place to start
Milan Marinković continues his discussion of the first phase of the new Serbian government:
“If the reports I am getting from the intelligence services are true, then I can immediately leave all of them to the opposition,” said Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić soon after assuming office at the end of May. Nikolić was expressing in an ironic way his distrust of security and intelligence agency directors appointed by his predecessor Boris Tadić. The irony was aimed in particular at Saša Vukadinović, the director of the state security agency (BIA), and signaled that he would soon be replaced.
Vukadinović by all accounts was loyal to Tadić. His dismissal took place once the new government, headed by Ivica Dačić, took office.
The new BIA chief is Nebojša Rodić. Rodić previously acted for a short time as one of President Nikolić’s advisers. The pattern continues: as Saša Vukadinović was Tadić’s man, so is Nebojša Rodić Nikolić’s man.
Rodić’s appointment immediately became a matter of controversy. Media close to Tadić’s Democratic Party (DS) claimed that in 1990s Rodić was the secretary of an election commission accused of electoral theft on behalf of then-president Slobodan Milošević. Nikolić’s Progressive Party (SNS) denied the allegation, admitting that Rodić was the secretary of an election commission in 1990s, but not of that one.
Concerns also arose over Rodić’s inexperience. Rodić had never before worked at any security or intelligence agency, but a former BIA deputy director, Zoran Mijatović, said that should not be problematic provided that Rodić’s deputy is an experienced official. That requirement has been satisfied. The man appointed as Rodić’s deputy, Dragan Marković, has two decades of experience working at both the state security agency and the interior ministry.
Prime Minister Ivica Dačić also distrusted former BIA director Saša Vukadinović. While on the surface Dačić seemed to have forged great political cooperation with his former coalition partner Tadić and his DS, the always sensitive battle for control over the security sector was fought out behind the scenes. The lack of mutual confidence came to the fore in the midst of the last election campaign, when hooligans who set the U.S. embassy ablaze during protests against Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 were finally arrested. According to Dačić, the police raid was planned and carried out without his knowledge, which he said was unacceptable given that he was the interior minister. BIA was rumored to have played a notable part in the preparation of the action.
Even though BIA, whose main responsibility is counterintelligence, belongs to the largely unreformed Serbian security sector, compared to other departments the agency has so far demonstrated significant professionalism. Vukadinović’s loyalty to Tadić aside, under his command BIA played a major role in significant achievements, such as the relatively successful international police action executed in cooperation with the American Drug Enforcement Agency and several other foreign agencies against a powerful drug cartel. This action set the stage for a more dedicated, albeit selective, campaign against domestic organized crime.
Likewise, BIA’s contribution to the arrests of the last three Hague Tribunal fugitives – Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić and Goran Hadžić – was indispensable. Karadžić was captured only a day after Vukadinović’s appointment. Although officials of Serbian intelligence and security services are suspected of helping war criminals hide out, such accusations – especially in the case of Mladić – pertain much more to the military and its agencies than to BIA.
Serbian ombudsman Saša Janković has recently praised BIA for its constructive and professional conduct. While the other security sector departments have been obstructing Janković’s oversight activities, BIA has proved highly cooperative and law-abiding. This is particularly noteworthy since BIA evolved directly from Milošević’s notorious secret service, which served as a mainstay of his dictatorship.
Despite these positive steps, BIA still operates with too little transparency to be considered a truly democratic institution and for the most part remains resistant to civilian control due to the still strong influence of its recalcitrant old guard. In the military’s security and intelligence agencies remnants of the Milošević regime can be seen even more readily. Unlike Mr. Vukadinović, none of their directors, who were also appointed by Tadić, have been removed from office thus far.
If Nikolić and Dačić intend seriously to reform the security sector, they have picked an odd place to start.
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Eid mubarak!
Today and tomorrow mark the end of the month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast during the day. Tonight and tomorrow night they feast.
It has been a truly terrible Ramadan in Syria, where Kofi Annan’s peace plan has died (along with thousands of additional Syrians) and the Asad regime has intensified military action, especially in Aleppo. Prospects are not good: Asad refuses to step aside and the opposition refuses to negotiate with him. We are not yet at Bill Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate,” when both sides see no gain in continuing to fight and decide instead to talk.
Egypt has taken another unexpected turn, with elected President Morsy taking over by decree the executive and legislative powers that the military had previously reserved for itself. He did it with savoir faire: previous military leaders were retired with medals and new ones chosen from just below them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsy hails, and the military have reached a mutual accommodation, leaving Egypt’s secular revolutionaries out in the cold, which isn’t very refreshing in Egypt at this time of year.
In Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the revolutions are looking a lot better. Libya‘s General National Congress, elected July 7, convened on schedule and chose as President Magarief, who promises to be a unifying figure. Tunisia is struggling to produce a constitution, with final approval delayed at least to April 2013 rather than October 2012. Yemen has made a start with military reform and is now embarking on preparations for its national dialogue, to be held in November and followed by constitution-writing.
Elsewhere counter-revolution is winning. Bahrain has sentenced human rights activist Nabeel Rajab to three years in prison. I wonder if he would have attracted more attention if his name were Pussy Riot. Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have stifled any serious reform moves. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki has weathered political challenges and continues to accumulate power even as frictions between Baghdad and Kurdistan grow.
It looks as if the Arab awakening will continue mainly in North Africa, where it began in early 2011. While Libya has ample oil and gas resources, none of the other countries in which revolutions have come to fruition does. Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all have serious economic challenges ahead. Syria will be an economic basket case the day after Asad is gone. If we want anything like democracy to prevail in these places, there is going to be a substantial bill to pay.
Marc Lynch has called this a cruel summer. It has certainly been that and worse in Syria. But those of us who have experience with transitions, especially in post-conflict environments, set the bar low. There has been progress elsewhere, even if halting and slower than hoped.
The big open questions are these: is Egypt getting back on track, or are we seeing a new, Islamist autocracy in the making? Can Saudi Arabia manage the succession to next-generation leadership without upheaval? Can the regional war that has begun in Syria be ended before it engulfs several other countries? Can Iran‘s nuclear ambitions be ended at the negotiating table, or will Israel or the United States attack?
No answers are needed today. It suffices to salute those who observe Ramadan with “Eid mubarak!”
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Wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds
Yesterday’s Security Council decision to end the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is one of those inevitable moves that makes me wonder how the international system, such as it is, manages to survive. We had several hundred trained observers in Syria in close contact with officials of the Asad regime and at least some of the opposition activists. They played a critical role in reporting what was going on in Syria for several months and in assigning responsibility for events like the Houla massacre. We know we are going to need that kind of knowledge of the local terrain whenever a transition away from the Asad regime begins. What do we do? We withdraw the observers.
Fortunately the UN is wise enough to leave a couple of dozen international officials behind in Damascus. Their immediate concerns will be coordination of humanitarian assistance and support for the newly named UN/Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. But they will also be the vital brain trust of any future UN transition mission. My compliments to friend and colleague Edmond Mulet, who heads of UN peacekeeping, for maintaining at least a seed of something that can grow if and when circumstances permit.
While it is amply clear that the Annan plan failed, largely because the opposition was unwilling to negotiate with the regime so long as Bashar al Asad remains in place and Asad was unwilling to step aside, it is not clear if the savvy Brahimi has better prospects. He has rightly spent the last week or so trying to ensure stronger and more unified Security Council support for his mission, but he does not seem to have succeeded yet. The Americans have decided to go around the UN to collaborate with Turkey and provide more direct support to the Syrian revolutionaries. The Russians canceled a meeting scheduled for today in New York of the “action group” for Syria. When diplomats cancel meetings, things are not going well.
I won’t be surprised if withdrawal of the observers precipitates intensification of the fighting in Syria. With less likelihood of being observed internationally, both sides will try to gain advantage. The sectarian dimension of the fighting will deepen. The Iranians are playing a more and more critical role in supporting the regime, with the opposition reporting not only Iranian boots on the ground but also direct engagement in fighting. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will be upping their ante in the form of weapons for the opposition, which is begging for shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) to counter Asad’s increased use of aircraft.
None of this is good news. While conventional wisdom holds that Asad cannot last, when and how he goes will be important. Continuation of the violence for even a month or two more risks serious regional destabilization, which is the worst outcome for the United States. It is not uncommon these days for people to question whether the territorial division in the Levant, rooted in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, can last. If the state structure of the region starts to implode, the consequences could be a good deal more chaotic, and geographically more widespread, than what happened during Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006-7.
I am wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds.
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There is good news and bad news
The good news is that Iraq has lots of oil. The bad news is that Iraq has lots of oil. That was the main message out of today’s Middle East Institute discussion of “Iraq and the Politics of Oil,” moderated by Allen Keiswetter (who amiably noted that he served in the U.S. Interest Section in Baghdad when Saddam Hussein was the vice chairman of the Ba’ath party).
Iraqi embassy commercial counselor Naufel al-Hassan opened emphasizing the positive: the main focus of American interest in Iraq is no longer military but economic. Oil production, which supplies 95% of the government’s revenue and employs 100,000 Iraqis, is up to 2.7 million barrels per day. Reserves are the third largest in the world, production costs are very low, Iraqi refining capacity is increasing (from 340 million barrels per day to 567 now) and there is lots of natural gas that is not yet exploited. Iraq needs and wants increased international company investment and technology, which will require a hydrocarbon law that is already eight years in the making.
PFC Energy’s Raad al-Kadiri took a less optimistic view. Oil is, as a Venezuelan oil minister once put it, “the devil’s excrement.” One can even hypothesize that whenever Iraqi oil production hits 3 million barrels per day it means war, previously with neighbors but now perhaps internally. Iraq is politically more polarized now than at any time since 2003. The state is fragile.
This is raising difficult questions about federalism, with the Kurds wanting a confederal arrangement with Baghdad and the Sunnis now opting for regionalism out of frustration. National reconciliation has not been achieved. The government is dysfunctional, undermining investor confidence. Chaos in Syria also makes international investors nervous. Iraq has the potential to produce 3-6 million barrels per day within a few years, but doing so seems more likely to exacerbate political tensions than resolve them.
Denise Natali, the Minerva Chair at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies focused on Baghdad/Erbil relations, which have deteriorated even as Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) relations with Turkey have improved. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and KRG President Barzani differ on Syria. Iraqi Arab nationalism and resentment of the Kurds is on the increase as Maliki seeks a rapprochement with his Sunni Arab opponents. Nevertheless, no sustained armed conflict within Iraq is likely. Baghdad and Erbil are likely to muddle through with temporary fixes and without passing an oil law.
The State Department’s senior advisor on Iraq Brett McGurk emphasized lessons learned from his experience in Iraq, especially on oil:
- There is no substitute for sustained engagement.
- We have to have relationships with all the stakeholders.
- There is a real need for “prenegotiation,” that is informal negotiation before formal talks.
- Patience is vital.
U.S. troop withdrawal (first from cities, then two years later from all of Iraq) made it easier to settle oil issues, not harder, because it removed an irritant that aroused Iraqi suspicions. The failure of the 2009 bid round set the stage for a much more positive Iraqi popular and government attitude toward the international oil companies, which needed greater incentives to come into Iraq. U.S. priorities now include helping to mend Baghdad/Erbil relations, helping with energy production and export, facilitating regional reconciliation (especially between Baghdad and Ankara) and promoting transparency and accountability in the oil sector and government operations.
Asking the first question, I got on my hobby horse and wondered whether we would do well to focus on the direction in which oil is exported if we are concerned about Iraq’s political orientation. Most of its oil is currently exported through the Gulf and Hormuz. It would be far better to tie Iraq more closely to the West by exports to the north and west.
This elicited, to my surprise, unanimous sounds of agreement from the panel. I had thought they might tell me this was a pipe dream, given the parlous relations between Erbil and Baghdad. Instead they agreed this was a key issue. Even using existing pipelines, some of which need refurbishment, Iraq could export more than 600,000 barrels per day without going through the Gulf. There are real possibilities for increasing this amount markedly, but the Iraqis are hesitating.
The other big issue in the Q and A was Kurdistan independence. The panel differed, with Raad al-Kadiri indicating that he thinks the Kurds want it (though they have so far been willing to accept a confederal relationship with a weak government in Baghdad) and might do it if they could export their own oil without Baghdad approval. But a lot still depends on Ankara’s attitude, which is vigorously opposed, as a Turkish embassy representative made clear. But the regional trend, especially considering what is going on in Syria, is downward, and the whole Middle East framework may be coming apart. Acquiescence by Iraqis to the current political arrangements should not be mistaken for (permanent) acceptance.
Denise Natali thought independence was simply not in the cards and that the status quo won’t change much for the foreseeable future. Naufel Al-Hassan hoped that the oil issues, and consequently tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, would be resolved soon. Brett McGurk was not making any predictions.
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